L-5

Sandhān

Journal of Centre for Studies in Civilizations

Editor
D.P. Chattopadhyaya

Volume IX
Number 2
July-December
2009



CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN CIVILIZATIONS
NEW DELHI

The Journal of Centre for Studies in Civilizations, Sandhān, is a biannual journal. It accepts and publishes original articles from scholars and intellectuals in areas of interdisciplinary studies and civilizational dialogues.

Each regular issue will contain full-length articles, information about CSC symposia, comments, discussions, book reviews, and news and notes on various academic activities of the Centre.

Sandhān is published in January and July every year.

ISSN 0972-3609

© Centre for Studies in Civilizations

The views expressed in the CSC publications are entirely of the concerned author/authors and do not represent the views of the Centre for Studies in Civilizations.

Annual Subscriptions:

	Inland	Foreign		
Institutions	Rs. 500	US $ 50	(£33)	(surface mail)
Individuals	Rs. 250	US $ 30	(£20)	(surface mail)
Students & retired teachers	Rs. 150	US $ 20	(£13)	(surface mail)
Life Membership: Individual	Rs. 2500	US $ 350	(£225)	(surface mail)
Institutions (Indian)	Rs. 5000			
Price for single issue	Rs. 150	US $ 20	(£13)	(surface mail)

For subscription and all other business enquiries please contact:

CENTRE FOR STUDIES IN CIVILIZATIONS
DD-24, (Near Nehru Enclave), Kalkaji
New Delhi-110 019 India
Phone: 91-11-2622 7832, 2622 7836 Telefax: 91-11-2622 7831
E-mail: csc@del2.vsnl.net.in, dpc@cal.vsnl.net.in

Published by Member Secretary, Centre for Studies in Civilizations. Typeset by Digigrafics, New Delhi 110049 and printed at Mahalaxmi Printers, New Delhi.

Sandhān

Journal of Centre for Studies in Civilizations

Volume IX
Number 2
July–December
2009

Journal of Centre for Studies in Civilizations

Editor: D.P. Chattopadhyaya

Editorial Advisory Board

Yash Pal
Chancellor, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi and
Former Chairman
University Grants Commission,
New Delhi

Yogendra Singh
Professor Emeritus
Centre for the Study of Social
Systems, Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi

V.R. Mehta
Member Secretary of Foundation for
Academic Excellence and Access
(FAEA) and Former Vice-Chancellor
Delhi University, Delhi

Rashpal Malhotra
Founder & Executive Vice-President,
Centre for Research in Rural and
Industrial Development (CRRID),
Chandigarh

Ram Prakash
Member of Parliament
(Rajya Sabha) and
Former Professor of Chemistry
Panjab University,
Chandigarh

T.N. Chaturvedi, I.A.S.
Former Comptroller and
Auditor General of India and
former Governor of Karnataka,
New Delhi

Ioanna Kucuradi
Former President
Federation Internationale des
Societies de Philosophie,
Turkey

Evandro Agazzi
President
International Society for
Philosophy of Science,
Italy

Executive Editor: Bhuvan Chandel

Associate Editor: A.K. Anand

From the Editorial Desk

The Centre for Studies in Civilizations brings out the issues of *Sandhan* – an interdisciplinary journal that takes into account the larger civilizational discourse with which the Project of History of Indian Science, Philosophy and Culture (PHISPC) is concerned. *Sandhan* has been in the forefront of the civilizational dialogue in India right from its inaugural issue. The present volume continues with the same spirit in projecting the conceptual issues pertaining to the domain of the philosophy, history, culture, science and social sciences from the civilizational perspective.

As always, we are grateful to all subscribers of *Sandhan* who continue to encourage us in our endeavours. We are in the process of publishing the delayed issues of this journal during this calendar year.

D.P. CHATTOPADHYAYA
Editor

Contents

I. ARTICLES

Repositioning Interpretative Social Science after Postmodernism: Understanding, Interpretation and Self 1
KOSHY THARAKAN

Self, Subjectivity and Social Science 21
CHHANDA GUPTA

The Relationship between Science and Ideology in the Philosophy of the Social Science 41
ISHWAR SINGH

Karl Marx's Scientific Discovery 53
MURZBAN JAL

Identity and Antagonism: Some Tensions in Post-Marxist Theorizing 83
T.V. MADHU

Hermeneutics as an Epistemic Tool to Achieve 'Truth' 93
A. V. AFONSO

A Plea for the Cultural Foundations of the Moral 105
BHAGAT OINAM

On Ascribing Morals to Animals: A Study in Evolutionary Ethics 121
THEOPHILA DOMINICA DE SOUZA

Justification as Social Practice 137
SREEJITH. K.K.

Understanding Intersubjectivity 151
MANIDIPA SEN

In Defense of Metaphysics 169
K. SRINIVAS 169

Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology: A Prospective but Temperate View 183
JAISON A. MANJALY AND SUMITAVA MUKHERJEE

II. BOOK REVIEW

Literature and Globalization: A Reader (Liam Connell and Nicky Marsh, ed.) 199
K SRIPAD BHAT

The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity—Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China (Tu Weiming) 203
TUKTUK GHOSH

ARTICLES

Koshy Tharakan

Repositioning Interpretative Social Science after Postmodernism: Understanding, Interpretation and Self

INTRODUCTION

Interpretative social sciences or better, 'Human Sciences' gained prominence as an antidote to the positivistic characterization of social sciences. Positivism conceives society as a 'thing'—an object that confronts the subject. It treats the phenomena it undertakes to investigate as 'objective' to discover the causal relations between them. Thus, by establishing causal relations among facts, it relegates the role of the subject. Interpretative social science, on the other hand, investigates how 'facts' are constituted as meaningful phenomena and hence how social experience is possible in the first place. In his work, *Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Dilthey observes that the science of society broke the bondage of metaphysics only to subjugate itself to a new bondage imposed by the natural sciences. While appreciating the spirit behind the early positivist thought of Comte, Mill and Spencer in developing an objective science of society, Dilthey criticized them for supposing that the method of social sciences is essentially the same as that of the natural sciences. According to Dilthey, the world of natural sciences is a meaningless given, while the human world, which is the theme of social sciences, is inherently meaningful. Society is a construct guided by human ideas, values and purposes. Thus, there is a distinction between the sciences of nature (*Naturwissenschaften*) and the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*). The difference in the objects of the two sciences constitutes a difference in their methods too. While the natural sciences aim to explain the natural phenomena in terms of causal laws by focusing on the external relations, the human sciences seek to understand human phenomena in terms of the meaningful acts of the participants by focusing on the internal relations.

With the advent of Postmodernism, there is a widespread disbelief in the philosophy of the subject. The 'Cogito' that propelled the Modernist conceptions of truth and certainty seems to be no more available with the demise of the subject/author. This then poses a challenge to interpretative social sciences as with the 'death of the author', the career of interpretative social sciences needs to be refashioned. The paper attempts to portray the trajectory of interpretative social sciences beginning with the methodical interpretation of Dilthey, passing through the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, reaches Ricoeur's hermeneutics. In doing so, we claim that the postmodern challenge to interpretative social sciences, is preempted in the course of development of hermeneutics.

1. AUTHORIAL INTENTIONS: CENTRALITY OF AGENCY

Dilthey in order to lay the foundations of human sciences conceived social institutions and cultural forms interpretable as 'expressions', or 'objectifications' of mind. The products of mind, whether institutions or literary works, are 'texts' which have to be read and interpreted in order to understand them. The method of interpretation or understanding is what hermeneutics emphasizes. For Dilthey, understanding is a rediscovery of 'myself' in the other subject and it is possible because both the 'other' and 'me' are particularizations of the same 'Spirit'.[1] The object of our understanding is thus the expression of the spirit. According to him, understanding has always the particular as its object and this particular is the individual self. Thus, one understands objects and events as the expressions of other individuals, as an expression of lived experience.

Dilthey, in formulating the method of human sciences, turns not to some process of coming to know the events of an external world but to 'lived experience'. The world of human sciences as distinct from the natural scientific world is a world constructed by historically and culturally located individuals in their everyday lives. The commonest understanding that all of us accomplish in our daily lives is empathy, that is, 'putting oneself in somebody else's place.' This points to our essential community life, as it is the community that enables the individual to put him or her in the place of another. There are higher forms of understanding like're-creation' (*Nachbilden*) and're-living' (*Nacherleben*). The totality of the spiritual life is grasped in these activities of understanding. The transference of the subject's own self into a given complex of expressions, the projection of the self into a person or work, that is empathy, is the basis of these higher forms of understanding. According to Dilthey, a perfect sharing of life is possible if our understanding moves along the actual sequence of events. Thus, understanding grows with the life-process itself. Reliving (*Nacherleben*) means creating along the line of events. It happens when "...we go forward with history, with an event in a far land or with something that is going on in the soul of a human being close to us. It reaches its fulfillment where the event has passed through the consciousness of the poet, the artist, or the historian, and now lies before us fixed and enduring in his work."[2] Thus, a literary work helps us to relive the connected lived experience by unfolding the line of events depicted in it. In higher forms of understanding, unlike the elementary understanding, we do not follow the directions and intentions of our own life, rather "...the 'interpreter' takes some time in which he is not immediately involved in elementary understanding but thematizes his/her own or other's life in its connectedness."[3] However, there is a connection between reliving and empathy, as empathy heightens our reliving. Dilthey argues that this is not to give a psychological explanation of the process of reliving; rather, we are interested in it only from the point of view of its function. Even though, the inherent possibilities of the life-process of every one are determined, understanding opens up a wide realm of possibilities before her. Re-creation or understanding by skilled reproduction (*Nachbilden*) attains a degree of perfection through inner affinity and sympathy. It is exemplified in scientific exegesis or interpretation and always has an element of ingenuity with it.[4] According to Dilthey, this inner relationship, which makes the projection possible, is the presupposition of all hermeneutic rules. Understanding cannot be conceived exclusively in rational terms, leaving behind the subjective projection. Thus, he makes a distinction between the method of natural sciences and that of human sciences; one that is based on the attitude of mind, in an inner perception, in lived experience that is immediately given to us. The neo-Kantian philosophers of South-West German School, namely Rickert and Lask, Dilthey and Weber, were all concerned with the distinctiveness of social scientific inquiry as consisting in the subjective reference it makes against the objective reference of the natural sciences. This subjective reference makes interpretative social sciences to adopt the 'intentional stance'.

The intentional stance derives from the belief that the purpose of social scientific explanation is to recapture the 'motives' or 'purposes' of the agents, as it is these subjective characteristics that make action meaningful. In other words, according to the intentionalists, action is not merely bodily movement, but has something over and above the manifested behavior, especially the accompanying mental processes that bestow meaning on it. For them, the mental processes are "...not merely an epiphenomenon and, hence, irrelevant to the nature of the action, but is precisely that which bestows upon action its nature as action; moreover it gives each particular action its individual essence."[5] Thus, the intentionalists seek to understand social reality by explaining it in terms of intentions and motives of the actors.

Many philosophers of social sciences insist that social enquiry should uphold the same interpretations the agents themselves adopt. This conception derives its rationale from the doctrine of social construction of social reality, a form of voluntarism. It construes social fact as a product of the agent's conceptions and meanings.[6] Thus, Alfred Schutz argues that each and every "...term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life."[7] For Schutz, the explanation of social action must be carried out in terms of the everyday interpretations provided by the agents themselves. The intentionalist stance gives rise to the metaphor of 'inside' or 'inner' description, contrasted to the external description, as relevant for understanding action. This commitment to the inner side of action often becomes problematic as many philosophers argue against the possibility of recapturing such subjective characteristics of the agents. That is, even if these motives and intentions are to be understood not as some mysterious 'inner' springs of action,[8] but as objective meanings, the critics of subjective interpretation point out that there is no such 'fact of the matter'. However, the proponents of the subjective interpretation of actions believe that intentional or subjective set of beliefs determines the meaning of action and accordingly it construes the goal of social scientific investigation as it recaptures what the agents "have in mind".

Dilthey's project of explicating the notion of 'understanding' in the human sciences is the result of his firm belief in the distinction between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*. The distinction between the two sciences calls for a special methodology for studying the human sciences. As Dilthey says, the object of natural sciences, namely 'nature' needs 'explanation' while that of the human sciences, namely 'mental life' needs 'understanding'. Thus, in the study of human action, Dilthey brings in the triad of 'experience', 'expression', and 'understanding'. By experience, he refers to the indissoluble unity of thought, desire and will. Thus, the empiricist's separation of conative and cognitive aspects of human action stands negated in Dilthey's concept of experience. In other words, 'experience' for Dilthey is man's subjectivity, which is realized in his lived existence. 'Expression' refers to the exteriorization of experience. That is to say, experience never remains merely subjective. It is expressed in actions and the permanent traces that action leaves behind by way of artifacts, institutions etc. Thus, through 'expression', 'experience' is crystallized. It is 'understanding' which, at a later point, retrieves the experience from these expressions. Dilthey uses terms such as 'recreating', 'reexperiencing' and 'empathizing' to characterize understanding. Thus, for Dilthey, understanding is to be seen as replicating the experience the agent had when s/he performed the act. This, however, does not mean that Dilthey was reducing understanding to a simple sort of intuitive act, rather it is a discursive process in which the object of understanding is viewed from a larger perspective of comparable actions that has reference to the agents' life-history and the socio-cultural milieu. This is evident from the fact that Dilthey includes grammatical and historical hermeneutics within the purview of methodical hermeneutics. Thus, even when Dilthey endorses Schleiermacher's first canon of hermeneutics, which states that a text is to be understood from the viewpoint of a reader of the author's own temporal milieu and environment, he does not thereby introduce some private intuitive act to grasp the same. As Seebohm points out:

> Dilthey has given an interpretation of the first canon which eliminates the suspicion that this canon demands some kind of a mysterious travel through time which has to reach the psychological states of readers in the past or even the author. Grammatical hermeneutics and critique allows us to select, methodically with the aid of comparatistic methods, a group of texts which use approximately the same language.... Historical interpretation allows us to locate texts within this set of texts taking into account the hints given in the texts to historical events in the presence and the past of the text which include other texts to which the text in question refers explicitly or implicitly.[9]

Thus, accordingly to Dilthey, the context of a text is determined methodically and hermeneutical understanding is carried out within this context. Thus, even when Dilthey talks about reliving the agent's intentions or recreating the author's intended meanings, his hermeneutics in contrast to Schleiermacher's, does not require the forging of a psychological unity with the author. Nevertheless, Dilthey shares with Schleiermacher the belief in the availability of a methodical hermeneutics through which one can retrieve the intended meanings.

2. ELUSIVE INTENTIONS: HEIDEGGER AND GADAMER

Against the methodical hermeneutics of Dilthey, Gadamer advances his philosophical hermeneutics. In doing this, he closely follows Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. For Heidegger, understanding is a basic mode of being-in-the-world. According to him, the Aristotelian categories like quantity, quality, space and time are not adequate to study the being of man. Nor any causal explanation of human behaviour as a chain of events in the external world will throw any light on the nature of Man. Dasein, the being-in-the-world, is to be understood by the 'existentialia' that give us access to

Dasein's overtness. These constitutive factors of Dasein's being-in are 'state-of-mind', 'understanding' and 'discourse'. State-of-mind and understanding are equiprimordial and characterized as such by discourse. A state-of-mind (mood) always has its understanding and understanding always has its state-of-mind. Thus, understanding is an existential structure of Dasein. This implies that 'understanding' as an existential is to be distinguished from 'understanding' as cognitive faculty contrasted with explanation. Understanding as a possible cognition is only a derivative of the primordial understanding as existentiale.[10] The primordiality of understanding according to Heidegger consists in its structure of projection. Understanding is the potentiality-for-Being. In addition, because of this 'projection,' Dasein is always 'more' than what it is factually. In other words, "Understanding is Dasein's mode of being as openness, for in understanding it projects itself on the possibilities of its ability-to-be."[11] It is this projective character of understanding that constitutes the peculiar 'sight' (*sicht*), which is always present in Dasein's basic ways of Being. Only because understanding is primarily a kind of seeing that it can display the various modes of sight such as the circumspection of concern and considerateness of solicitude. Thus, by showing all 'sight' as grounded in understanding, which is a fundamental existentiale of Dasein, Heidegger strips "... pure intuition (*Anschauen*) of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology. 'Intuition' and 'thinking' are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological 'intuition of essences' ("*Wesensschau*") is grounded in existential understanding."[12] Now, for Heidegger, interpretation is the working out of possibilities projected in understanding. In this sense, interpretation is not something added on to understanding; rather it is the development of understanding itself. As Heiddegger puts it: "In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. Nor is interpretation the acquiring of information about what is understood; it is rather the working-out of possibilities projected in understanding."[13] In Interpretation, the 'as-structure' of that which is understood is made to stand out explicitly. Therefore, to interpret is to lay bare the 'as-structure'. According to Heidegger, this 'as-structure' of interpretation is grounded in the 'fore-structure' of understanding, which comprises fore-having (*vorhabe*), fore-sight (*vorsicht*) and fore-conception (*vorgriff*). The 'ready-to-hand' is understood always in terms of a totality of involvements. Thus the 'fore-having' is what I have in advance of any interpretation, the totality of involvements by which I relate to an object. This in turn, is always guided by a point of view, a 'fore-sight' with regard to which what is understood is to be interpreted. In other words, the fore-sight 'makes a start' on what we have in advance. But over and above, Dasein has a 'fore-conception', something we grasp in advance. That is, in interpretation the way in which we conceive the entity to be interpreted is decided in advance. All these imply that, as Heidegger says:

> ...interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us. If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal... to what 'stands there,' then one finds that what 'stands there' in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption... of the person who does the interpreting...[the assumptions] presented in our fore-having, our fore-sight, and our fore-conception.[14]

Thus, like Quine, for Heidegger too, there is no 'fact of the matter'. However, 'the non-determinacy' that emanates from Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology is different from Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation. Quine's thesis has to do with the unavailability of meanings that are right or wrong in course of translation from one belief system to another. Dreyfus illustrates this point by the example of trying to capture the intentions of the author to determine what a literary work means. For both Quine and Heidegger it is impossible to determine the meaning of the text by capturing the author's intentions, precisely because what the text means is relative to an interpretation and interpretations do change in accordance with changing background assumptions and practices. Now Dreyfus points out that for Quine, the impossibility of grasping the agent's intention lies in the fact that our evidence for the so-called intentions is only the behaviour of the agent, which is again in need of interpretation. Thus, Quine points out that a theory is always underdetermined by evidence. Heidegger's argument for the non-determinacy of interpretations is different from this. He would rather say, Dreyfus points out:

> ...an artist or a thinker, just like anyone else, cannot be clear about the background practices of his life and his age, not just because there are so many of them that such explication is an infinite task, but because the background is not a set of assumptions or beliefs about which one could even in principle be clear. The artist is thus in no better position than his contemporaries to make explicit the pervasive individual and social self-interpretation his work embodies.[15]

Heidegger refers to this problem as the 'essential unthought in the work'. Thus, for Heidegger, we cannot get at 'the meaning' of a work not because our only evidence for meaning is the behaviour of the subject/author, but because for hermeneutic explication there is no fact or theory explicitly stated, about which we can be right or wrong. Nevertheless, hermeneutical explication has to be fraught with and we can still decide as to whether a particular interpretation is better than another one. Thus, Dreyfus says that Heidegger maintains that "... a better interpretation is one that makes the interpreter more flexible and open to dialogue with other interpretations....[Nevertheless in] the later works he holds that a better interpretation is one which focuses and makes sense of more of what is at issue in a current cultural self-interpretation."[16] This, then, is to say that with regard to interpretation, 'something really is at issue', even though no final answer comes forth 'as to what that something is.'

Gadamer takes the cue from Heidegger and develops 'philosophical hermeneutics' in contrast to Diltheyan 'methodical hermeneutics'. Like Heidegger, Gadamer insists on the ontological primacy of human historicity. Thus, he believes hat hermeneutics is not merely methodological but is the very feature of our existence. Thus, 'understanding' for Gadamer is the hermeneutical dimension of existence, it belongs to the being of that which is understood. Gadamer's hermeneutics presupposes a context or setting, which requires engagement on the part of the individual subjects. The pre-understanding (in Heidegger's words, the 'fore-structure' of understanding) shapes this engagement. This way of conceiving understanding implies that we can never understand a text in itself, independently of our historicity through which we gain access to it. In other words, for Gadamer, interpretation is not a matter of reconstruction but is mediation. In order to understand the past, we mediate the past meaning into our situatedness. That is, our historicity is integral to our understanding. It is historicity, even though it involves presuppositions and prejudices that open the past for us. The metaphor of 'fusion of horizons' captures this aspect of understanding. For him, genuine understanding is a 'fusion of horizons' in which the subject and object of knowing are fused together such that in knowing the other, one knows oneself.[17] It is this element of 'prejudice' in our understanding that marks Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as distinct from traditional hermeneutics. As Outhwaite points out:

> Traditional hermeneutic theory postulates a subject who aims to understand an object (a text, a social practice, or whatever) as it is in itself. This means that the subject must be as open-minded and unprejudiced as possible, approaching the object without preconceptions. For Gadamer, by contrast, preconceptions or prejudices are what make understanding possible in the first place. They are bound up with our awareness of the historical influence or effectivity of the text; and without this awareness we would not understand it.[18]

Thus, Gadamer holds that all our understanding involves situatedness and is essentially interpretative. For him, understanding, interpretation, and application are interrelated. "Just as understanding is always interpretation, similarly understanding also relates to application or praxis. In order to understand the true meaning of a text the interpreter must take into account its *consequences* and *significations*"[19] (emphasis added). Thus, for Gadamer, the effect or consequences of a text (or action or social practice) is significant in the determination of its meaning. This intertwining of meaning and effect of the text has its legacy in Aristotle's conception of 'phronesis' or practical knowledge. Gadamer says:

> In order to work out an orientation which brings together *both* methodological access to our world *and* the conditions of our

social life, it was natural for me to return to preceding philosophical orientations and ultimately to the tradition of the practical and political philosophy of Aristotle.[20]

In 'phronesis' thought and action or intention and consequence are inseparable and it is to this dialectical unity of action and thought that Aristotle refers by his notion of praxis. Gadamer notes:

> *Praxis* is not restricted to the special area of technical craftsmanship. It is a universal form of human life which embraces, yet goes beyond, the technical choice of the best means of a pre-given end. Aristotle's concept of prudence includes, as a matter of fact, the concrete determination of the end. ...Prudence as practical deliberation upon and discovery of concrete decision is both the finding of the means and the concretization of the ends.[21]

Thus, for Gadamer, the idea of application is inherent in hermeneutics. It is not something that succeeds theoretical knowledge; rather theoretical knowledge is co-terminus with practical knowledge as both are co-determined by application, which is intrinsic to hermeneutics. As Bernstein points out, for Gadamer the central thesis of philosophical hermeneutics is the fusion of hermeneutics and praxis.[22] Gadamer elaborates his hermeneutics by the notion of a 'play' that consists of a back and forth movement resulting in understanding. For him dialogue is praxis. In order to explicate the notion of understanding, Gadamer takes the model of 'dialogue.' When we are in a "...dialogue with another person and then is carried along further by the dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person, holding itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative... the law of the subject-matter (*die Sache*) is at issue in the dialogue and elicits statements and counter-statements and in the end plays them into each other."[23] Thus, understanding as play is not the expression of the intentions of the subject but rather is a praxis in which the player is absorbed into understanding. In other words, understanding relieves the subject from the burden of taking the initiative, which goes into the making of actual existence.[24] Here another important dimension of Gadamer's hermeneutics comes to the fore, namely the central place he accords to language in hermeneutic experience. It is the 'linguisticality' of our experience that enables us to participate in a tradition. Language mediates our experience of the world and concretizes the effective historical consciousness. Thus he remarks "...language, not in the sense of *langue,* but in the sense of real exchange and work, manifests itself in the dialogue. In any form of dialogue, we are building up. We are building up a common language, so that at the end of the dialogue we will have some ground."[25] Thus, for Gadamer understanding as permeated by language and manifested in dialogue makes hermeneutic experience identical with human existence.

Unlike the methodical hermeneutics of Dilthey, which bears the imprint of the Romantic ideal of reliving or recreating the experience of the subject, the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer rejects the idea of capturing the authorial meanings or the intentions of the subject as constitutive of understanding. Thus, Gadamer construes the trajectory of hermeneutics as an overcoming of the romantic hermeneutics by the ontological turn it accomplished through Heidegger's phenomenology.

3. BRINGING THE SUBJECT BACK: PAUL RICOEUR

Paul Ricoeur, another prominent hermeneutically oriented thinker, argues that we can never give up Dilthey's perspective altogether as Dilthey elevated hermeneutics from mere textual exegeses to the domain of human sciences. The epistemological paradigm of Diltheyan hermeneutics has decisively shown how human sciences are qualitatively different from natural sciences. At the same time, Ricoeur points out that Heidegger's ontological twist to phenomenology shows that hermeneutics even in its methodological or epistemological moorings is grounded in the existential structure of Dasein. Gadamer in following Heidegger, could dispel the subjectivism implicit in the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Though Dilthey has explicitly stated that the psychological basis he tried to provide for the human sciences is not to be identified with empirical or scientific psychology of his time, he could not precisely state the nature of descriptive psychology to which he attempted to reduce the cultural sciences. Moreover, Dilthey subscribed to the view that 'understanding' belongs to the domain of human sciences alone and counterpoised understanding to explanation.[26] In doing so, Dilthey excluded 'explanation' from the purview of human sciences and limited it to the sciences of nature. Moreover, Dilthey interpreted the process of understanding as 'empathy' or subjective identification with the other. According to Ricoeur, hermeneutical understanding is compatible with explanation, as these are mutually complementary. In Ricoeur's phenomenological hermeneutics, the dialectic of interpretation "...culminates in an act of understanding that is mediated by the explanatory procedures of structural analysis. These procedures ensure that the object of understanding is not identified with something felt, but rather with a potential reference released by explanation..."[27] Thus, by integrating explanation and understanding within the 'hermeneutical arc', Ricoeur attempts to provide a non-psychological and objective account of hermeneutics. Nevertheless, such an attempt should not be construed as obliterating the difference between human sciences and natural sciences. Ricoeur demarcates the two sciences by showing that the phenomena of human sciences are constituted by language. In other words, the notion of explanation that Ricoeur refers to is not a projection from the natural sciences, but from the field of language itself.

Ricoeur's approach to human action comprises three types of discourse on action: descriptive, dialectical and hermeneutical discourse.[28] Descriptive discourse makes use of the resources of linguistic analysis and phenomenology. Linguistic analysis takes off from the utterances or practices, which express the phenomenological data of experience publicly, and thus avoids the difficulties of introspective methods. It is carried out in three levels, namely a conceptual, a propositional and a discursive level. At the conceptual level, the linguistic analysis attempts to elucidate the notion with which we describe action in everyday life, especially the notions like reason and motive. Proclamations of purpose or intention are analyzed at the propositional level. It is at this level that we analyze the statements that employ the concepts of action. At the discursive level, we try to clarify the relations between statements about action by classifying and distinguishing action. Nevertheless, Ricoeur points out that we cannot remain contended with linguistic analysis in the descriptive discourse, rather it must be reinforced with a phenomenological investigation as the linguistic analysis cannot reflect upon itself to justify the distinctions and elucidations it makes. According to Ricoeur, such justifications can come forth only by returning to the realm of pre-predicative experience. Phenomenological investigation with its noematic analysis alone is capable of objectifying the immediately lived experience by articulating such experience in the contents of the respective noemata.

In contrast to the descriptive discourse, action can also be grasped in a dialectical discourse. In the dialectical discourse, the problematicing of action proceeds through mediation and totalisation instead of distinctions and classifications. In that, it ceases to be neutral and descriptive and takes a prescriptive stance. The dialectical discourse "...does not limit itself to an analysis of the motivated action of an isolated individual, but attempts to comprehend the relation between motivated and rational action, between practical and theoretical reason, between individual and collective will."[29] Thus, the dialectical discourse reveals the dimensions of the objective structure of the society by showing how the main aspects of will namely 'having', 'power' and 'worth' presuppose the objective structures of society namely 'economy', 'polity', and 'culture'. In economy is included all that result in an accumulation of human experience. Thus, machinery as well as its products and the required knowledge for production belong to economy. The polity consists of the various institutions through which a historical community appropriates the resources of the economy. In doing so, it establishes relations between people, which are not just economic relations but that corresponding to the primordial passion of 'power'. The cultural dimension of the social world reflects the values and attitudes that go into the making of the traditions of a society.

The third approach to the study of human action is the hermeneutical discourse. This approach is necessitated by the fact that we have to reinterpret the tradition in order to grasp the mode of being in the world. Thus, dialectical discourse inevitably points towards hermeneutical discourse. The possibility of this approach is revealed in treating action as a text. Thus, Ricoeur points out:

> ...if there are specific problems which are raised by the interpretation of texts because they are texts and not spoken language, and if these problems are the ones which constitute hermeneutics as such, then the human sciences may be said to be hermeneutical ... in as much as their *object* displays some of the features constitutive of a text as a text, and ... in

> as much as their methodology develops the same kind of procedures as those of ... text interpretation.[30]

To capture the meaning of action in a textual analogue, we must be clear about the distinction between spoken and written language. According to Ricoeur, 'text' or 'writing' is not the inscription of some anterior 'speech', rather 'speaking' and 'writing' are equally primordial aspects of discourse. That is, as 'discourse' language is either spoken or written. Therefore, 'discourse' is the preliminary concept in Ricoeur's hermeneutics. Discourse is always temporal; it exists in a present instance. In speech, the instance of discourse is a fleeting event. That is, any utterance, as a discourse exists only in the act of saying. It is writing that fix the discourse in surpassing the event of saying by the "said" of speaking, the intentional exteriorization. In other words, "...what we write, what we inscribe is the *noema* of speaking. It is the meaning of the speech event, not the event as event."[31] Thus in the text as an inscription there is first a distanciation of the event of saying by surpassing the event by the meaning. Moreover, in speech the intention of the subject and the meaning of the discourse overlap each other, while in writing this coincidence does not come through. Therefore, in the text there is a second distanciation between what is written and the original speaker. Ricoeur says:

> With written discourse, the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. This dissociation of the verbal meaning of the text and the mental intention is what is really at stake in the inscription of discourse....[T]he text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author. What the text says now matters more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author.[32]

Thus, according to Ricoeur only interpretation can save the meaning, which its author can no longer secure. The third form of distanciation is similar to the second form as there is a distance between the text and the original audience. In the case of a spoken discourse, the dialogue refers to a situation or context, which opens a world that is common to the partners in the dialogue, namely the speaker and the listener. However, the text decontextualizes itself from the historical conditions of its writings and opens up a welter of readings. This distanciation attests to the plurivocity of the text. In other words, in speech, the reference is ostensive but in inscription, the text no longer has such ostensive reference. This aspect of freeing the text from its limited ostensive reference engenders the fourth form of distanciation. As Ricoeur notes:

> In the same manner that the text frees its meaning from the tutelage of the mental intention, it frees its reference from the limits of ostensive reference. For us the world is the ensemble of references opened up by the texts. Thus we speak about the "world" of Greece, not to designate any more what were the situations for those who lived them, but to designate the nonsituational references which outlive the effacement of the first and which henceforth are offered as possible modes of being...[33]

Thus understanding a text, for Ricoeur, is also, at the same time, enlightening our own situation. According to Ricoeur, 'action' becomes an object of scientific study under an objectification that is similar to the fixation of discourse by writing. As it happens with writing, the objectification of action is made possible by the inner traits of action itself. "In the same way as the fixation by writing is made possible by a dialectic of intentional exteriorization immanent to the speech-act itself, a similar dialectic within the process of transaction prepares the detachment of the *meaning* of the action from the *event* of the action."[34] In other words, the distanciation we find between the speaker's intention and the meaning of a text obtains in the case of action too, that is, a distanciation between the agent and his/her action. Ricoeur refers to this distanciation as the 'autonomization of action' and argues that it is autonomization of human action that gives action its social dimension. "An action is a social phenomenon not only because it is done by several agents in such a way that the role of each of them cannot be distinguished from the role of the others, but also because our deeds escape us and have effects which we did not intend."[35] Thus, Ricoeur points out that human action become institutions through the sedimentation in social time with the result that the meaning of action no longer coincides with the subjective intentions of the actors. In other words, much like a text, the significance of an action goes beyond the relevance of its conditions of production. As Ricoeur says a "...work does not only mirror its time, but it opens up a world which it bears within itself."[36] Moreover, like a text, human action too is an open work that calls for a plurality of readings with the result that the "... problem of the right understanding can no longer be solved by a simple return to the alleged intention of the author."[37] However, the inherent plurivocity of the text need not abrogate the question of superiority or inferiority of one interpretation to another. Put it differently, the multiplicity of readings does not necessarily lead to arbitrariness or unmitigated relativism. Ricoeur points out that it is possible to arrive at an agreement in confronting different interpretations. According to Ricoeur, the objectivity of the text is displayed in the dialectical character of the relation between explanation and understanding.

CONCLUSION

The postmodernist challenge to the 'philosophy of subject' though seemed to have threatened the prospects of interpretative social sciences, the latter could successfully thwart it by repositioning itself. Interpretative social sciences checkmated postmodernism by changing its course along post-phenomenological hermeneutics of 'understanding' inaugurated by Heidegger and developed by Gadamer on the one hand and retaining the project of 'interpretation' attempted by Dilthey, but modified at the hands of Ricoeur as 'hermeneutics of suspicion' on the other. Ricoeur's employment of the model of text to understand human action extended the concept of meaning to incorporate speech, writing and action. Though human subjectivity is linguistically designated and mediated by symbols, Ricoeur places subjectivity in the human body and the material world, of which language is a second order articulation. As he puts it, "to say *self* is not to say *I*...[where] the *I* is posited, the *self* is implied reflexively."[38]. The hermeneutics of the self is different from the philosophy of the subject, as while the latter asserts indubitable knowledge of truth or certainity, the former leads to a *belief* of truth or certainity[39]. According to Ricoeur, this does not mean that hermeneutic belief is inferior to knowledge; rather such a belief is a testimony by the individual self, regarding the truth of what the self believes.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Zygmunt Bauman, *Hermeneutics and Social Sciences*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1978, p.35.
2. Wilhelm Dilthey, 'On the Special Character of the Human Sciences' in Marcello Truzzi (Ed.), *Verstehen: Subjective Understanding in the Social Sciences*, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1974, p.12.
3. Thomas M. Seebohm, 'Boeckh and Dilthey: The Development of Methodical Hermeneutics' in J.N. Mohanty (Ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1985, p.96.
4. Cf. Wilhelm Dilthey, op.cit, p.14.
5. Finn Collin, *Social Reality*, London, Routledge, 1997, p.103.
6. Finn Collin, *Theory and Understanding: A Critique of Interpretive Social Science*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,1985, p. 148.
7. Alfred Schutz, 'Common-sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action' in Maurice Natanson (Ed.), *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader*, New York, Random House, 1963, p. 343.
8. Nagel misconstrues the nature of subjective interpretation as one that unsuccessfully attempts to capture the 'inner springs' of action. See in this regard 'Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences' in Maurice Natanson (Ed.), *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader*, p.206.
9. Thomas M. Seebohm, op.cit, p. 98.
10. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, Harper and Row, 1962, p.182.
11. Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, tr. J.L.Mehta, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, p. 49.
12. Martin Heidegger, op.cit, p.187.
13. Ibid., pp.188-189.
14. Ibid., pp.191-192.
15. Hubert L. Dreyfus, 'Holism and Hermeneutics' in *Review of Metaphysics*; vol.34, September , 1980, p.13.
16. Ibid., p.14.
17. Gadamerian notion of 'fusion of horizons' should not be construed in a simplistic manner where two perspectives coalesce into a single unifying perspective. Gadamer makes this point many times in various ways. Thus he says in one of his writings, recently translated into English, that a "perspective that sees everything would abolish the very meaning of perspective". (Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity, Subject and Person', *Continental Philosophy Review*, Vol. 33, 2000, p. 281.) As Kathleen Wright points out the 'fusion' has two phases: the first

phase is the one that results from 'the projection of difference between two horizons' by projecting a horizon against the background of one's own horizon. Charles Taylor emphasizes this aspect of 'fusion' when he reads it as a "Language of Contrast". However, the second phase sets aside this difference by calling into question one's own horizon through the projected horizon. (Kathleen Wright, 'The Fusion of Horizons: Hans-Georg Gadamer and Wang Fu-Chih', *Continental Philosophy Review,* Vol. 33, 2000, p. 345). It is in this sense that Gadamer talks of knowing the other as knowing oneself. I am thankful to Professor Amitabha Das Gupta for pointing out to me Taylor's reading of 'fusion of horizons', which helped me to elaborate on Gadamer's notion of the same.

18. William Outhwaite, 'Hans-Georg Gadamer' in Quentin Skinner (Ed.), *The Return of the Grand Theories in the Human Sciences,* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1985, p. 25.
19. Krishna Roy, 'Hermeneutics and Ethnomethodology' in Krishna Roy and Chhanda Gupta (Eds.), *Essays in Social and Political Philosophy,* New Delhi, ICPR and Allied Publishers, 1989, p.63.
20. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 'Hermeneutics and Social Science' in *Cultural Hermeneutics,* Vol.2, No.4, 1975, p.311.
21. Ibid., pp.312-313.
22. Cf. R. J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism,* Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, p.141.
23. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics,* tr. David E.Linge, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, p.66.
24. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method,* (tr.) Garret Barden and John Cumming, New York, Seabury Press, 1975, p.94.
25. Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1985, 'The Hermeneutics of Suspicion' in J.N.Mohanty (Ed.), *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences,* p.82.
26. Charles Taylor argues that though Natural Sciences too have hermeneutical dimension, the nature of interpretation that characterizes human sciences is different from the former and as such the claim regarding a "new unity of method" is not legitimate. See in this regard, Charles Taylor, 'Understanding in Human Science', *Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 34, 1980 and Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', *Review of Metaphysics,* Vol. 25, 1991 However, Kuhn questions Taylor's characterization of Natural Sciences as one that meets the "requirement of absoluteness", independent of human interpretation (Thomas Kuhn, 'The Natural and the Human Sciences' in David R. Hiley et al.(Ed.), *The Interpretive Turn: Philosophy, Science, Culture,* Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1991). I am thankful to Professor S.G. Kulkarni for bringing to my notice Thomas Kuhn's position regarding the role of interpretation in sciences.

27. J. B. Thompson, Critical Hermeneutics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.54.
28. Ibid., pp.60-64.
29. Ibid., p.62.
30. Paul Ricoeur, 'The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text,' in Paul Rabinow and William M.Sullivan (Eds.), *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1979, p.73.
31. Ibid., p.76.
32. Ibid., p.78.
33. Ibid., p.79.
34. Ibid., p.81.
35. Ibid., p.83
36. Ibid., p.86.
37. Ibid., p.88.
38. Paul Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, (tr.) Kathleen Blamey, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 18.
39. Ibid., p. 21.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Chhanda Gupta

Self, Subjectivity and Social Science

The concepts of self may lead an inquiring mind along various speculative trajectories, for the notion has been studied from a plethora of perspectives. Numerous questions have stemmed from such speculations. A few of these which may be expected to be discussed here are: Is the self an eternal undifferentiated consciousness which is pure and disembodied? Or, is this view to be discarded since consciousness cannot be comprehended in the sphere of ordinary experience without reference to a particular person who is the owner of consciousness? Do we need to refer merely to certain transitory conscious states to understand what we mean when we speak of the self as a conscious person? Or, should the concept of self be joined to a substantive notion and be viewed as a persistent thinking being that can consider itself as itself in different times and places through a consciousness which is presumably its quintessential characteristic? What however is the nature of consciousness? Is it irreducibly non-physical? Or, is consciousness reducible to processes in the brain? Or, is it to be denied and dismissed as a myth?

Questions such as these, however, are not what this paper seeks to problematize. The focus is on a specific image of the self as an embodied human agent who acts, and endows his actions with a *meaning* or significance which must be grasped by those who want to understand such actions. If social sciences are to understand what they aim to understand, namely, human action, then they have to comprehend the subjective meaning attached to such actions by the acting self. This is a basic conviction of one powerful tradition in the philosophy of social sciences, which, in sharp opposition to a positivist view of human behaviour, emphasizes that subjective understanding is the specific characteristic of social knowledge.

Seen from the perspective of this subjectivist tradition, 'self', 'subjectivity' and 'social science' are notions that have deep conceptual linkages. The paper aims to explore these linkages. This endeavour might be viewed with suspicion for it seems to jeopardize the scientificity of social sciences, inasmuch as scientificity is supposed to be rooted in objectivity. My aim, however, is to move beyond the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity, or the antithesis which they are typically believed to constitute.

I

BEYOND SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM

The emphasis on self and subjectivity is bound to bring us to the brink of a major divide in the understanding of social sciences. Strong voices would be heard on either side of this divide expressing diametrically opposed viewpoints.

Humans cannot be treated merely as physical objects, urge the anti-positivists, and their actions are not merely manifest physical behaviour. Behaviour becomes action when the acting self confers meaning on that action. To attain knowledge of such an action we cannot simply look at it, but have to look at it through the prism of the agent's perspective. The self's point of view penetrates and pervades his actions.

In stark contrast to this self-oriented approach, the positivists aim to rinse out all subjective elements, which, in their opinion, are unscientific as they are opaque to observation. Action is nothing more than manifest behaviour which must be considered in abstraction from all points of view—from those of the acting self, and also of the social scientists who investigate it. The social scientists should be absolutely objective and base their investigation on facts, and facts alone, in abstraction from all traces of anyone's point of view.

Facts, however, cannot be separated from interpretation, according to those who belong to the anti-positivist tradition. The aim of social science in that tradition, particularly the one that has originated from the methodological writings of Max Weber, is *interpretative understanding* of human actions. This understanding or *verstehen*, as it is called, has more than one sense. In its psychological sense, *verstehen* is a direct empathic understanding through which the investigator imaginatively identifies himself with the acting agent, and reaches the inner motives, thoughts, etc., in the agent's mind which cannot be accessed by ordinary observation. In the semantical sense *verstehen* signifies an *interpretative understanding* (not just an introspective empathic capacity) which is called for by actions of individuals who interpret the world so differently, that their actions cannot be simply described in a language that allegedly records facts devoid of interpretation. The interpretation, furthermore, is usually expected to be given in the light of the way in which the acting individual himself interprets his actions. However, the interpretation offered by the investigator and narrator conditioned by his own socio-cultural background.is no less important and is sure to leave its imprint on the action he investigates and narrates.

Once again, in sharp opposition to the *verstehen* approach, the positivists construe the aim of social science in a totally different way. The aim is not interpretative understanding but a purely objective description of facts untouched by human consciousness. Insisting on a complete separation between subject and object, positivists aim to attain a fully objective account of the hard core of facts pertaining to action by retrieving them from the "surrounding pulp of disputable interpretations". One must not plunge in "the shifting sands of interpretation".[1]

The influence of the cult of facts which held sway, especially in the nineteenth century, has gradually waned. Yet many feel drawn to the positivist methodology of explaining action by appeal to facts, facts which can be repeatedly observed. Actions like natural events, they would urge, are to be explained in terms of laws which are assertions of regular connection between types of facts. An action would be explained if it is shown to be related to some other facts or type of facts with which it, or actions like it, have been repeatedly observed to be conjoined. This kind of explanation by a 'covering law' has also been widely held to be a kind of casual explanation which explains not only the 'events' in the non-human sphere of nature but also 'actions' notwithstanding their subjectivity.

A strong resistance to this kind of methodological monism and its causalist version is voiced in several anti-positivist quarters. Historical Idealists like Croce and Collingwood demanded a separate methodology for social sciences. A free and unique action cannot be brought within the sweep of an observable causal relation of invariable succession of two types of external events. Such an action, they maintain, must be understood in the light of unobservable inner motives, thoughts, etc., in the agent's mind. Instead of taking explanation by causal laws as a model for social scientific methodology, a distinctive method is then to be evolved in the sphere of human action. The *verstehen* or the 'understanding' approach offers one such alternative to the positivist model of '*erklaren*' or explanation. This tradition, stemming from the works of Weber, Droysen, Dilthey and others, continued to develop through other very influential streams of thought, phenomenological and hermeneutic.

This opposition between subjectivism and objectivism, and the conflicting images these positions project regarding the nature of action, the aim of social sciences and their methodology sketched above, have gripped our thought through ages. Even if we feel uneasy as we move back and forth between these extremes, and even if a new trend emerges which seeks to get beyond the dichotomy, there still remains a lurking belief that the only viable alternatives possibly are some form of objectivism or subjectivism. My concern here is to initiate a debate that will not be structured within such traditional extremes. Indeed, the reconciliatory stance which underpins the reformulation of the debate has powerful precedents in the *verstehen* tradition itself. Even Weber, the pioneer in this tradition, stressed "the nomological side of the social sciençes, (and) the desirability of *explaining* social action with the help of more or less well-confirmed law-like hypotheses...". He insisted on the "necessity of combining the causal explanation of social phenomena with the interpretative understanding of their cultural significance."[2] Following the Weberian peace move, I have argued elsewhere that even if subjective elements like the agent's and the investigator's ideas, interests, beliefs and value commitments intrude into their judgements concerning the cause of a specific event, there is no good ground for renouncing all causalist claims in social inquiry.[3]

I still subscribe to this view. In addition I wish to contend that though a social phenomenon cannot be understood apart from what happens in the mind of an individual actor whose act leads to the phenomenon in question, such a phenomenon cannot be said to be completely subjective in the sense of being created by an individual agent acting *in isolation* from others. The act cannot be wrenched out from its social setting. The account to be given by the social scientists cannot be said to be *completely objective*, it is true, chronicling the so-called pure or virgin facts uncontaminated by the mental images carried by the narrators.

But it cannot *be completely subjective* either, for—even if social phenomena are to be understood in relation to and as interpreted by individual thoughts of individual selves—such selves are "born into societies and are made by them, as well as making them."[4] Individualism should be seen as a view which is consonant with contextualism which demands that a proper understanding of action "must see the part played by agents in a wider social setting."[5]

The account cannot be completely subjective, moreover, because the actions can be traced to multiple causal constellations which are objective social realities, even if such realities too have an interpretive encrustation.

Social realities have to be interpreted no doubt, but interpretation is not *imputation* or *projection* or *construction*. Such realities are inextricably bound with persons and points of view, but are not for that reason to be viewed as mere constructions. Social realities are *relational realities* each of which may be seen as a subject-object continuum. What is expressed in language regarding these realities is a subject-object relationship.

In the sections that follow I have tried to expand on these points. For the purpose of illustration I have chosen a basic concept which can be taken as a reference point of discussion regarding the contentions noted above. This is the category of '*jāti*', which, together with other kindred notions like 'caste', 'race', and 'the Indian Nation' had inspired and triggered a series of nationalist literary activities in the Indian socio-cultural scene in the late nineteenth century Bengal. The activities comprised a new quest for *identity*, which was intended to redefine the Bengali *self-image* that was being challenged and tarnished by the 'colonial other'. The 'self engaged in this search is represented by the western-educated, professional, mainly high-caste Bengali literati of colonial Bengal.

II

SELF AND SUBJECTIVITY

The 'self' and its 'other' are usually believed to constitute a dichotomous binary. This has a strange hold on our minds even though the division suggests a false abstraction. The accent on the contrast stems possibly from the idea that things are best defined by their 'others'. The contrast throws into sharper relief the identity of each member of the pair. But while this seems necessary for facilitating our comprehension of such identities, 'otherness' overstressed would obscure their interdependence.

Our understanding of 'self' proceeds not only by way of contrast with the 'other' but by way of what has been termed an "integrative participation". We "come to understand ourselves better by discovering the cultural others in our self. Sometimes these others are already deeply there in one's...self..., but sometimes they are lurking more in the margins as potential dimensions waiting to be incorporated into the self."[6] So even if we cannot comprehend an action apart from the individual thoughts, motives, wishes and feelings of the individual self who performs the action, the self must not be viewed as an individual acting *in isolation* from others, as I have remarked before.

An eminent exponent of the phenomenological view of social action, Alfred Schutz writes: "We want to understand social phenomena, and we cannot understand them apart from their placement within the scheme of human motives, human means and ends, human planning—in short—within the categories of human action. The social scientist must therefore ask...what happens in the mind of an individual actor whose act has led to the phenomena in question."[7]

Resonance of this view stressing the primacy of the individual is found in the writings of Weber too. Even if one argues that combinations of individuals may form a collectivity having a collective consciousness, Weber would not accept the argument. Apparent collectivities are merely combinations of individuals, he would contend. These "collectivities must be treated as solely the resultants...of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action."[8]

It seems to me, however, that even if we emphasize the importance of the contents of individual minds, we cannot accept the phenomenological and Weberian approach totally. For, as Roger Trigg argues, "... in stressing the importance of the individual subject", such an approach "lapses into a position which makes all judgements valid for the person making them. It finds itself embroiled in a rampant subjectivism..."[9] One need not endorse the excesses of Emile Durkheim's theory and claim that social phenomena must be considered in themselves, detached from the consciousness of individuals. Nor do we need to treat collectivities of individuals as 'social facts' which are irreducible to individuals. Yet one may try to mediate between the stark alternatives of individual and society, between rampant subjectivism and extreme holism. Schutz and Weber were right to highlight the subjective meaning given by individuals or selves to their actions. But they did not emphasize that just as society is to be understood in terms of the individuals making it up, individuals too, are to be understood in terms of the societies of which they are members. The self gains his or her identity in the context of society.

The Bengali literati of the late nineteenth century, steeped in activities that sought to recreate the regional and national identity of their '*jāti*', represented such a 'self'. That 'self' was not a rootless abstraction segregated in a solitary recluse but a member of a community which was enmeshed in a network of extremely complex relationships with its 'colonial other'. The 'self' was engulfed by mighty waves of social, cultural and political change unleashed by the tremendously powerful 'other'—the British Raj. The literati's activities are to be understood against the backdrop of this powerful presence—against the changing interactive relationships between the ruler and the ruled, and the ruler's contemptuous perception of the ruled as a community who had no sense of history and identity and a notion of nationhood.

This perception and other colonial sociological exercises left deep imprints on the literati's (or self's) psyche. Paradoxically, the literati accepted this colonial critique and even tried to procure reliable documents and evidence for thinking about their past, emulating western positivist empiricist historical standards. So far the literati allowed the 'other' to have an "integrative participation" in their psyche. But at the same time they were determined to counter the colonial challenge and recast their own past—own *jāti* in an indigenous history that was not a duplication of the historiography of the western type. The social, cultural and political 'other' proved to be a catalyst for the complex and mixed reactions and activities of the 'self' searching for an identity as a *jāti*.

Many among the most eminent Bengali literati were deeply disturbed by the colonial strictures that portrayed the subjugated 'self', particularly the Hindus, as a history-less *jāti*. James Mill's conviction that Hindus were incapable of writing factual history[10] penetrated into the minds of the intelligentsia thinking about their past. It was as if the 'self was looking at its own history through the eyes of the 'other', namely, the western historians who maintained that "Indians, both Muslims and particularly, Hindus, were so preoccupied with eulogy, rhetoric and metaphysics that they had little or no interest in documenting particular details."[11] We should attach due importance to the 'subjective meaning' conferred on actions by acting individuals or selves, as Schutz and Weber insisted, but we must recognise at the same time that on occasions the social and cultural 'other' is deeply there in one's self as Richard Shusterman observed whom I have quoted earlier.

Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay's *Bānglar Itihas*[12] is an example of how the self's consciousness mingles with and absorbs the ideas and convictions of the 'other'. Bankim admitted that an overwhelming importance was attached to '*daiva*' (fate/providence) that undermined human endeavour, which, if duly emphasized would have encouraged writing history of the *jāti*'s glorious past. Other writers, too, aware of the absence of reliable documents, emulated western empiricist evidence-based methodology. To trace the origin of the Bengali *jāti*, Rāmgati Nyāyaratna used linguistic evidence, trying to prove that "Hindus are not the original inhabitants of Bengal." Many words in the Bengali language, he wrote, "are neither Sanskrit, nor Arabic, nor Parsi, and must have come from the dialect of the ancient non-Hindu inhabitants of Bengal."[13]

In spite of this "integrative participation" of the 'colonial other' in the thoughts and works of the literati ('self'), their consciousness was not merely a reflection of western viewpoints. The self's sensitivities were stirred by the scathing colonial critique that the Bengalis were a history-less people. To counter this challenge and to fill up the historical void the literati strove to rewrite an indigenous history within a new framework where absence of a detailed fact-based sequential history was to be compensated by popular imagination, folklore, legend, myth and epic, and above all by an *empathic understanding* of the region-specific histories of different provinces of Bengal—of their culture, language and ways of life. The regional histories were sought to be welded to provide a cohesive unity to the history of Bengalis which would recreate their identity as a *jāti*. Akṣoy Kumar Moitreya in *Gourer Kathā* traced the *jatiya* past to such specific histories of a district, province and also the country, emphasizing the need of an *empathic understanding* of the culture, language and the people of the land, which, he thought were crucial clues for a true history.[14]

A similar accent on the history of culture and social attachments is found in other works. Rabindranath Tagore's *Itihās* signals a departure from western historiography. It illustrates a shift from polity and political history to society and community (*Samāj*). Rethinking an indigenous history from non-political, cultural and social standpoints, he wrote: "The history that we read is like an unhappy dream in India's night of gloom. The saga of political upheavals, violence and bloodshed is not the clue to real India. We have to discover real India, an India outside the textbooks popularized by the Raj."[15]

The writings of the literati reflected individual thoughts no doubt, but these epitomized at the same time the *collective reaction* of a community located in a specific social, cultural and political situation. The reaction was an "autonomous assertion", in Sumit Sarkar's words, and an organized expression of the *collective mentality* of the Bengali literati who strove to build a *new jātiya* self-image. This self, speaking in a different voice about its past, however, was not an isolated self, but a representative of selves deeply engaged with each other, responding collectively to the colonial 'other'.

The examples cited above may be used for reiterating the claim made in section I, the claim that Individualism should be seen as a view which is consonant with contextualism. A proper understanding of human action, which social scientists seek to achieve, must see the part played by agents rooted in a wider social setting. This, needless to add, requires a methodological move beyond subjectivism of an extreme individualistic type.

III

UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

The contextualist image of a 'self' immersed in influences of its socio-cultural location stretches the connotation of 'subjectivity'. Individuals do assign meanings to their actions, but consciously or subconsciously incorporate in these subjective meanings much of what they absorb from others. There seems to be a merger of the margins that separate the individual selves on many occasions.

However, one may wonder at this juncture whether even this kind of a shared, interactive, integrated and interpretive subjective meaning, which selves attach to their actions, can really mitigate the excesses of extreme subjectivism. Actions are to be *understood* in the light of such 'subjective meanings' no doubt. But how can this 'understanding' be coupled with 'explanation' of actions in terms of *well-confirmed causal laws*, as Weber desired? The ideas, interests, beliefs, and values that comprise 'subjective meaning' intrude into the judgements which the individual agents make concerning the cause of a specific event. These factors colour the judgements of the investigators too, who investigate the actions of these agents. How in that case can the agent and the investigator ascertain the objective constellations of causal conditions which are believed to lead to the event in question? Moreover, the causal constellations are multiple, and the complexes of conditions which the agent and the investigator select from these constellations for making causal imputations, bear the stamp of their beliefs and bias.

There were in fact different constellations of selectively constituted complexes of causal conditions to which the causal origin of the nationalist literary activities of the Bengali intelligentsia might be traced. There was, for example, the colonial sociological exercise of preparing census reports and imperial gazetteers' accounts, which, exposing divisions between castes and sub-castes, impelled the literati to search for a *jātiya* unity amidst such disunities. This was a positive condition in a complex of causal conditions. There seems to be a negative condition too figuring in the same complex, namely, the absence of a well-connected evidence-based, reliably documented history. This might have implanted the European model of writing a fact-based history in the mind of the educated Bengali schooled in the new colonial education, and adopting the principles of European historiography, they set out to write a 'new' history of the nation. Yet another causal condition in the same complex could be the acceptance of the colonial critique that the Hindus had no historical sense and no notion of nationhood. This complex of positive and negative conditions may be symbolized as ABC, which, as one among other alternative complexes, could have provided the initial impetus for the literati's search for *jātiya* unity and a history that would reflect this unity. If the literati selected this particular constellation of causal conditions, say ABC, rather than other complexes, say DEF or GHI, to explain their actions, then their choice did exhibit a bias. The bias comprised the acceptance of colonial contentions resulting in the admission that "Hindus...have coloured historical events by fancy and supernatural description..." and that it is "very difficult to glean the truth from such accounts."[16]

This, however, was not the only constellation of conditions which was causally relevant for explaining the activities of the literati of colonial Bengal. The bias in favour of colonial contentions was mutated. Even though the English educated literati had enthusiastically welcomed and emulated European historiography, they "did not accept the history of India as it was written by British historians." They were, in fact, "engaged in open contestation with the colonialist interpretation of Indian history."[17] The new condition which provided a fresh and powerful causal impetus was not one of acceptance and admission but of protestation—protestation about the way in which the British portrayed Indian history. Kshirodchandra Roychaudhuri, for instance, announces in the preface of his book, published in 1876: "I have written this book for those who have been misled by translations of histories written in English."[18]

In addition to this condition there was the prevalent miserable state of society, "misfortunes and decline" ever since "the day the *Yavana* (Muslim) flag entered the territory of Bengal", as a certain Bholanath Chakravarti remarked in his lecture at an Adi Brahmo Samaj meeting in 1876.[19] This, together with the scathing colonial critique of such a decadent state, sharpened the sensitivities of educated Bengalis about their ancient glory. The oppressive condition, and the reminiscences it roused, provided a strong causal impulse for the Bengali intelligentsia's nationalist agenda. As Partha Chatterjee observes: "Half of nationalist history has been already thought out... In the beginning, the history of the nation was glorious; in wealth, power, learning, and religion it had reached the pinnacle of civilization. This nation was sometimes called Bengali, sometimes Hindu, sometimes Arya, sometimes Indian... After this came the age of decline."[20]

The cluster of causal conditions noted here is different from the one symbolized as ABC. The protestation against the colonial critique of Indian history, present misery, and reminiscences of ancient glory constitute an alternative constellation of causal conditions, and this might be symbolized as DEF. The literati therefore were making different causal imputations. Their bias, beliefs, interests and ideas were intruding into their judgements about what they thought was the cause of their activities, writing a nationalist history for example. But if that be the case, then should we not abandon the Weberian project of combining causal explanation of social phenomena with the interpretive understanding of their cultural significance? In the face of alternativity ensuing from bias, it is debatable whether the causal model can provide an objective explanation of actions in terms of well-confirmed causal laws.

Carl Hempel, to whose view I have alluded at the outset, maintained that nothing less than *unexceptionable* strict laws can qualify as the basis of what he calls the *idealized*, model of 'covering law explanations' of the causal brand. It is obvious that we cannot have a generalization of this required *unexceptionable* sort for linking what the literati have selected and interpreted as the complex of casual conditions (like ABC or DEF), on the one hand, and their activities, on the other. But does this really matter? I have argued elsewhere (referred in note 3) that even though strict, exceptionless 'covering laws' need not be branded as "inadequate... sterile and unilluminating,"[21] they are nevertheless *unavailable* and *inapplicable* in concrete situations. In such situations a person seeking an explanation has to look for something that is at hand. It is otiose to look for some *inherent necessary feature* in the law *itself*, which would guarantee its exceptionless character. Instead, it is better to look for lawlikeness of a generalization in the *good evidence* we have for it, which would permit us to believe in its explanatory force. In concrete explanatory situations one may accept a rough generalization as 'lawlike' provided it has good evidence in its support.

Max Weber had made a strong plea for the causal role of precisely these probabilistic generalizations in explaining human action. "We meaningfully explain overt behaviour by characterizing it as an action", i.e., by describing it in terms that incorporate its 'subjective meaning'. We meaningfully explain the action in its turn, by making explicit inferences about its motives and its relation to assumed goals. But this provides 'explanatory understanding' of the action; such 'understanding' *cannot* rank as 'explanatory *knowledge*' until we find empirical generalizations by virtue of which the imputed motives are shown with high probability to be the actual causes of the action.[22] Whether one can achieve this kind of *explanatory knowledge* in social sciences, however, is contentious.

It is true that the complex of causal conditions which the agents select and interpret as conditions responsible for their actions, are objective. To take our previous example, that the people of Bengal were actually ravaged by waves of oppression was indeed a social reality. That such a state of decadence stirred memories of ancient glory too was a fact. So one can say, it seems, that present misery and ancient glory have provided the motive for the literati to write their own history for restoring their past self-image. And it also seems that these imputed motives may be shown with some probability to be the actual causes of writing a nationalist narrative. But that narrative, according to an eminent scholar, is imbued with prejudices and presumptions. One of the most influential early nationalist narratives written by Tarinicharan Chattopadhyay, this scholar points out, drew heavily on the discoveries of the nineteenth century Orientalists.

Echoing Orientalist citations on the excellence of ancient Indian learning and also the judgement of British historians that Muslim rule in India was a period of despotism, Tarinicharan's book, *The History of India* (reprinted every year), moves in the direction that would end with the equation of Indian nationalism with Hindu nationalism.[23] What was central to this Hindu nationalist narrative, moreover, was not some premodern religious conception, but the western modern idea of the state, its unity and sovereignty. "The identification in European historiography between the notions of country or people, sovereignty, and statehood is now lodged firmly in the mind of the English-educated Bengali."[24] The actual causes of writing a nationalist narrative, therefore, does not seem to be merely a concatenation of objective conditions, present misery and ancient glory, etc., but also certain presumptions stemming from the political play of power and modern western ideas.

In writing such narratives the Bengali literati were *constructing* and *imagining* a past. Partha Chatterjee, to whose views I am referring, questions the nationalist presumption of the literati regarding the *imagined unity* of the people of this country in the past. The so-called nationalist narrative *projects* or *imputes* unity, sovereignty, nationhood and statehood to a past which really did not have these characteristics. If there had been any unity in the past, it was not *national* but *confederal*, according to Chatterjee.[25] 'Nationhood' is a notion imported from modern western political thought which *imputes* unity to a country that was actually fragmented.

IV

TOWARDS A NON-IMPUTATIONIST INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Chatterjee's analysis is powerful and pathbreaking. Yet it seems to me that his interpretation of the 'nationalist' activities of the late nineteenth century Bengali literati is premised on a contentious presupposition about the nature of *interpretation* itself. We have indeed lost our faith in the classical, 'external realist' picture of pure *uninterpreted* factual realities. We have instead a great attraction for 'perspectivism' which insists that no meaningful discourse is possible about anything unless that thing is *interpreted* from a particular point of view. These two traits characterize what has been aptly described as the "interpretive turn" of our age.[26] The turn signals a shift from the *absolute conception of interpretation-independent* realities to the *relative conception* of realities. Such 'relative realities' have been termed 'objects-as-interpreted' or 'realities-as-represented'. This relativization of objects and their properties, however, need not imply *construction, imputation* or *projection*. To say that things-as-interpreted have relational features is not to say that these features are *imputed* or *projected* on to these things which in fact do not have them. We may regard objects and properties as interpretation-dependent but we need not construe interpretation as *imputation*. One may celebrate the 'interpretive turn' without subscribing to the imputationist view of interpretation.

This claim, of course, is not likely to be endorsed by those who deny the classical realist idea of transcendent, interpretation-independent realities. They believe that things and their features do depend on us, and are therefore our *constructions.* This kind of anti-realism is labelled 'constructivism'. Primarily regarded as a sociological view of scientific knowledge, it even goes to the extent of believing that "scientists literally *make* the world,"[27] (emphasis mine). Needless to add, constructivism regards everything as interpretation-dependent and construes interpretation as *imputation.*

The sharp difference between the two views, classical 'external realism' of the type mentioned, on the one hand, and this kind of constructivism, on the other, is firmly maintained by many thinkers. Even those who try to move beyond this dichotomy, and fashion an irenic ontology that seeks to reconcile rival viewpoints, cannot shake off the idea of this basic divide. Michael Krausz, for instance, provides a rich and absorbing overview of such reconciliatory ontologies in his book *Limits of Rightness.*[28] But even he who wishes to take the reconciliatory route seems to suggest that the rival views may peacefully co-exist only if each is allowed to retain its core contention after entering into an alliance with its philosophical 'other', that is, if realism continues to cleave typically to the idea of objects and properties which are interpretation-independent, and constructivism is allowed to treat everything as interpretation-dependent construing interpretation as imputation. I have tried to show elsewhere that the retention of the dichotomous views within the bounds of a pacifist ontology is likely to frustrate reconciliatory efforts.[29] To succeed in a reconciliatory exercise proponents of the rival views need to compromise. A realist should abandon the notion of a transcendent, interpretation-independent reality, and a constructivist should give up the imputationist view of interpretation.

In Krausz's version of a reconciliatory ontology which he, however, calls 'constructive realism' the notion of a *representation-independent* reality that precedes our interpretive activity is retained intact. Interpretation surely cannot be spun out of nothing, he argues. There must be something, 'a further object' which is interpreted. Imputation of salience to certain features of this 'further object' is furthermore believed to confirm the propriety of interpreting it in one way or the other. But Krausz thinks that when certain features of the 'further object' are singled out as salient, then such properties are not to be predicated of the 'further object' *itself.* They are to be predicated of the *object-as-represented* or the *object-as-interpreted.* The interpreter *imputes* such chosen features to *objects-as-represented.* These imputed properties are brought into being by some favoured interpretation, it is argued in a constructivist vein, and they are *no part* of the 'further object'.[30] Imputed properties of a face and a vase, for example, are no part of the 'further object', in this case a line drawing.

It seems to me, however, that even if one agrees that certain properties emerge from some favoured interpretation it would be wrong to suggest that they are *no part* of the 'further object'. For the newly ascribed emergent properties stem from salience assigned to *selected* features of the 'further object'. One may concede that the features of the 'further object' by themselves are not the *sufficient* condition of the emergent properties, but they are *necessary* nevertheless. One cannot rule out the rootedness of these emergent properties in properties, that *are part of the* 'further object'. The new emergent properties are not *created* by the interpreter and his interpretation *alone.*[31]

The term 'Indian nation' was a foreign coinage. It was a new political category—a conceptual import from the West. In the light of Krausz's analysis, therefore, 'nationhood' may be taken as an *emergent property,* germinating from the literati's favoured interpretation borrowed from the West. In consonance with this analysis one can even concede that Partha Chatterjee was right to insist that the new notion of nationhood was being imposed on the people's fragmented prehistory, although this notion was unknown in that history. If that prehistory of Indian nationalism is described in Krausz's idiom as 'further object', then the property of nationhood would seem to be *no part* of the 'further object'. Even if the Mutineers of 1857, for example, were using the category—"Hindus and Musalman of Hindustan"—there is a gulf which lay between this category and the category of 'Indian nation', "...as far as political and social ideas are concerned! One looks forward to a 'modern' world; the other looks back to a 'medieval' past."[32] Yet it does not seem to me that this kind of analysis can mandate *constructivism* or *imputationism* in an unqualified sense.

The prehistory of nationalism, the 'further object' so to say, might not be the *sufficient* condition for the emergence of the novel political category of 'nationhood', nor of nationalist identities. But such identities "are not 'created' all of a sudden..." They are not imagined overnight. It "is not possible to grasp an identity without exploring the mentality in which it is rooted, and the culture in which it has grown..."[33] That mentality and culture seem to constitute features of the 'further object', i.e., of the prehistory of nationalism, which, though not *sufficient* were *necessary* nevertheless for the emergence of the national or *jātiya* identity. For Chatterjee, nationalism and national identity are parts of a modern, intellectual political history. These are projections, and no part of the indigenous prehistory of the national movement, i.e., the 'further object'.

To me it seems, on the contrary, that the features signified by the category of 'nationhood' are not rootless projections. They are deeply anchored in the mentality—emotions—culture which constitute features of the 'further object', namely, the prehistory of the nationalist movement. The political idea of nationhood "may be new, but the mentality and emotions are rooted in the past". The political or intellectual history "ought not to be read in isolation from emotional history, where large masses of people are concerned".[34] We cannot deny, therefore, the rootedness of emergent properties in features that are part of the further object, after all.

Social phenomena are not uninterpreted, transcendent, presystematic materia on which interpretation imposes something from within a conceptual system. Interpretation is *not imputation* or *projection.* Projection means imposing something upon something else which does not have what we impose upon it. The literati of colonial Bengal were surely interpreting their past. Their activity was an interpretative activity. The past was a social reality which both the acting selves (literati) and the investigator or narrator (Chatterjee, for instance) had interpreted *in relation* to the western interpretive system. It was a *relational reality*, inextricably bound with an interpretive scheme or theoretical perspective. But this relativization is not projection. The theoretical perspective of the western conceptual scheme did not *impart* an emergent property to a prehistory of nationalism any more than the touching hand *imparts* warmth to a body which does not have it.

The literati's activity is a social reality which may be characterized as a subject-object continuum, in which the subject *interprets* but does not *create* the object and the object, though interpreted, is to be viewed as a *relational reality*. What is expressed in language regarding these realities by social scientists are subject-object relationships.

NOTES

1. Carr, E.H. 1961. *What is History?* R.W. Davies (ed.). London: Macmillan & Penguin.
2. McCarthy, Thomas, 1972. "The Operation Called *Verstehen.*" *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol. 20, PSA Proceedings of the 1972 Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association. Kenneth F. Schaffner and Robert S. Cohen (ed.), Holland: Dordrecht, p. 70.
3. Gupta, Chhanda. 1989. "Objectivity in Social Inquiry". *Essay in Social and Political Philosophy.* Krishna Roy and Chhanda Gupta (ed.). New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Allied Publishers, p. 50.
4. Trigg, Roger. 1985. "Understanding Social Science". Oxford: Basil Blackwell. p. 53.
5. Ibid.
6. Shusterman, Richard. 1998. "Understanding the Self's Others". *Cultural Otherness and Beyond.* Chhanda Gupta and D.P. Chattopadhyaya. Leiden: Brill, p. 107.
7. Schutz, Alfred. 1962. *Collected Papers*, vol. I. *The Problem of Social Reality.* The Hague. I have borrowed the quotation from Roger Trigg. *Understanding Social Science.*
8. Weber, Max. 1947. *Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* A. Henderson and T. Parasons (trans.). London, p. 92.
9. Trigg, p. 55.
10. Mill, James. 1858. *History of British India*, vol. 1. London, pp. 115-17.
11. Chattopadhyaya, D.P. 1998. "*Itihāsa*, History and Historiography of Civilization". *Cultural Otherness and Beyond*, p. 61.
12. Chattopadhyaya, Bankimchandra. 1954. "*Bānglār Itihās*". *Bankim Rachanabali*, vol. 2, reprinted. Calcutta, p. 330.
13. Nyayaratna, Rāmgati. 1867. *Bānglar Itihās.* Hugli. p. 1. I am grateful to Swarupa Gupta for providing me with this and other reference materials of works authored by the Bengali intelligentsia of the nineteenth century.
14. Moitreya, Akshoykumar. 1984. *Gourer Kathā*, 1899-1900, reprinted, p. 2.

15. Tagore, Rabindranath. 1955. *Itihās.* reprinted. Calcutta, p. 1. See also, Sarkar, Sumit. 1977. *Writing Social History.* Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 24.
16. Sen, Ramdas. 1872. *Bhāratbarṣer Purābritta Samālochan.* Calcutta, p. 1.
17. Chatterjee, Partha. 1995. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories.* Oxford India Paperbacks. Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 88.
18. As quoted in, Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments,* p. 91.
19. Ibid. p. 93.
20. Ibid. pp. 93, 94.
21. Hempel, Carl. 1965. *Aspects of Scientific Explanation.* New York: Free Press, p. 427.
22. See Brodbeck, M. Introduction to ch 1, "The Nature of Human Action". *Readings in Philosophy of the Social Sciences:* M. Brodbeck (ed.). New York: Macmillan. pp. 15, 16.
23. Chatterjee, Partha. *The Nation and Its Fragments.* pp. 97, 98, 102, 110.
24. Ibid. p. 95.
25. Ibid. p. 115.
26. Krausz, Michael and Shusterman, Richard (ed.). 1999. *Interpretation, Relativism and the Metaphysics of Culture: Themes in the Philosophy of Joseph Margolis.* New York, Amherst: Humanity Books, p. 8.
27. Downes, Stephen M. 1998. "Constructivism". *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* vol. 2. London: Routledge. p. 625.
28. Krausz, Michael. 2000. *Limits of Rightness.* Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
29. Gupta, Chhanda. 2002. Postscript in *Realism versus Realism.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 136.
30. Krausz, Michael. *Limits of Rightness.* p. 26.
31. Gupta, Chhanda. *Realism versus Realism.* p. 140.
32. Roy, Rajat Kanta. 2003. *The Felt Community, Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press. p. 8.
33. Ibid. p. 34.
34. Ibid. p. 5.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Ishwar Singh

The Relationship between Science and Ideology in the Philosophy of the Social Science

This article investigates the nature and relationship of science and ideology—two characteristic forms of modern knowledge. It explores the following question: Is science the 'other' of ideology or the same as ideology? This has been the defining question for the social sciences and the theories of ideology since the enlightenment period. It is argued here that the relationship between science and ideology can be explained by looking into the history of changing correlation between natural and social sciences that in turn reflects the debates over the connection of the natural and social domain. This article intends to critically examine the views associated with philosophies of positivism, critical rationalism, conventionalism, and the Frankfurt School on the relations between science and ideology.

The question of relationship between ideology and science is a very complex one, because there are numerous conceptions and meanings attached to both the terms. Different notions of ideology suggest a different kind of relationship to science. The same applies to the conception of science. For example, the Leninist positive conception of ideology blurs the difference between science and ideology, so that a 'scientific ideology' can be conceptualised.[1] However, from other positions the expression 'scientific ideology' is nothing but paradoxical. This expression presupposes a very exclusive meaning of science. The ideology, which serves the interest of the bourgeoisie is said to be unscientific, whereas ideology, which serves the interest of the working class is described as scientific. This involves a very arbitrary understanding of science. History shows us that the prefix 'scientific' is being used to legitimise all type of whimsicalities associated with the State-capitalist rule of the "Soviet Union".

One of the responses of Enlightenment thinking to the question of ideology was seeing ideology as non-science or falsity. Ideology was also seen as a poor science or illusion in the guise of science. This conception had its roots in the Enlightenment belief that the task of reason was to unmask prejudices and errors of tradition. The sociologist August Comte, who is one of the founders of positivism, developed the discipline of sociology with the aim of replacing ideological thought imbued with metaphysics and tradition. Comte believes that there are three stages of theoretical development: 'The theological or fictitious, the metaphysical or abstract, and the scientific or positive.'[2]

Emile Durkheim also drew a distinction between ideology and positivist science. For Durkheim sociology as a science of facts must be free from ideological thinking. In his *The Rules of Sociological Method*, ideology stands for 'an irrational obstruction to scientific knowledge.'[3]

The most articulate polarisation between science and ideology emerged in the writings of two thinkers of the twentieth century. Ironically, of these, one belongs to the Marxist camp, viz., Louis Althusser. The other belongs to the anti-Marxist camp, viz., Karl Popper. Both wanted to demarcate clearly between science and non-science. For Althusser, Marxism and psychoanalysis were the leading instances of science, but the same were the worst examples of ideology or pseudo-science for Popper.[4] Both wanted to relate the problem of ideology to the question of science and rigorously tried to separate science from other discourses. The pitfall of this approach was the belief that science has universal character, is always sensitive to truth, and is constantly self-correcting. It followed from this that science could not be ideological.

On the question of relationship between science and ideology, there have been broadly three types of responses. The first sees an exclusive antagonism between science and ideology. For the second view, there is no difference between both the realms. Science is just another kind of ideology. The third view sees neither opposition nor identity between science and ideology. This simply accepts that there is a certain difference between the two realms. This can be expressed as three logical possibilities of the relationship between the realms of science and ideology: Science against ideology, science as ideology and science different from ideology.[5]

Is ideology "the other" of science or the same as science? This has been the crucial question for the debates of the critical conception of ideology. Related to this is the question that can there be a relationship between science and ideology other than inclusion and exclusion.

Mostly the term *science* is used to denote the realm of natural science. Science usually does not denote the social or human sciences. How important is the term 'social' in social sciences? How scientific are social sciences? These are the basic questions pertaining to the philosophy of social sciences. However, these questions are also important for understanding the relationship between science and ideology.

The relationship between natural sciences and social sciences also reflects the debates over the relationship of the realms of natural and social. There have been three types of theoretical responses to the question of relationship between natural and social. The first is scientism, which tries to put the natural outside of the realm of social and historical. The second is historicism, which tried to appropriate the natural into the realm of social and historical. These two tendencies have been dominating the debates on the nature and relationship of natural and social sciences. The third approach sees a certain differentiation and intersection between the two realms of the natural and social. Both the tendencies have been equally in force in Marxist and non-Marxist circles.

Larrain suggests that the relationship of science and ideology can also be seen as based on the relationship between natural and social sciences.[6] We have discussed above that there can be three logical schemes of possibilities of relationship between science and ideology: relations of exclusion, relations of inclusion, and relations of overlapping. It would be useful to know how this logical scheme actually unfolded historically. Larrain suggests a three-fold scheme, while Afonso presents the history of relationship between natural and social science in four stages.[7] We would generally refer to both the accounts while discussing the question of relationship between science and ideology. The changes, which took place in the relation of the natural and social sciences, have some bearing on the relationship between science and ideology.

The first stage was the foundational movement for the social sciences. In the period of Enlightenment humanism, the analysis of "human action" became the new subject matter of epistemological reflection and philosophizing.[8] In this period, metaphysics was scorned at, but was not regarded as non-sensical.[9] Simultaneously empirical methods were appreciated and promoted but did not become the only valid method in social inquiry.

From the first stage of "philosophise empirically,"[10] a new stage of positivism began. Jürgen Habermas characterised this transition as 'the replacement of epistemology by the philosophy of science',[11] in which 'knowing subject' is dislocated from the system of reference. Positivism as the philosophy of science is 'philosophical only insofar as is necessary for the immunisation of the sciences against philosophy.'[12]

The epistemology from Immanuel Kant to Karl Marx accepted the subject of cognition in the form of consciousness, ego, mind, and species-being (*Gattungswesen*). The notion of subject changed considerably within this period,. but always retained the concept of synthesis as the basis for the validity of statements. However, in the times of positivism, when epistemology deforms into methodology, 'it loses sight of the constitution of the objects of possible experience; in the same way, a formal science dissociated from transcendental reflection became blind to the genesis of rules for the combination of symbols.'[13] Based on Habermas' account of positivism in *Knowledge and Human Interest*, it can be said that this process generated three kinds of effects, i.e., objectivism, scientism, and technological triumphalism.

Objectivism can be referred to as a philosophical approach concerning methodology. Richard J. Bernstein has pointed out that objectivism can be associated with the search for an Archimedean point, that refers to a 'permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, and goodness of rightness.'[14] Habermas links it to the suppression of the awareness of the knowledge-constitutive interests of one's thought. When objectivism was succeeded in the concealment of the *a priori* constitution of facts, then it began to delude the sciences 'with the image of a self-subsistent world of facts structured in a law like manner.'[15]

Scientism can be referred to as a general approach towards the imagined and magnified capacities of the sciences. Immanuel Wallerstein sees scientism as the claim that science is self-referential and does not need philosophical grounding, that science is value-neutral and extra-social, and that science is the only valid knowledge.[16] This implies that any theory of knowledge, which does not substantiate the parameters of methodology of science, would become simply non-sensical. It can also be said that if one imagine a narcissistic self-image of science that would be scientism.

The position of positivism involves a paradox. Positivism does not see the validity of knowledge outside the system of empirical sciences, but paradoxically it had emerged firstly as a new philosophy of history. August Comte presented it as the third stage of individual and species' intellectual development. Comte's arguments of defence of positivism themselves do not follow the empirical criterion. These paradoxes expose the intentions of early positivism: 'the pseudo-scientific propagation of the cognitive monopoly of science.'[17]

Habermas argues that positivistic elimination of the philosophical concept of knowledge could have proved very risky for science, as from where now science attain meaning, without which it would have become irrational and meaningless. The trick positivism played to surmount this crisis was the supply of meaning to the enterprise of science from without empirical methodology—from the perspective of philosophy of history itself. Positivism thus seeks the meaning of science from the basis of the historical genesis of modern scientific inquiry and consequential institutionalized scientific progress. The loss of subject's reflection upon it is being compensated by the phenomena of scientific-technical progress. In a smart move, positivism, and what somewhere Roy Bhaskar called "technological triumphalism" presupposed mutual legitimisation for each other. In this context, Habermas observes:

> Because the concept of knowledge became irrational, the methodology of the sciences and the scientific rationalization of life conduct must interpret each other reciprocally. This is the real job of early positivism. It justifies the sciences'

> scientistic belief in themselves by constructing the history of the species as the history of realization of the positive spirit.[18]

It can be seen from the above discussion that positivism was established supposedly on the ground of exclusion of non-science including ideology from the realm of science. However, the spirit of scientism and the binary of science and ideology went much further than the positivism of Vienna school. The structuralist Louis Althusser, the rationalist Karl Popper, and Imre Lakatos—all can be described as post-empiricists, but they share with empiricism the idea of dichotomy of science and ideology. If positivism's criterion for the separation of ideology and science was the principal of verifiability, for Popperian rationalism, it was the concept of falsifiability, and for Lakatos' rationalism, it was methodological falsificationalism.

Karl Popper himself did not like the tag of "positivism", but effectively his theories have a compromise with positivism. Apart from the key role of sense experience, arranged by experimental methods, in refutation, he shares with positivism the principle of the unity of scientific method.[19] He believes that method of natural and social sciences are the same. He goes to the extent of saying that 'a social technology is needed whose results can be tested by piecemeal social engineering.'[20] Jorge Larrain has pointed out the legitimizing function of such theoretical position:

> In equating social facts with natural facts they tend to absolutize the existent structure of society as though it was a natural law. In other words, they disregard the historical character of social reality and thus can easily become an apology of the status quo.[21]

Now we would take up the third stage of the relationship between natural and social science. If in the stage of scientism social science were modelled on the natural sciences, in the third stage social sciences were deliberately separated from natural sciences. The key claim of this stage is that 'social sciences, by their very nature, are hermeneutical and their conclusions essentially contestable.'[22] Not only the relationship between natural and social sciences has changed, but also the hermeneutical method has extended to the domain of natural sciences.

Among other things, the philosophies of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend had contributed to this transition. Nonetheless, the historicist tendency was present even at the peak of positivism. The historicist tendency in social sciences came in reaction against scientist tendencies and took inspiration from the old tradition of German historicism. But the extension of phenomenological and hermeneutical inquiry into the domain of natural science can be said to be a post-Kuhnian phenomena. After shaking of the foothold of "science", historicist understanding took strength in social sciences as well.

Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend's approach is called conventionalism. It has three key features.[23] Firstly, theories or statement of science are not portrayal of external reality, but are "artificial construction" made by scientists. Hence, they are neither true nor false. Secondly, there is no universal or rational criterion for the selection of a theory, instead it is chosen by subjective criterion. Thirdly, there can be no empirical data or theory-neutral observation of sensory data.

Kuhn believes that a scientific research is undertaken with some theoretical framework or outlook, which he named "paradigm". Selection of a paradigm is not the matter of rational criterion, but is based on social convention. That is why the distinction of science and ideology is also based on social convention. Thomas Kuhn challenged any possibility of objective knowledge. For him a scientific paradigm is not more than 'a value system, an ideology'.[24]

Paul Feyerabend went further and claimed that there is no distinction between science and ideology. Science is simply one ideology among many ideologies and no ideology can claim to be better than the other ideology. Feyerabend's position has been described as 'permissive anarchism'.[25] Feyerabend's theories are also vulnerable to the relativist's paradox. David Morrice suggests that there is a difference between Karl Mannheim and Paul Feyerabend on this count. Mannheim tries to deny the problem of relativism in the name of relationalism, whereas Feyerabend on the one hand puts forth a distinction between relational judgement and relativism, but on the other hand announces that intellectual should not be afraid of relativism.[26]

There is an interesting phenomenon, in which positivism, rationalism, and conventionalism entail each other and sustain each other's arguments. The reason for this is that some theories take extreme stands, which are difficult to hold on and slip into the others. David Morrice argues that the seeds of conventionalism can be seen in the accounts of Popper and Lakatos. Popper's moral relativism considers 'all moral judgement as unjustifiable human decision'. Lakatos also believes that human decisions involved in sciences are not themselves scientific or rational. Thus Popper and Lakatos's rationalism was based on an epistemological relativism, which ultimately leads to the theory of incommensurable paradigms in Kuhn.[27]

Leszek Kolakowski sees conventionalism as the manifestation of the self-destructive tendency of positivism itself. Positivism in its attempt to search the ground for knowledge in experience falls into the trap of an infinite regression, which paradoxically can be broken only by taking recourse to an *a priori* element, which is the idea of convention in this case.[28] But there is also a reverse process. David M Walker remarks:

> Just as positivism's search for a final basis of experience for knowledge must fail and end up in the adoption of conventions, so the flaws of conventions, principally their lack of a secure basis, lead conventionalism back into the arms of positivism. Positivism offers a model from which to draw conventions.[29]

Based on the above discussion, it can be said that extreme positions of inclusion or exclusion of natural and social involve the risk of either infinite regression or of the liar's paradox, characteristic of relativism. If social is included or assimilated in the realm of natural than ideology and science becomes the opposite of each other. This is a scientistic fallacy. And when the natural world is excluded from the realm of social then ideology and science become the same. This is a historicist fallacy.

There remains yet another possibility. This can be put like this—when the natural and the social intersect each other, then we find an intersecting relationship of science and ideology. There is a fourth stage of the relationship between natural and social sciences, in which misplaced attempts of seeing the relationship between the two domains as the relationship of similarly or contrast are finally overcome. This is attained after the releasing of the conflictual tension between the "analytic" and "phenomenological"[30], and after the realization that perceptual judgements are both hermeneutical and causal, a position which avoids both objectivism and gross subjectivism. This position visualizes a different relationship between the social and the natural.

In this context, it can be recalled that Marx's insights about the relationship of the social and the natural is able to avoid both the extreme tendencies, discussed above. But in the course of history of ideas, his dialectical insight got suppressed as Marxism after Marx was hegemonized by either positivism or historicism. For the recovery of Marx's dialectical insight into the relationship between natural and social and ideology and science, the above mentioned 'fourth stage' played a crucial role. For Marx human beings are part of nature. The history of society is situated within natural history, which in turn could be intelligible only with reference to social history. A. Schmidt called this relationship "differentiated unity."[31]

The above-mentioned scientist and historicist positions on the relationship of science and ideology either discuss these realms in terms of truth and error or treat them as a certain kind of symbol systems or set of beliefs. For them legitimization of domination is not the basic criteria for the characterization of ideology, whereas for Marx ideology is intrinsically linked to legitimization of class domination. We have discussed earlier that for Marx ideology is not tantamount to cognitive or logical errors. Ideology cannot be overcome by taking recourse to science or even to the exercise of critique.

If one starts from Marx's critical conception of ideology and the dialectics of social and natural history, then a dialectical understanding of the relationship of science of ideology can be arrived at. In this understanding, there remains a possibility of non-ideological errors or metaphysics and also there can be non-scientific truths. The sphere of knowledge could not be exhausted between the neat division of science and ideology. Ideological strategies involve some kind of cognitive illusion or discursive deception, but ideology is not made up of error totally. We have seen that true statements can be very much a part of ideology. Moreover, for effective legitimization of power relationship every ideology uses some truths. Ideology takes the resources of rationality in the form of rationalization. Reason and unreason are both among the ingredients of ideology.

The Scientistic and historicist approaches themselves proved ideological. If one approach believes in the ideology-free nature of science, for the other science is equal to ideology. Both positions fail to notice that science as a body of knowledge can both legitimize and de-legitimize power motives according to the context given. Hence, science can be both ideological and non-ideological contextually.

Scientists and positivists including the Marxist variety face a difficulty in comprehending how science can be employed ideologically, when science is sensitive to self-correction and applies the tests of objectivity over itself from time to time. They ask if science's nature of incompletion in itself does not entail that scientific knowledge is historical and repairable.

The historical nature of science does not imply that scientific truths are not objective in a historical context. Again, objectivity would also be a subject matter of interpretation. Objectivity of science does not entail that scientific statements are true and objective in every condition. Natural science entails universality, but only within its delimited sphere. The observation of Ian Angus can be applied in this regard. A scientific truth, for example truth of physics, may be true within its *delimited and specialised sphere,* but when it is extended beyond its *legitimate* sphere and is applied to 'the determination of the society as a whole,'[32] then it turns into being ideological.

One example of this is the science policy of governments or social policies based on science. Not only is science a social product, but its use, employment or consumption is determined in the sphere of social and political, which is outside of a legitimate sphere of any single science or set of sciences. There must be an analytical distinction between science in itself and science in society. The existing power relations not only influence the course of science's development, but also utilize it as a trusted pool of resources for legitimization of power relationships. A science as a body of social knowledge can be sure of itself at any given time. But it must always be under the scanner of the critique of the power relationship. A critique of a particular scientific truth would tend to transcend its delimited sphere of knowledge.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, , B.I. Publications, New Delhi, 1980, p. 172.

2. See ibid, p. 28.
3. See, Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: an Introduction,* Verso, London, 1991p. 153.
4. See Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory,* Macmillan, New York, 1979, p. 185.
5. This is based on Jorge Larrain's argument. See Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology,* pp. 172-176.
6. See ibid, pp. 174-176.
7. See AV Afonso, 'Social versus Natural: an Image of "Social" Science', *Summerhill: IIAS Review,* Volume 10, No. 1 & 2, 2004.
8. Ibid., p. 74.
9. Jorge Larrain, *Concept of Ideology,* p. 191.
10. A.V. Afonso, 'Social versus Natural: an Image of "Social" Science', p. 74.
11. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987, p. 67.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 68.
14. Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis,* Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p. 8.
15. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* p. 69.
16. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Uncertainties of Knowledge,* Temple University Press, Philadlphia, 2004, p. 13.
17. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests,* p. 71.
18. See ibid., p. 72.
19. Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology,* p. 192.
20. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies,* Volume 2, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973, p. 218.
21. Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology,* p. 193.
22. A.V. Afonso, 'Social versus Natural: an Image of "Social" Science', p. 74.
23. See David M. Walker, *Marx, Methodology, and Science: Marx's Science of Politics,* Ashgate, Aldershot, 2001, p. 119.
24. Thomas Kuhn cited in David Morrice, *Philosophy, Science and Ideology in Political Thought,* Macmillan, Houndmills, 1996, p. 100.
25. See ibid., pp. 101 and 103.
26. Ibid., p. 104.
27. Ibid., p. 106-107.
28. See the discussion of Leszek Kolakowski's argument in David M. Walker, *Marx, Methodology and Science,* p. 126-127.
29. Walker's comment in based on the argument of Schndelbach Cited in ibid, pp. 127 and 135 n. 59.

30. A.V. Afonso, 'Social versus Natural: an Image of "Social" Science', pp. 75 & 79.
31. Cited in Jorge Larrain, *The Concept of Ideology*, p. 176.
32. Ian Angus, *(Dis)figurations: Discourse/Critique/Ethics*, Verso, London, 2000, pp. 32-33.

Murzban Jal

Karl Marx's Scientific Discovery

In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income.

Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I.

I should *then* say that this science (historical materialism) cannot be a science like any other, a science for 'everyone'. Precisely because it reveals the mechanisms of class exploitation, repression and domination, in the economy, in politics and in ideology, it cannot be recognized by *everyone*. This science, which brings the social classes face to face with their truth, is unbearable for the bourgeoisie and its allies, who reject it and take refuge in their so-called 'social sciences': it is only acceptable to the proletariat, whom it 'represents' (Marx). That is why the proletariat has recognized it as its own property, and has set it to work in its practice: in the hands of the Workers' Movement, Marxist science has become the theoretical weapon of the revolution.

Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy*

They tell you we are dreamers. The true dreamers are those who think things can go on indefinitely the way they are. We

> are not dreamers. We are awakening from a dream that is turning into a nightmare.
>
> Slavoj Žižek speaking at
> "Occupy Wall Street", October, 2011.

MARX AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE NEW GALAXY OF KNOWLEDGE

Probably the best metaphor to explain Marxism as a rigorous science comes from Althusser. In *Lenin and Philosophy* he talks of Marx discovering a new continent of knowledge, the continent of history, that follows the two prior continents discovered: mathematics and physics.[1] Since "continents" signify imperialism and not knowledge, one may have to say that Marx discovered a new galaxy. So let us say that Marx discovered a new galaxy and constituted a new discipline: historical materialism. One may like to have the term "new galaxy", for imperialism has not yet colonized outer space, despite their great efforts. But one will also like to use this term since Marx uses the metaphor of the telescope to indicate how he has discovered this new site of the human understanding.[2]

Now with this new galaxy discovered, Marx also discovers a New Physics with a radically new account of understanding space and time. This New Space one will call after the young Marx the space of species being (*Gattungswesen*) and following Engels' terminology we call it *Gemeinwesen*[3] (roughly translated as "common essence", though Engels implies the Paris Commune here). Besides this new space he also discovers a new time zone: the time of dialectics that transcends the old time zone of formal logicit where time is understood as everything and humanity as nothing.[4] The two distinct time zones is the time zone of historical time and the reified zone, the zone that suppresses history, change and movement. The latter appears as the neurotic time: the time of the neurotic's compulsion to repeat. Marx calls this "circular movement"[5], which in the last resort is the phantasmagoria of idealist philosophies that restore abstractions, and thereby restores religion and theology.[6]

Keeping this New Physics in mind and the understanding of the new ideas of space and time I shall bracket our argument here and go to what science in Marxism means. Firstly one will have to bracket the post-Marx-Marxists' understanding of science, since quite often than nought they built their theories from Engels' *Dialectics of Nature* almost forgetting Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. By "real science" Marx implies the establishment of "true materialism" that is built on the principle of the social relationship of human to human.[7] A little note on the history of what we call "science" is thus necessary, since (despite its rigour) manifold meanings emerge. One must firstly differentiate science from the ideology of the sciences. One must then note that 'science' cannot be taken purely as a fetishized 'objectivist' perspective, but has also to be considered as a class project. What the scientific revolution since the European Renaissance did was to push theology away from human imagination and bring in human reasoning. The industrial revolution pushed back theology altogether in the space of pure fantasy. This historical note is of extreme importance since it brings in scientific reasoning as a dominant discourse. The blow that this would give to idealist speculation and to faith would be so severe that it would need only the crises of capitalism to bring in the same theological fantasies back again onto the stage of world history.

One must also note that Marx, whilst keeping an internationalist perspective, writes more oft than nought in German (with the exception of his *Poverty of Philosophy* which he wrote in French). In German, science is *Wissenschaft*. Hegel, for instance, titles his logic: *Wissenschaft der Logik*, or the *Science of Logic*. The Germanic *Wissenschaft*, especially after the Hegelian philosophical revolution, is not to be confused with the Anglo-American renderings of 'science'. It is not a positivist 'science'; most certainly it is not what is known since the Frankfurt school as "scientism", to be precise it is not reason as instrumental reason, where the will to power subdues the will to knowledge. We shall see that in the past century, at least since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, there was a sort of a philosophical and ideological game characterizing the idea of science, as the very defence of bourgeois private property was necessary.

Consequently in the background of this paper on Marxism as a rigorous science, there lie not only the themes of the French materialists, the English empiricists and Hegelian dialectics, the three distinct themes that characterize the making of Marx's philosophical and methodological repertoire. One also has the post-

Marx debates initiated by the Heidelberg Circle on the radical difference between the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaft*) and the natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaft*)—a theme taken up by Georg Lukács in his *History and Class Consciousness* followed by the Frankfurt School (especially by Marcuse and Habermas)—which itself was followed by the debates on scientific positivism, critical rationalism, scientific realism, etc. One therefore has not only Marx speaking along with Engels (who was more vocal on Marxism as a science), Plekhanov, Kautsky, Lenin, Bukharin, Trotsky, Lukács, Gramsci, Lucio Colletti, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Sartre, Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Roy Bhaskar.

We see that the field of 'science' (especially the philosophy of science) is diverse having manyfold streams. What one will attempt is to see whether a dialogical discourse is possible. We will also see how Marxism as rigorous science can come onto the scene of philosophical imagination. We come back to the new continent discovered—history. We see that there are reservations constituted within this newly discovered new continent: the reservations of alienation-reification-fetishism. We call this the *black hole of alienation*. This black hole will devour humanity.

So we see that Marx discovers a new body, the *body of history*. But he also discovers a *new cell* (of this new body), the *cell of alienation-reification-fetishism*. Now it is well known that thinkers before Marx spoke of alienation, or reification, or fetishism. But no one spoke of all three. No one saw the order of this triad. No one saw that the new cell was composed in this triadic form: alienation-reification-fetishism. Unfortunately, though thinkers after Marx did speak on this theme, the triad as a rigorously defined triad was absent from their analysis. Consequently the new continent relapsed into an older continent. Old Physics came back onto the scene of world history. Not only was the collapse of the Soviet experiment proof of this going back onto the Old Physics, but far back to the Stalinist counterrevolution in 1928, the triumph of this old Physics take place.

To state very briefly, the new continent of knowledge is a rigorous science. This rigour however should not be confused with deterministic theories. Marx was no determinism and as Gramsci had shown this determinism that was initiated by the Second International was nothing but born-again messianic theology of the "weak will". Marxism as rigorous science makes a difference between two sites: (1) what one call after Marx the model that appears in "pure form", and (2) the chaotic model. The pure form model is the model that functions at the deep level of scientific inquiry. It operates at the level of everyday life-world in altogether different way. I call this way of the appearance of the pure form, the chaotic form.

Consequently Marx's theory of history is rigorous, especially his main thesis on the historicity of capitalism and the inability of capitalist to function when its forces of production has transcended the social structure of society, or in other words transcended its relations of production. This thesis claims (made famous by Marx's in his 'Preface' to his 1859 *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*) that within the base, there occurs a clash between the two levels of the base, i.e. between the forces and relations of production, where the latter become fetters to the development of the productive forces, thus creating havoc in society. Since a clash occurs between the two one witnesses the transformation in the social structure. In this deep structure, or the pure form, Marx discovers three sites: (1) forces of production (the level of the sciences and technologies), (2) production relations (the structure of society which are comprised of the ownership of means of production and the class struggle), and (3) the ideological superstructure. The former two are the "base" whilst the third rests on this base. Since quite often there has been a tendency to have a reductionist explanation which gives priority to only the first site (Cohen's explanation in his magnum opus *Karl Marx's Theory of History* is one good example), one must make it clear that the pure form lays only a certain methodological guide lines for understanding this new science. In this pure form we see that the movement of level 1 (forces of production) to the level of say "A" witnesses the likewise movement of level 2 (relations of production) to "A". When level 1 becomes "A^1", then level likewise follows the same. This, as we insist, operates at the pure form, or the cell form. It is found in the laboratory of historical materialism. Its mode of appearance i the everyday life-world takes an altogether different form. One therefore has to differentiate the cell form from the body form.

The pure form of science shows what Marx calls the "progressive development" of history from primitive communism, via the Asiatic societies, European slave society, feudalism, capitalism, and the consequent struggle for communism. Since there has been a sort of misunderstanding whether Marx implied a unilinear theory of history (made sacrosanct by Stalin) and since Marx's *Ethnological Notebooks* (where he talks of non-European societies and their own concrete course of historical development) has almost been ignored, it must be stated that Marx did not impose a teleological view of history where only the forces of production were seen to determine the development of the course of history. One only has to note Marx's 1877 letter on the Narodniki mis-interpretation of history, where he differentiates the concrete analysis of primitive accumulation of capital in western Europe and the European transition from feudalism to capitalism from what he calls an imposition of this theory onto the whole world, where one has the fantasy of "an historico-philosophico theory of the general development prescribed by fate of all nations".[8] One cannot have, as Marx notes, a "master key" as a "general historico-philosophical theory", for what in the end happens, is being supra-historical.[9]

History, and Marx's account of it, is dynamic and fluid and cannot be kept in the magical jar where the predetermination of theological theories are substituted by some sort of 'science'. Marxism is not this born-again theology, nor is it the phantasmagorical gin kept in the magical jar. One must here not only bring to attention Gramsci's reading of theology parading as Marxist 'science', but also those of Walter Benjamin. That this theory came into being at the time of the revisionism of the Second International (who did not want to fight for the revolution, but wanted it to 'inevitable' happen, and because it did not 'inevitable' or 'magically' happen one had to support the necessities of so-called history including imperialist wars) is well known. That it was made sacrosanct by the Stalinist counterrevolution should also be noted because the Stalinist bureaucratic state capitalist *new class* wanted to justify their counterrevolution. Stalin's last work *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* is an example of this parading of theology as science where he redrafts theology's "laws" and humanity's necessary obedience to these "laws" as a "science".

What one sees, is what one calls after Marx, a "so-called science" which works in a "roundabout way".[10] We call this a *'duplicate' science* because it seems to imitate the scientific method, whilst in actuality it mimes it in an altogether manipulative way. It is not what one calls "reason" but what we call after the Frankfurt School's use of the

Weberian term an "instrumental reason". It uses the "authority of science" whilst in actuality invoking "magical formulae".[11] This duplicate scientist attempts to be a utopian, but in actuality becomes a *duplicate utopian.*

Since Marx calls his science a *human natural science*[12], and since this vocabulary is by and large forgotten, one needs to conceptualize this very idea, for it is this idea that resolve the contradictions and tensions between the social and the natural sciences. It is also this idea that opens a new framework where not only is this human natural science as *dialectical and historical-humanist materialism* found its method of operation, but also how the humanization of the sciences is rendered possible. If we saw that historical materialism as articulated in Marx's 1859 Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* articulates the three basic structures of human history in its "pure form" or "cell form": forces of production, production relations and the political and ideological superstructure; the problematic of human natural science from the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* activates the dialectics of the natural sciences and philosophy in the genre of "humanity's essential powers"[13]. The ontology of humanity, or human *Dasein,* that articulates the sciences as springing from "human sensuous essential powers"[14] becomes the new basis for the understanding of Marx's new galaxy of knowledge. Humanity thus stands at the base of Marx's scientific revolution. The question of seeing history as a "process without a subject" (as done by Althusser) is a fallacy that stems from his reading of Marxism as "theoretical anti-humanism". One must recall Marx here: "Humanity is the immediate object of natural science..."[15]

What Marx does is that he radically transforms the ideas of subjectivity and objectivity thus being able to articulate anew the idea of science and philosophy. Nature is thus no longer to be seen an objectivity lying "out there", independently of human existence. Nor is subjectivity to be seen as dealing with merely 'consciousness', the 'will', etc. Instead one deals with subjectivity and objectivity as forms of human praxes and thus as "manifestation of human reality".[16] It is class society (and capitalism in particular) that erases human reality and fragments the diverse systems of knowledge. If there was to be a sense of unity between the natural sciences and philosophy it would only be what Marx calls a "momentary unity" that is based on a "chimerical illusion"[17]. "The will was there", as Marx says, "but the power was lacking".[18] This is how Marx comprehends the complex dialectic and also articulates the possibilities of a real unity between philosophy and science:

> Historiography itself pays regard to natural science only occasionally, as a factor of enlightenment, utility and of some special great discoveries. But natural science has invaded and transformed human life all the more *practically* through the medium of industry; and has prepared human emancipation, although its immediate effect had to be the furthering and the dehumanization of humanity. Industry is the actual, historical relationship of nature, and therefore of natural science to humanity. If, therefore, industry is conceived as the *exoteric* revelation of humanity' *essential powers*, we also gain an understanding of the *human* essence of nature or the *natural* essence of humanity. In consequence natural sciences will lose its abstract material—or rather, its idealist tendency, and will become the basis of *human* science, as it has already become—albeit in an estranged form—the basis of actual human life, and to assume *one* basis for life and a different basis for *science* is as a matter of course a lie.[19]

It must be stated that Marx's idea of science is not the positivist searching of laws that are independent of humanity, Instead it keeps the Feuerbachian concern for sense-perception that is said to be the basis for all science.[20] There are four main points that one can draft as Marx's fundamental understanding of the natural sciences: (1) articulating humanity's essential powers, (2) of understanding the genesis of nature and human society, (3) articulating sense perception in the twofold forms of sensuous consciousness and sensuous need, and (4) of understanding *humanity as humanity* and human history as part of natural history.[21]

Marx thus concludes:

> History itself is a *real* part of *natural history*—of nature developing into humanity. Natural science will in time incorporate into the science of humanity, just as the science of humanity will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be *one* science.[22]

Thus by putting the Feuerbachian idea of human essential powers and the Hegelian idea of truth as a process[23], Marx transcends the sites of human estrangement and the consequent emergence of what he calls "pseudo questions", and comes onto the new site of *humanity as radical historization.* Marx's science thus becomes the science of human knowing as well as human emancipation. If "knowing" and "being" are no longer considered as opposites, then "knowing" and "emancipation" are also not regarded as binaries. To transcend this state of binaries is the fundamental point for the scientific revolution. Once one does this then science becomes a material force and literally "grips the masses"[24].

But to do that one has to transcend the continent of knowledge that goes right from Aristotle to Kant. And since Hegel is the first one to be involved in this transcendence, one will have to go immediately to him.

ON UNDERSTANDING THE HEGELIAN REVOLUTION

We will see besides Althusser's two pre-Marxist revolutions, another tremendous revolution, the revolution set by the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution. This is the theoretical revolution started by Hegel that closed the intellectual history of two millennia that began with Aristotle. If Aristotle was the "great thinker" that Marx attributed him as the, master of thought, society and nature[25], then Hegel is the logical and historical successor to the Aristotlean revolution. Yet this revolution appears in the dual forms of mystification and the rational. In mystified form the Hegelian revolution becomes a "fashion" because it transfigures and glorifies the existing state of things, whilst in its rational form it is a scandal and adomination to bourgeoisdom.[26] So what is this Hegelian fashion, this mystification that glorifies the inglorious; and how can one transform this fashion into a scandal that rattles the doctrinaire professors?

The answer at first glance seems to be rather simple. One has to understand what the pre-Lenin Russian revolutionary Alexander Herzen called "the algebra of the revolution". Hegel is this algebra. One has to understand it. To understand Marx's newly discovered continent/galaxy one needs to briefly understand the differences that

Hegel made between the sites of the understanding (*Verstand*) and reason (*Vernunft*). To put it very simply, *Verstand* is the domain of the formal sciences governed by Aristotlean logic (with its dualisms that was perfected by Kant), whilst *Vernunft* is the new domain that Hegel discovers, the domain of post-Aristotlean logic. Now we know that Marxists of the last century put this Hegelian discovery at the centre of their discourse. We know of Illyenkov's *Dialectical Logic* and Zeleny's *Logic of Marx*. We know that Lenin in 1914 and following him Lukács and Gramsci, followed by Raya Dunayevskaya, one time colleague Trotsky, and founder of Marxist-Humanism, placed the Hegelian logic at the centre of revolutionary Marxism.

However at second glance the dialectic between the mystical and the rational is much more complex. At least since Engels' *Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* the rational was said to be the dialectical method, whilst the mystical was written as the Hegelian metaphysical system. But what Engels did not tell was the relation between the Hegelian "mystical" and the phenomenology of the estranged commodity that Marx outlined in *Capital*. The "mystical" is not to be understood as merely the idealist gibberish that university professors churn out, or what the media industry continuously propagates. Then what is Marx's understanding of the Hegelian mystical? What Marx means is that the mystical is that which is predicated to mode of thought that accedes to the mode of thinking that mimes outlines in the theory of value in *Capital*.

Now what Marx does is that he follows the genealogy of the commodity. He studies how it is a de-humanized process, that it is estranged from humanity, and after this first estrangement, it loses its material character to take an idealized form of value and exchange-value. Marx thus contextualizes the Hegelian mystical. He grounds it in capitalism and the phenomenology of the commodity. So estrangement, value and exchange-value do not allow Hegel to fully revolutionize his system. Hegel remains in what Marx calls "the orbit of estrangement".[27] And yet there is the rational that Marx accepts, a rational that Lenin in 1914 with the commencement of the first Imperialist World War (and the betrayal of the Second International to the forces of social imperialism) thought it necessary to read the entire *Logic* of Hegel. This what Marx says about Hegel:

> The outstanding achievement of Hegel's *Phänomenologie* and of its final outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving

> and generating principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-creation of humanity as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of *labour* and comprehends objective humanity—true, because real humanity—as the outcome of humanity's *own labour.* The *real, active* orientation of humanity to itself as a species-being, or his manifestation as a real species-being (i.e., as a human being), is only possible if he really brings out all his *species-powers*—something which in turn is only possible through the cooperative action of all of humankind, only as the result of history—and treats these powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible in the form of estrangement.[28]

So one reads Hegel not only in the dual sites of the rational and the mystical, but also understands the "one-sidedness and limitations" of Hegel[29]. What Marx did was take this logic and discover a New Physics by not applying the dialectical method onto reality, but discovering the mechanisms of world history as they actually function. What marks what we call the rigour of the scientific method is its unconditional materialistic method, or as we may dare to say, the dialectical materialist method. But this science is not merely a study of so-called "objective facts". It is humanist, or if one may say after Gramsci it is historicist and humanist, or better still one may say after Marx that it is "naturalism and humanism" that is distinct from both materialism and idealism, and yet it unifies the truths of both[30]. Marx's materialism is not to be confused with traditional materialism. Or to go further, it involves what the young Marx called, a human natural science which is also the natural science of humanity.[31] And since it is this humanism with passion realized as the "essential power of humanity energetically bent on its object"[32], which is said to be the basis of Marxist science, I had earlier christened it an "irresistible science".[33]

We saw above that Hegel breaks out from the domain of the understanding, the domain that the Frankfurt School had called the domain of science as *power seeking*, as different from reason (*Vernunft*) which is the critical science of human emancipation. Now what we see is that this "irresistible science" is the dispeller of the phantasmagoria that comes in the way of critical and emancipator thinking. This is what I had once said in my essay on the irresistible character of Marxist science:

> Amongst the theme of the birth of a "New Science" whether objective and verifiable as in Louis Althusser's rendering of Marxism or humanist and emancipatory as with Herbert Marcuse[34], or even a debunking of this radical novelty as Jürgen Habermas once suggested[35], science as *Wissenschaft* is empirical knowledge as distinct from idealist constructs. One has (as Jacques Lacan once insisted) to put the "real object" at the centre of discourse. In this sense Galileo's physics serves as a paradigm shift in the history of the sciences. His telescope showed that it was not belief that stood at the horizon of human knowledge, but intellect. Modern sciences were thus born, not merely as the European sciences, as Edmund Husserl once suggested, but as objective and universal method. Since Galileo there can be no going back. Galileo showed the cosmos freed from onto-theology and the original sin. One had to the same with the human cosmos. Argumentation and profane reason replaces theology. Dialogical discourse and intersubjectivity replaces monologue. The telescope replaces hysterical blindness. The material world replaces the transcendent "Idea"[36].

Along with this material site of analysis, Marx inserts the questions: *"What is humanity?"* and *"How is free humanity possible?"* Consequently if Althusser said that philosophy is always linked with the sciences[37], then one also says that the sciences (the science of the material world) are inexorably linked with philosophy. The world is thus linked to the question: *"How is free humanity possible?"* So if one says that the space that is opened that of the real object as the material for investigation, one now says that science and philosophy are placed under the genre of "critique". What this Marxist science does is places itself as a "critique", a point that not only covers the original Kantian concern of the analysis of the conditions of knowledge, but primarily deals with the analysis of human emancipation. Marxist science deals thus with human emancipation. It becomes "scientific dialectics" as Marx called it, that is derived "from a critical knowledge of the historical movement which itself produces the material conditions of emancipation".[38]

In contrast to this reading of Marxism as a science, there is another site usually opened by the reactionary ruling classes: that of the anti-sciences that appear as what Marx chided as "apparitions", "spectres", "whimsies" and other types of idealist humbug[39]. One has to stress on this site because the ruling classes love exploring this site—from the RSS and the Jamaat-e-Dawa to the American culture industry. Whilst one wants a "Hindu nation", another wants the "Islamic caliphate". The Yanks of course who desire the end of the world (one only has to watch Yankee satellite TV), which is another pop form of their biblical nonsense could be said to be the biggest producers of the factories of the "apparitions", "spectres" and "whimsies". Now one knows that these are being bombed not only in Libya and Afghanistan, but also in Indian universities, under the label of "ancient Indian wisdom". Scientific temper has not only to confront these apparitions in the age of late imperialism in permanent crisis, it will have to wage a just war of independence. In case India has to remain a secular and democratic society, this scientific revolution has to be the mainstay of the Indian public intellectuals. One only has to see the philosophy departments in India, and one will find the exact parallel that goes on in Pakistan. Obscurantism and superstition govern the South Asian feudo-bourgeois imagination.

But there is another space that is different from both these of the sciences and the organized superstitions. This space is the space called utopia. Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* sharply divided science from utopia. Science had the essential moments of description, explanation and prediction based on verifiable material principles, whilst utopia is a mere longing for an apparent just or even sometimes a classless society but based more on metaphysical sermons that on material practice. Science occupies a *verifiable space*, utopia occupies an *alien space*. In the *Communist Manifesto* Marx and Engels talked of the somewhat 'critical' thinking of the Utopian Communists, but a critique that was tied down by its own metaphysics, a metaphysics that did not want to get involved in the politics of class struggle, but in fact wanted to preach class reconciliation.[40] Consider Marx:

> The significance of Critical-Utopian socialism and Communism bears an inverse relation to historical development. In proportion as the modern class struggle develops and takes definite shape, this fantastic standing

> apart from the contest, these fantastic attacks on it, lose all practical value and all theoretical justification. Therefore, although the originators of these systems were, in many respects, revolutionary, their disciples have, in every case, formed mere reactionary sects. They hold fast be the original views of their masters, in opposition to the progressive historical development of the proletariat. They, therefore, endeavour, and that consistently, to deaden the class struggle and to reconcile class antagonisms. They still dream of experimental realization of their social utopias, of founding "*phalansteres*," of establishing "Home Colonies," of setting up a "Little Icaria"—duodecimo editions of the New Jerusalem—and to realize all these castles in the air, they are compelled to appeal to the feelings and purses of the bourgeois.[41]

They violently opposed the independent political action of the proletariat and transfigured politics in the "blind belief in the new gospel".[42] Their founders were revolutionaries; their followers were founders of reactionary sects.[43] The space that they occupy is *alien space* because their politics is based on the metaphysics of the *estranged mind.* And it is to this estranged mind that philosophy must turn its attention. One goes thus into the realm of the unconscious. If Marx went into the dual sites of (1) the alienated political economy and class struggles that emanate thereon, along with (2) the study of the estranged mind; one needs a psychoanalytic revolution to proceed further to explicate Marx's great discoveries.

But how does this scientific discovery of historical materialism operate in actuality? What is this actuality, this *necessity* that can be labelled as a *science*? We shall again reiterate. Marx proceeds to explain: if the forces of production are 'A', then the relations of production, either tend to be, or almost with a type of *iron necessity* follows the path of 'A'. And so if forces of production become 'A^1', then relations of production too follow this same pattern. From this argument there arose a problem: if necessity is the moving force of history, then what happens to Marx's main argument—the argument of radical and authentic ethics, the philosophy of praxis? What is the relation between freedom and necessity? Would Engels' appealing to freedom as the "appreciation of necessity" make Marxism a continuation of Spinoza and thus make historical materialism into the theory of pre-destination and determinism? The anwer of course is that if one does not keep the idea of humanity woven within the genre of class struggle, and if both are abstracted form the above given 'scientific' argument then one goes back to the old theories that oppose freedom and necessity.

Marx was not a determinist. The wrong reading of this follows mainly from the Plekhenovean narrative (the father of Russian communism); if not from Engels himself who tended to argue for a positivist type of reading of historical materialism After all it is well known that Marx was not a determinist and by *Bestimmung* (in the theorem: the economic base determines (*bestimmt*) an ideological superstructure) is implied determination which is not a determinism, but closely related to the notion of *Gestaltung* or formation. What Marx thus asks is: "How are social structures formed and what comprise their essential structures?" What Marx also asks is: "How is the estranged mind produced from the reified base?" It is this structure that one needs to grasp. And since one forgets these questions and also since we find the critique of the scientific method emerging as a critique of Western Reason one needs to look into these question. That they emerged in the genre of romantic anti-capitalism we all know. That the young Lukács was an advocate of this we too know. We also know that Edward Said kept this critique at the central of his *Orientalism.* But what we forget is that there are also distinct right-wing echoes of this. Consider this statement from Riza Davari-Ardakani the contemporary of the Islamic Republic of Iran:

> Notwithstanding the roots of Westoxication in Greek philosophy and its 2500 years of history, its specific and predominant form has emerged with the Renaissance. With the appearance of Westoxication, the old form of history is abolished and a new man is born who is no longer submissive to the *Haqq*. (*Haqq* here in the present Iranian sense is primordial Being in the Heideggerean sense, or to be precise, *estranged and despotic Being*. It ought not to be confused with the Sufi useage of *Haqq* (as 'truth', 'right', 'authentic'). My insertion. M. J.). He forgets the *Haqq* so that he can replace Him to expropriate the earth and the heavens.......The freedom of religious beliefs in the Declaration of Human Rights means alienation from religion; it means leaving the individuals to their own devices so that they may do whatever they want with

> religion in their private lives and have any religion they want... Modern man sees his own image in the mirror of *Haqq* and instead of entering into a covenant with *Haqq*, has entered into a covenant with himself. Therefore it is inevitable and natural that such a man would turn his back to religion and cover up his act with claims to nationalism, internationalism, liberalism, collectivism and individualism.[44]

Is there something wrong with "Western Reason" despite Marx? I will begin with the idea that the critique of "Western Reason' may turn out to be rather gripping. But in the end not only does it show to be entirely fallacious, since there is nothing really called "Western Reason", but also it shows to have distinct right-wing strands. After all not only would the RSS and the so-called "Islamic radicals" claim that there is something wrong with this rather strange creature called "Western Reason", but also one would have industries based on its critique. One does not merely have to go to the works of Ashis Nandy and company to comprehend how this bad and awful "Western Reason" has harmed "Eastern Reason". One may also go the a number of the departments of the social sciences in Indian universities to see how they have literally "banned" this awful "Western Reason", only to welcome not merely the writers of anti-secular manifestos but also Yoga, and other spiritual and occult 'sciences'. That there is a distinct ideological bias one must note. Marx is the villain, Marx the European fellow traveller, Marx who apparently hated Asia. Consider Nandy for this type of ideological reasoning:

> Everyone knows, for instance, that Karl Marx thought Asiatic and African societies to be ahistorical. Few know that he considered Latin Europe, and under its influence the whole of South America, to be ahistorical, too. Johan Galtung once told me that he had found, from the correspondence of Marx and Engels, that they considered all Slavic cultures to be ahistorical and the Scandinavians to be no better. If I remember Galtung correctly, one of them also added, somewhat gratuitously, that the Scandinavians could be nothing but ahistorical, given that they bathed infrequently and drank too much. After banishing so many races and cultures from the realm of history, the great revolutionary was left with only a few who lived in history -Germany, where he

> was born, Britain, where he spent much of his later life, and the Low Countries through which, one presumes, he travelled from Germany to England.[45]

One needs to point out (contra Nandy) that even what is known as the 'beginnings of Western Reason' grew from a very close interaction between the Mesopotamians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, the Medes, Egyptians, Indians, etc., and that Greek philosophy did not emerge only from the womb of the Greek cranium. Clearly Heidegger was wrong in postulating the beginning of western philosophy as a purely Greco affair that did not interact with other philosophies. What we now know (and this is what has recently pointed out by Peter Hudis in his essay on Marx and the Muslims[46]) that European rationalism was directly influenced by al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Averroes, that Descartes was inspired by al-Ghazzali, and that al-Sijistani influenced dialectical thinking. One should also not forget Hegel's reference of the Sufi mystic Rumi in his *Phenomenology of Mind.* Human history is not understood as the 'Destiny of Being from the European stand point'. Instead one should talk of the *humanization of history* from what Samir Amin had talked of, namely, the three waves of *universalizing humanity* starting with the Persians, Chinese and Greeks that culminated in Judaic, Christian and Islamic thought (this is the first wave: the idealist wave) which then proceeded in the European Renaissance (the second wave) and then finally ended in Marxism[47]. When Marx talked of communism as being a synthesis of humanism and naturalism, he did not mean that the human was to be solely the European.

So for one thing there can be nothing really called "Western Reason" because there is nothing really called the "West" and the "East". Yet, and because, one has to see the dangers of this line of thinking that does not want to comprehend imperialism, but instead claim how "Western Reason" has destroyed Indian life (not to forget how it has destroyed the Iranian mullahs' lives, besides the lives of other transcendental fascists), one will have to go through these rather rough waters. Now we know that according to a certain line of thinking we live in the grips of Western Reason. We shall now stick to the seriousness of this discourse and not be fooled by the occult-driven yogis and mullahs.

There are two dominant strands of Western Reason: one stressed by Husserl (and taken over by the Frankfurt School), the other being articulated by Martin Heidegger. In the first articulation, Western Reason begins with the Greeks and is built on the idea of rationality. It culminates in the modern sciences, to be precise technological reason, the domain that Hegel called *Verstand* (understanding). *Verstand* is strictly speaking not reason (*Vernunft*). The second strand of Western Reason is the Heideggerean one, again beginning with the Greeks and this time not culminating in the modern sciences, but in mythopoetics, to be precise European fascism that would, as Heidegger claim, rescue Western *Dasein* from the dangers of Bolshevism.[48] Whilst the first stream of Western Reason ends in the modern sciences, the second one culminates in mythopoetics. There is it seems, a peculiar type of telos, almost a form of an iron law, what Heidegger called the "destiny of Being" which governs both these strands of Reason. We do not exist in the West. Yet we are gripped by this double edge of Western Reason.

And in this response to the double effect of Western Reason we take up the critique of the doubling effects of Western Reason (primarily the humanist critique of the crisis of the modern sciences) based on Marx's reflections on the relation between reason, the sciences and society. Along with this discovery—called the science of Marxism: historical materialism—we have the philosophy of Marxism: the critique of the estranged mind. The former asks the question: *"how is history possible?"*, whilst the latter asks: *"how is humanity (as emancipated humanity) possible?"* It is in this question: how is history-humanity possible, that the critique of estranged reason finds concrete articulation.

We begin by concluding Marx's views on the specific understanding of the sciences. For Marx just as with Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* truth lies in the whole. Yet Marx's holism is distinct from Hegel's idealist holism. And this nature of dialectical materialist holism Marx outlines in his theory of the sciences whereby he distinguishes himself from both metaphysics as well as the technological rationalists. Now according to Marx, science is not merely a technological enterprise—a will to mere knowing, but a project towards human emancipation—a will to human freedom. Marx outlines this scientific will in two Young Hegelian concepts—*Gattungswesen* (species being) and *das menschliche Wesen* (the human essence) where he views existence not in the estranged biblical and capitalist forms of the subject-object, human-nature splits. Marx consequently claims that the scientific enterprise cannot be reduced to an estranged mind studying a reified nature, nor the control of nature by this estranged mind. The double will to knowing and human freedom cannot become a will to power. The very idea of calculation and control (that is at the base of the bourgeois understanding and practice of the sciences) have to be expunged from the scientific enterprise.

But besides emphasising on the idea of human emancipation as the core issue of the sciences, Marx also involves a radical critique of the intervention of the capitalist division of labour (and this ideology of the bourgeois misunderstanding of the sciences) into the sciences. One does not have to unconsciously give consent to the fragmentation of the sciences that capitalism drives them to. Instead one has to de-alienate the sciences from this ghettoization of knowledge, that bourgeois ideology (under the pretext of knowledge) under Corporate Imperialism strives for. One has to argue of a coherent science—a non-schizophrenic science. Marx uses the term "one science", a "single science" (or a unified science)—a science of history with its "two (inseparable) sides": of the history of nature and the history of humanity.[49]

So what Marx does is differentiate the science of emancipation—the historical materialism of *Gattungswesen* and *das menschliche Wesen*—the humanist natural sciences from the ideology of the sciences, and thus distinguish the essence from the appearance. The former keeps the humanist and naturalist concern central to its philosophical repertoire, whilst the latter actively negates it. Marx thus keeps both humanity at large and nature in general at the centre of his scientific concern. Marx is thus both a humanist and an environmentalist. What we have in the Marxist landscape is the incorporation of the "science of humanity" (*Wissenschaft vom Menschen*) into the natural sciences.[50] This new science—historical materialism—is now known as "*human* natural science" which is at the same time a "*natural science of humanity*"[51]. Historical materialism is not about "iron laws" governing humanity and nature; it is about humanity and nature. We now have the humanization of nature and the naturalization of humanity.[52] The biblical-bourgeois spirit of anti-naturalism and anti-humanism has to be exorcised.

Yet Marx claims that leaving the natural sciences (which in fact is the realization of the labour of *Gattungswesen*)[53] to the spontaneous activity of capital accumulation renders it not only metaphysical and theological but also psychotic and barbaric. Both the natural sciences and the philosophical project governed by the capitalist division of labour turn a blind eye to one another.[54] They are the two Faustian souls tearing off the breast of humanity. The "human essence of nature" (*das menschliche Wesen der Natur*) is divorced from the "natural essence of humanity" (*das natürliche Wesen des Menschen*).[55] And in this great gap between nature and humanity, between the natural sciences and the human sciences, the crisis of the modern sciences first emerged, a crisis that is inexorably woven to the crisis of capital accumulation. And thus one insists that the problem cannot be posed as the mere crisis of the sciences, but the crisis of the capitalist project itself. Not only do society with its warring classes and their infinite ideologies but also science now appears in "estranged form" (*entfremdete Gestalt*).[56] It is at this site that Marx asks: how is "a genuine, comprehensive and *real* science" possible?[57] So if the natural sciences have slumbered into a reified state claiming to have life of its own, and sometimes even taking on the role of theology that it itself had removed from the centre state of world history, then one may say that one needs to psychoanalyse the sciences—one needs to understand its political unconscious, in order to humanize it.

Now besides Marx's dialectical and historical materialist thesis on scientific holism—human-natural sciences as radical emancipation—there is also the dualist understanding of the sciences, which did not understand the historicity of the scientific method. On one end of the critique of the modern sciences was Husserl who claimed that the European sciences had lost their basic humanist concern and on the other end of the spectrum was Horkheimer's and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* which castigated not only the sciences but the entire project of Western Reason as the tyrannical development from Odysseus to Hitler. It seemed thus that fascism and imperialism were culminating moments of Western Reason with the modern sciences seeming to mediate between the ancient Greeks and fascism.

But to understand the history of the problem of the crisis of the sciences one has to understand that the problem is deeply rooted in the neo-Kantianism of the Heidelberg Circle. According to this type of thinking, especially Dilthey, there is a difference between explanation (*Erklären*) which functions in the natural sciences and understanding (*Verstehen*) which operates in the social sciences. The latter studies subjective meanings of historical actors, a realm totally missing in the natural sciences. It would thus be a fallacy (according to them) to mime the natural sciences and to raise it to an exemplary status. The natural science (according to the neo-Kantians) studies laws independent of human subjects, the human sciences studies not merely human subjects, but their consciousness, will, etc. But there is another dominant feature which is present in the debate in the methodology of the sciences, a feature that was raised by Georg Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* and Husserl in *The Crisis in the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Whilst these two texts are rigorously different, there is shared theme—the concern of the loss of the humanist structure of Reason, and the claim that the rise of the modern sciences is responsible for this loss, besides the third claim that the modern sciences have itself an unexamined base which leads to an irrationality. But if the principle theme is the critique of positivism (in the 1894 Rectorial address Wilhelm Widelbland had initiated the critique) the dualism of the neo-Kantian method gave no possibility for a humanist solution. Lukács, as the heir to this Kantian dualism, would transform the idealist dualism of Kant to Hegelian idealism. Remember Lukács was the youngest and latest member of the Heidelberg Circle, who after a period of romantic anti-capitalism typical of late nineteenth and early twentieth century anarchist thought, drawing inspirations from thinkers as diverse as Nietzsche, Kiekergaard, Dostoevsky and Sorel, would by 1917 shift to an ultra-left form of Hegelian Marxism.

For Lukács, Marxism is not a type of a 'science' modelled after the natural sciences, as much as it is a type of a radical act. For him all 'scientific' mimesis are fallacious, and Marxism, if it attempts to model itself after the natural sciences, would collapse into a quietism, typical of the positivist school of thought. In this sense not only would Karl Kautsky and Plekhanov be mistaken in creating a theology of the natural-scientific school of thought, but also Engels himself was to blame for constructing the 'dialectics of nature', the chief fault with this thesis being that it leaves out the fundamental thesis of Marx—revolutionary praxis.[58] Not only would this alleged 'science' relapse into an ideology, but would become a metaphysic itself.[59] The main problem (as we noted earlier) is that it would have an uncritical and unexamined base that would stand outside the 'scientific' process itself.

But the main fallacy of the natural sciences, for Lukács (he should have said "the ideology of the natural sciences' or "the spontaneous philosophy of the natural scientists") is that it studies supra-historical laws, and thus relapses into a metaphysic of the eternal laws of nature. If history is suspended, then so is the project of revolution. Marxism consequently collapses. There are five points within this argument: (1) loss of totality within the natural scientific model of explanation, (2) rationalized objectivism, (3) pure quantification, (4) the reification of facts, and (5) abstract formalism. For Lukács, none of the above can operate as Marxism. But the chief fallacy is the alleged anti-historical nature of the natural sciences, besides the also alleged theme of the *iron laws* of nature, where humanity is converted into a tool of this *inevitably occurring phenomena* in nature. Fatalism is the main principle of the natural sciences. When one talks of necessity, repetition and prediction in the sciences, then life is said to be governed by these apparent fatal laws of nature. Science becomes theology. And humanity has to rebel. Anything other than rebellion is folly. If one has to rebel against God to become a humanist, then now one has to rebel against both the natural sciences—and also against nature itself. The Romanticism in this critique is evident.. But then *History and Class Consciousness* would become a sort of a New Age Bible. For the natural sciences (as well as nature) are not only estrangements, but literally the Biblical 'Fall' itself—in Lukács's words: "a charnel-house of long-dead interiorities".[60] 'Man' is condemned not to freedom, but to the reification of the eternal recurrence of estranged nature. 'Man' is only matter pure and simple (as Lukács would read the philosophy of the natural sciences). Consequently materialism becomes an "inverted Platonism".[61] All scientists are Platonists in the reverse. It only the soul (Lukács's understanding of the proletariat) that would rebel against this naturalized-reification of humanity.

This thesis would be in a way both utopian and radical, radical in the sense that it would challenge, if not the very basis of the legitimation of capitalist societies, then at least its instrumental reason—the modern-bourgeois sciences themselves. The modern sciences (one should say: "the bourgeois sciences", or better still:

"the bourgeois ideology of the sciences") are both at the same time said to be rationalized and reified. And when it was said (as Marcuse insisted) that science is the concrete project of society, he would be taking up the Marxist theme of the base superstructure dialectic. On the one hand the sciences are read as objective, being grounded in the site of productive forces of society, and on the other hand, they are understood as *ideological projects.* In this setting what happens is that the sciences in the double occurrence of techne and ideology mime not only the dominant class position, but also the ontological structure of the commodity which is fetishizing at its very essential nature. So when the Frankfurt School, following Lukács, claimed that pure quantification and the negation of qualities (along with the negation of humanity) forms the core of the natural scientific method, then they were emphasising Marx's claim in *Capital.* Marx in *Capital* had said that commodity production negates use-values and consequently also negates qualities. In the quest for realizing exchange value it posits pure quantities. What we are left is with nothing but spectres: *Alle seine sinnlichen Beschaffeneiten sind ausgeläscht*[62]*–all* sensuous conditions are extinguished! After peeling off all materiality, there is only one residue left: "ghostly reality" (*gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit*)[63]. And this ghostly reality will dictate not only the political ideology of capitalist societies but also its technical apparatus. The five points of Lukács's critique of the natural sciences that we noted above are understood in the ontology of the ghostly commodity. The ghostly commodity not only possesses the capitalists but also the scientists. They have become the high priests of the capitalist mode of production.

It is thus that one is able to understand the critique of rationalization as reification of the Frankfurt School. The crisis of the modern sciences would not only be based on what Husserl called the inability for science to tell us anything[64], but also on the will to power—"the need to be authoritative", in Nietzsche's words, "the need not to 'know', but to subsume, to schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation".[65] Because humanity and nature are split up in the act of commodity production, the will to calculate and control becomes now the leitmotiv of the modern sciences. It also becomes the ideology of societal modernization. The inherent logic of the modern sciences grounded on commodity production and the accumulation of capital is the logic of violence. It is not only the *techne* of the modern science and the telos of Western Reason. It is the *theoria* itself. To question this very basis of western rationality is now the essential part of radical philosophizing. If the sciences have erased the very telos of humanity, then the point is to put this humanity in the very centre of philosophy.

When it seemed that Platonism and the philosophies of the transcendent "Idea" had been banished by the modern sciences, then it was a mistake, because the mathematization of nature initiated by the modern sciences created a "purely rational, ideational system.... the dream", as Marcuse called it, "of all Platonism".[66] This ironic return of idealism was also an ironic end to Western Reason—the fulfilment of its telos as well as its betrayal,[67] because reason and theoria develop only as the positive sciences, whilst philosophy which "was supposed to give the ends, the objectives, the meanings of science" moves into the background.[68] Reason is now divorced, as Marcuse says, from "that rational *humanitas* envisaged in the original philosophical project, scientific, technological rationality becomes reason *Kath' exochen*".[69]

Now not only is the original project of philosophy betrayed, but so are the projects of modernity and the Enlightenment. Modernity is now rationalized modernity—'rationality' now meaning not Reason per se, but capitalist economic activity, bourgeois private law, and bureaucratic authority.[70] So if reason and theoria are reduced to techne, if reason becomes only instrumental reason and if the original idea of philosophy that raised the ideas of truth, beauty and goodness are lost then what we have is the betrayal of the original project of reason—reason exists only in the "name of rationality" which is in the last resort nothing but political domination.[71]

So reason as technological reason or scienticism is strictly speaking neither scientific nor philosophical. Rather it ideological, ideological because it is conceived as a *social project*.[72] What we get now is technology and technique as independent realms, independent not only from philosophy, but from the sciences themselves. In fact technological reason pretends itself to be 'science'.

For Marxism, the critique of technological reason as the leitmotiv of Western capitalist rationality is not focussed on the critique of science, but the regression of the sciences under this ideological project of late imperialism in permanent crises. If scienticism, appearing as the reified spectre is critiqued, then one ought not to fall back on the mythopoetical attack on the sciences themselves. For when one is attacking the crisis ridden domain of the modern sciences and so-called "Western Reason" (it is best to use the term *"Bourgeois Reason"*), one cannot turn to a fictitious "Eastern Reason" (or any other variation of romantic anti-capitalism) for a mythical solution. For Marx, every society has a tremendous accumulation of the sciences, and as he records in his lesser read *Ethnological Notebooks*, the non-capitalist societies has had a history of scientific reasoning. Yet this uncanny "Eastern Reason" that almost inevitably may arise from the critique of Western Reason, ought to be seen merely as a return of the spectre and delusion haunting class societies. This type of reasoning is the ideology of what Marx preferred calling the ideology of the Asiatic Mode of Production—the economic world of the periphery of international capital accumulation who have lost out to the west, because the west with its most grotesque discovery of capital accumulation colonized it. Colonization is the most important 'scientific' discovery' of the west. Not only is colonization its ideology, but also its theology. If we claimed that Western Reason, as Bourgeois Reason, has two main epistemic points (modern sciences/ mythopoetics) then it also has two main geo-political locations: the centre and the periphery. Now this ideology-theology of the west claims that what lies outside its own realm (the 'rest') has to be occupied. In this pyramid made by Bourgeois Reason, the elites of the west stand on top of the pyramid. And most certainly not any form of Eastern Reason, and most certainly any form of idealizing "Indian philosophy" is going to destabilize it.

In anti-thesis to this west/east, science/philosophy, materialism/ idealism divide one must recall the symbolic interactive world of Habermas's communicative action. For it is this symbolic interaction that would be able to bridge these great divides. Or else, one will have to "drum dialectics into the heads of the mushroom-upstarts of the new, holy Prusso-German empire"[73], whereby not only the hegemony of Bourgeois Reason would collapse, but also the hegemony of brother mullah and sister yogi. And that is why I had earlier said that human passion is the basis of Marxist science where we have the following historical reading:

> According to Hegel, all sciences are woven by the thread of the *aufheben*—the logic which raises them at a higher level of

existence. Hegel thought (and falsely so) that his science, his *Wissenschaft*, the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, would be the culminating moment of all the sciences and remain at the centre stage of world history. Little did he know that history would propel a certain Karl Marx who would be waiting in its wings. And with the discovery of the continent of history, he was literally knocking at the doors of world history. It is then that one understands, that at each stage in world history, it is not utopia which is either waiting in the wings, or knocking at its doors, but revolutions, for revolutions (whether in the history of theory or material practice) are simply irresistible.[74]

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy* trans. Ben Brewster (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971), pp. 15, 38, 39, 42, 72, 99.
2. Karl Marx, 'Preface to the First German Edition', *Capital*, Vol. I, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1984), p. 19..
3. Fredrick Engels, 'Letter to Bebel', March 18-25, 1875, in *Marx. Engels. Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).
4. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978), p. 52.
5. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), p. 100.
6. Ibid., p. 127.
7. Ibid.
8. Karl Marx, 'To the Editorial board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapaiski*, London, November, 1877', in *Marx-Engels. Selected Correspondence* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 293.
9. Ibid.
10. Karl Marx, 'To J.B. Schweitzer, London, January 24, 1865', in *Marx-Engels. Selected Correspondence* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 145.
11. Ibid.
12. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 99.
13. Ibid., p. 98.
14. Ibid., p. 99.
15. Ibid., p. 98.

16. Ibid,. p. 94.
17. Ibid., p. 98.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 99.
24. Karl Marx,' A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', in *Karl Marx. Early Writings*, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. 251.
25. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, pp. 64-5.
26. Karl Marx, 'Afterword to the Second German Edition', in *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 29.
27. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 133.
28. Ibid., p. 132.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 136.
31. Ibid., p. 99.
32. Ibid., p. 137.
33. Murzban Jal, 'The Irresistible Science of Karl Marx', in the *Social Scientist*, Vol. 38, No.s 5-6, May-June 2010.
34. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), *One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), *An Essay on Liberation* (London: Allen lane, 1969), 'On Science and Phenomenology', in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1985).
35. Jürgen Habermas, 'Technology and Science as Ideology', in *Toward a Rational Society*, trans Jeremy J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1971).
36. Karl Marx, Afterword to the Second German Edition of *Capital*', *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 29.
37. Louis Althusser, op. cit, p. 15.
38. Karl Marx, 'To John Baptist Schweitzer, London, January 24, 1865', in *Marx. Engels. Selected Correspondence* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), pp. 144-5.
39. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 51, 61.
40. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, 'The Manifesto of the Communist Party' in *Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels. Selected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 61.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.
44. See my *The Seductions of Karl Marx* (Delhi: Aakar Books, 2010), p. 208. Riza Davari-Ardakani, *Inqilab-I Islami va Vaz'-I Kununi' Alam* [*The Islamic Revolution and the Current Conditions of the World*] (Tehran: Markaz-e Farhangi-I Alame Tabatabai, 1982). Quoted in Farazin Vahadat, 'Post-Revolutionary Islamic Discourses on Modernity in Iran: Expansion and Contraction of Human Subjectivity', in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 35, Nov. 2003, No. 4, pp. 605, 610.
45. Ashis Nandy, 'History's Forgotten Doubles', in *History and Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Theme Issue 34: World Historians and Their Critics. (May, 1995), p. 46.
46. See Peter Hudis, 'Marx Among the Muslims', in *Capitalism, Nature, Socialism*, Dec 2004.
47. See Samir Amin, *Capitalism in the Age of Globalization. The Management of Contemporary Society* (Delhi: Madhyam Books, 1994), pp. 80-90. See also my *The Seductions of Karl Marx*, p. 25, 81.
48. Martin Heidegger, 'To Herbert Marcuse, January 20, 1948', in Herbert Marcuse, *Technology, War and Fascism*, ed. Douglas Kellner (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 265..
49. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), p. 98; Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 34, n.
50. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), p. 98.
51. Ibid., p. 99.
52. Ibid., p. 92.
53. Ibid., p. 97.
54. Ibid., pp. 97-8.
55. Ibid., p. 98.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., p. 97.
58. Georg Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness* (London: Merlin Press, 1983), p. 3.
59. Ibid.
60. Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, trans. Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 1994), p. 64.
61. Ibid., p. 202.
62. Karl Marx, *Das Kapital*, Erster Band (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1981), p. 52.
63. Ibid.
64. Edmund Husserl, *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston. I.U.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 6.

65. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans., Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 278.
66. Herbert Marcuse, 'On Science and Phenomenology', in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, p. 469.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Jürgen Habermas, 'Technology and Science as Ideology', in *Toward a Rational Society*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1971), p. 81.
71. Ibid., 82
72. Ibid. See also Herbert Marcuse, 'Industrialization and Capitalism in the Works of Max Weber', in *Negations. Essays in Critical Theory*, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1968).
73. Karl Marx, 'Afterword to the Second German Edition of *Capital*', *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 29.
74. See my 'The Irresistible Science of Karl Marx'.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

T.V. Madhu

Identity and Antagonism: Some Tensions in Post-Marxist Theorizing

Identity has conventionally been defined to be a relation that each thing necessarily has to itself and to nothing else. To say that everything is related to itself is to state nothing. It is an empty statement of the logical form AA. Essentialists, however, take this to be implying an ontological value. For them, to say that AA is to say that there is some underlying essence that makes A what it is, different from B. In the philosophical literature, the term substance (*sub - stance* standing under) refers to this underlying essence of a thing. Postmodern thinkers in general challenge the essentialist notion of identity. For this purpose, they largely depend upon the Saussurean perspective that identity is a differential function. Saussure's concern, as is well known, is the problem of identity in linguistics; for him the identity of a linguistic sign is wholly a function of differences within a system. This thesis obviously implies the rejection of the referential theory of language. According to the referential theory, names are like labels pasted on the objects that are already given to us as coherent entities. Human beings merely assign a name to each object or idea; different languages carry different sets of names, but the relationship of every language to the totality of objects is fundamentally the same. Against this view, Saussure argues that a linguistic sign is to be understood as a union of a form that signifies and an idea signified rather than a thing and a name. The relationship between the signified and the signifier is purely arbitrary.

The first implication of the arbitrariness of the sign is that there is no essential relation between the signifier and the signified. That is, another signifier could easily replace one signifier for the same signified. The thesis of the arbitrariness of the sign also implies that each language is to be understood not as a system of representation but as a system of articulation; language articulates reality. It is through language that the real that is meaningful for us is constructed. Each language categorizes the totality of objects, organizes and articulates the world differently. The articulation of reality is arbitrary in the sense that there is nothing outside language that determines this process. There is nothing in 'nature' that determines where we should mark the boundary between two linguistic units. In other words, the identity of a sign has nothing to do with a natural essence; the relations that set it off from other signs define a sign. Pushing this insight into its logical extreme, Jacques Derrida argues that any insistence on the differential nature of linguistic units would work against the 'metaphysics of presence'. If the identity of every sign is to be what others are not, and a signified consists of traces of what contrasts with it, then it is impossible to speak of the presence of a single autonomous signified as the original source of signification. To say that the 'original' or the transcendental signified is absent is not only to say that identity does not refer to anything substantial but also that every identity is internally challenged.

Discussion in this paper is centred on the question of social/ political identity. For postmodernists, social and political identities are analogous to Saussure's linguistic signs. Like Saussure and Derrida they reject the essentialist/ referential theory of identity in favor of a differential theory. One of the most important attempts to subvert essentialism in the social and political field is the poststructuralist inspired 'radical democratic theory' of which the work of Earnesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe is the best-known example. Their theory that claims to undertake the project of reinventing liberal democracy is often characterized as post Marxist. At fundamental level, it takes the poststructuralist critique of identity to be its essential methodological presupposition.

Post Marxism, for Laclau and Mouffe, is an anti-essentialist remolding of Marxism. In a significant sense, it is a continuation of the Marxist project inspired by Marx's critical theory. But, at the same time, it moves beyond Marxism by critically reworking its conceptual presuppositions. Poststructuralists in general treat Marxism to be one of their targets of attack. For most of them

Marxism is nothing but a different variety of the essentialist mode of thinking. Laclau and Mouffe, however, do not agree with this perception. For them, the attack on the essentialist tendencies of Marxist theory does not necessarily lead to the total abandonment of Marxism. Their project necessarily involves a rejection of the classical Marxist idea of an underlying economic rationality that is claimed to constitute the essential core of human history and also the thesis of the primacy of the economic structure and the centrality of a universal class. Hence, their relation to Marxist theory is of the nature of a critical engagement. It opens up a new conceptual plane which no longer properly be termed Marxism. Nor is their intervention anti-Marxist, since the conceptual plane they engage is somehow rooted in the Marxist tradition itself. The expression 'post Marxism', with all it vagueness, thus only indicate the direction their theoretical explorations move in.

Classical Marxism, as Laclau and Mouffe understand, implicitly contains essentialism mainly in two interrelated socio-theoretical forms: Economism and Classism. By economism they refer to the tendency implied especially in the second international Marxism to conceptualize the domain of economic relations as the ultimate base impervious to other social/cultural domains. Classism, as they understand, refers to the dogmatic belief in the privileged role of the working class and particularly to the tendency of reducing different forms of social and political agency to the class-agency. In other words, classism involves the claim that the non-class identities are ultimately reducible to the class identity, to the 'original'. In their most celebrated work *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, both the thinkers undertake a detailed attack on these tendencies with a strong conviction that the social reality is irreducibly plural in nature. We, here, do not go into the different aspects of their attack, but confine ourselves to their aim. Positively, their critique is aimed at legitimizing the so-called 'new social movements' of the West. New social movements represent the struggles of different social groups like women's or indigenous group's identity struggles that have almost replaced the political space of the traditional leftist movements, especially in the second half of the last century. By rejecting the class–politics of the traditional left, that is, the politics that assume class to be the single fundamental reality, Laclau and Mouffe aim to defend a kind of identity-politics that the new social movements tend to propose. As a part of it, they also aim to overcome the limitations of leftist 'imaginary' by proposing the ideal of a pluralistic society, the 'radical democratic imaginary'.

What is the content of the 'radical democratic imaginary' that Laclau and Mouffe talk about? Obviously, what both the thinkers have in mind when they talk about the radical democratic imaginary is the image of a non-totalitarian association toward which different groups might strive. The question that concerns us here is the question of the identity of this association. What kind of identity that it is allowed to have? As Mouffe herself says in one of her works, one cannot hope to build up such an association without referring to a 'we'; to build up it is to construct a 'we' based upon the ideals of a certain radical democratic tradition[1]. Both this conception of 'we' and the image of an ideal society would create some difficulties in understanding Laclau and Mouffe's perspective. The question of how such positions can be justified within the ambit of the postmodern/anti foundationalist mode of theorizing of Laclau and Mouffe is definitely a troubling one. Let us have a close look at the way both the thinkers try to tackle this issue.

In contrast to the essentialist conception, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize the discursive construction of social identity. Discourse, as they understand, is a system of differences in which meaning is constantly negotiated and constructed. To say that identity is discursively constructed is to say that it does not necessarily refer to anything substantial. It is true that at certain level social identities appear to have some fixed meaning. Laclau and Mouffe explain this by using the concept of hegemonic articulation. It is through the hegemonic practices of articulation that the meaning of social identities gets partially fixed. This idea can be made clear by looking at the way both the thinkers deal with the identity of political movements. A political movement gains its identity, they argue, not by means of any essence, but through the hegemonization produced by some one of the particular groups in the movement. That is, the interest of particular group gets articulated to be the meaning of the whole movement. Laclau and Mouffe argue that it is the same kind of articulation that is constitutive of the identity of anti-Tsarist movement in Russia. The anti-Tsarist revolution is not a single autonomous movement having an original meaning. Its identity could come only from some sub-group in the struggle; for example, the workers who went on strike for higher wages. The movement would then derive its identity from the 'hegemonization' produced by this group.[2]

Another important concept of Laclau and Mouffe that is to be mentioned in the context of our discussion of their anti-essentialist theory of identity is the concept of antagonism. While discussing the question of political movements they emphasize the antagonistic construction of identity. A political movement gets its identity by means of the fact that those different unrelated struggles within the movement share a common enemy, for example, the Tsar's regime in Russian revolution. This sharing, Laclau and Mouffe claim, is provided to be the condition for the possibility for the joining of various groups to form a movement. The concept of antagonism discussed in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* is to be understood as implying this crucial insight. Originally the notion of antagonism is employed in the writings of the German political philosopher Karl Schmitt who defines the enemy to be the 'the opposed other' or 'the antagonist' implied in every collective identity. In his essay, "The Concept of the Political", Schmitt claims that there cannot be any identity without antagonism.[3] Every single actor who is engaged in an antagonistic conflict constructs itself as the only group that has the capacity to grasp the truth, the good and the just. That is, a social group constructs its identity by defining itself to be a privileged group and this is possible only when there is an opposed other with whom each group contrasts itself. It is on enemy's account that each group becomes a coherent subject. In other words, enemy defines who 'we' are. In his *Glossarium*, Schimitt writes, "Tell me who your enemy is and I will tell you who you are".[4] For Mouffe, such a conception of the enemy is indispensable in theorizing radical democratic imaginary. We have already mentioned her view that radical democratic theory aims at constructing a 'we' basing on certain traditional radical democratic ideals. In addition, she argues that "to construct a 'we' it must be distinguished from the 'them' and that means establishing a frontier, defining an enemy".[5]

Differing from the somewhat naïve formulation of Schmitt, Laclau and Mouffe try to work out the logical implications of social antagonism in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. For them, to say that identity implies an opposed other is actually to say that *identity does not exist*. The statement that identity implies an opposed other is of the symbolic form 'A ⊃ anti A'. That is, A implies the forces that challenge A. That which occupies the space represented by 'anti A' cannot be merely a different particular. It indicates a permanent movement that makes A radically unstable. Every being is made unstable by the non-being and it is this movement of destabilization that is the true meaning of 'the enemy'.

Jacob Torfing, in his excellent analytical study of the radical democratic theory[6] points out a significant shift in Laclau and Mouffe's understanding of the concept of social antagonism. We shall have a close look on this shift. Laclau, in one of his earlier essays, defines social antagonism to be a relation of logical contradiction within discourse.[7] He arrives at this definition precisely to distinguish the relation of social antagonism from the relation of real opposition. In a real opposition, two independent things are related in such a way that they are opposed to each other i.e., a relation of the type A—B. Whereas logical contradiction involves a mutually affirmative relation between two binarily opposed propositions i.e., a relation of the type A—non A. The relation of real opposition is 'real' because the two poles in the relation are claimed to be representing the real entities. But, for Laclau, there is nothing 'real' in the social world. The so-called real is discursively constructed, and once this possibility is admitted, then there is nothing wrong in viewing social antagonism as a relation of logical contradiction within discourse.

This position, however, is clearly rejected in the later writings of Laclau and Mouffe. The reason behind this rejection is more important for us. Laclau and Mouffe later realize that the two poles in an antagonism are not always logically contradictory. Take the antagonistic relation between Nazism and Jews as an instance. Both are obviously opposed to each other but they are not logically contradictory. Neither are they real oppositions, since both Nazism and Jews represent no substantial identities. Laclau and Mouffe thus claim that social antagonism is to be distinguished from both real opposition and logical contradiction. In real opposition, say 'A—B', both A and B are independent things. In logical contradiction, say 'A—non A', A is independent but 'non A' is not. But, real opposition and logical contradiction both assume A is fully A, whereas in social antagonism the other prevents A from being fully A. To be more specific, in logical contradiction A is fully A, it is defined in its own terms, and the other (non A) is defined in terms of A. In the case of social antagonism the situation is entirely different. The identity of A is threatened by the antagonistic force. Hence, what distinguishes social antagonism from both real opposition and logical contradiction is that the latter two are objective relations whereas social antagonism puts into question any objectivity. Torfling summarizes Laclau and Mouffe's later argument as follow: "If social antagonism helps us to establish the boundaries of the discursive formation of society, it also, at the same time, prevents society from constituting an objective, rational and fully intelligible reality. As such, social antagonism is, at once, the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of *society*".[8]

The implications of the concept of social antagonism are extremely complex. One of the obvious implications is concerned with the impossibility of conceiving society as an essentialist whole. The logical conclusion of this position is that society, as a whole does not *exist.* What exists, then, is a fragmented *society,* an inherently fractured composition of different groups or identities. If it is the case that every identity is a matter of antagonistic construction, then no social group can claim any final truth with regard to their identity. There is no closed identity possible in the social field since every identity carries with it an element of indeterminacy at the fundamental level. Every identity is internally challenged, and no social group can escape this self-contradiction. It is not only the case that a social group is internally prohibited from knowing itself but that it is prevented from being itself, since that with which it identifies can never be claimed to the original. To use the Derridian jargon, original is permanently deferred. For Laclau and Mouffe, it is this indeterminacy that makes politics possible.

But, what kind of politics do Laclau and Mouffe talk about? Does their theoretical proposal for a radical democratic imaginary escape essentialism by positing indeterminacy at a basic level? More precisely, is it possible to propose a project of political action basing on the thesis of indeterminacy? These questions, to my mind, are indicative of some of the unavoidable tensions in the post-Marxist theorizing. We shall start with the question of political action and explore a little into the paradoxes associated to it. Agreeing with Laclau and Mouffe, we argue that a particular social group in its fight for a non-repressive society constructs a 'we' by contrasting itself with a 'them', since, there is no 'we' without 'them'. But, following the same logic, we would have to admit that this antagonistically constituted 'we' will always be in tension, precisely for two reasons: one, the 'we-consciousness' of the social group does not refer to any substantial identity at the time it engages in the political action. Two, the social group in question can never hope to achieve any final identity even in future. Its political action will not tend to be guided by the illusion that the abolition of the antagonistic force will permit them to become the fully constituted 'we'. For example, the *Dalits* in India construct their identity by contrasting themselves with the caste-based oppression. But, with the knowledge that "to construct a 'we' it must be distinguished from 'them', their political action is freed from the illusion that afterwards, when the caste-based oppression is abolished, Dalits will finally achieve their full identity with themselves. Political project that the Dalits engage in here cannot imply any claim on final or complete identity. As a matter of fact, it deconstructs itself, makes itself impossible. Slavoj Zizek, who is supposed to be one of the sympathizers of the post-Marxist thinking, points out this *aporia* in any such conceptions of politics. He argues, 'to grasp the notion of antagonism in its most radical dimension, we should invert the relationship between the two terms: It is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving identity with myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an impossibility'.[9]

Let us briefly look at the crucial implications that Zizek's insights have for understanding the *self-other dialectic* in the social field. If other is something that constitutes self, the self-consciousness of a social group, then it is, as Laclau calls, a 'constitutive outside': an outside that constitutes and also at the same time destabilizes the inside. Zizek goes further by arguing that a particular enemy does not exhaust this 'outside'. It is a vacuum that *exists* irrespective of particular enemies. To use Zizek's expression, every other is a trace of the Other. When a social group represents itself in terms of an identity, that is, in every act of its self-representation, it actually attempts to mask this radical otherness, a move that necessarily fails. This failure is indicative of a certain 'traumatic impossibility'. The social field, thus, is structured around this traumatic impossibility, 'around a fissure which cannot be symbolized'.[10]

Laclau and Mouffe would claim that their vision of society is not essentialist because it does not refer to anything substantial. If a theory conceives identities in terms of differences, then it is impossible for it to presuppose the existence of a substantive subject outside the discursive system. The subject is, rather, to be seen as having a particular discursive subjectivity. Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe put forward a constructionist perspective of the social. The theory of subject implied here is obviously rooted in constructionism, especially of an Althusserian variety. For Althusser, individuals become subjects through a process called interpellation. Ideology *interpellates* concrete individuals as subjects by addressing them in a way that constitutes them as particular discursive subjectivities. Subjects having the discursive identities, in Althusser's terminology, are 'subject-positions'. Society is not the totality of subjects or concrete individuals. It is constructed of various subject-positions. But a deeper analysis of the concept of antagonism, the one that we have attempted earlier, would reveal that the concept has the potential to subvert even the Althusser-inspired, radicalized vision of the subject. The concept of society as constructed of 'various subject-positions' implicitly already *substantializes* society—suggesting a master 'viewpoint' of the social itself, a viewpoint from which all the discourses of the 'subject-positions' are exposed as limited and ideological.[11] Antagonism, on the other hand, disallows anything to become substantial. For the same reason, it cannot serve as a principle on which a theory of society can be built.

The aim of this paper was to reveal some of the tensions involved in the mode of theorizing of Laclau and Mouffe. These tensions, we may say, are due to the *deconstructive impulse* that is necessarily implied in their theoretical move itself. Laclau and Mouffe's attempt to problematize identity-thinking in social theory basing on the concept of antagonism is of obvious importance. But, however, the implications of the concept of antagonism work against the pretension of the theory that it could provide us with an alternative model of society. To be more precise, Laclau and Mouffe assume antagonism to be a condition that makes the radical democratic imaginary possible. Antagonism, as we have seen earlier, implies indeterminacy, that, there is an element of indeterminacy at the fundamental level of every antagonistically constructed identity. Thus, paradoxically, the condition that makes the formation of radical democratic imaginary possible *deconstructs* itself, making such kind of a formation radically impossible.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. C. Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, London and New York, Verso 1993.
2. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Zizek *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality*, London and New York, Verso, P. 302-303, 2000.
3. Karl Schmitt, (1976), *The Concept of the Political*, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p.65, 1976.
4. From Schmitt's *Glossarium*, quoted in Anna Marie Smith *Laclau and Mouffe, the Radical Democratic Imaginary*, London and New York: Routledge, 1998, p.129
5. C. Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, (1993), London, Verso, p.69
6. Jacob Torfing, *New Theories of Discourse*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999.
7. Torfing refers to the perspective of Laclau's paper 'Populist Rupture and Discourse', p. 43.
8. Jacob Torfing, 1999, p.44.
9. Slavoj Zizek, 1990 'Beyond Discourse-Analysis', in Ernesto Laclau (ed.), *New Reflections on the Revolutions of our Time*, London, Verso, 1990, p. 251–2.
10. Slavoj Zizek, (1990, p. 249.
11. Cf. Thomas Brockelman, 'The Failure of the Radical Democratic Imaginary', in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Vol. 29, no. 2, 2003, pp.187-212.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

A. V. Afonso

Hermeneutics as an Epistemic Tool to Achieve 'Truth'

The discussion in the present paper centres around two tasks: one to understand the conceptual foundations of hermeneutics, and two, to locate the role of hermeneutics in achieving 'truth'.

The dialectical relation between the 'interpretation' in natural sciences and 'hermeneutics' in social sciences[1] deserve a special attention in order to understand the intricate relationship between growth of knowledge and rationality, and search for truth. The result of this dialogue between the 'interpreters' would lead to a proper understanding of 'realism' in philosophy in general and in science in particular. The fundamental issue could be articulated as an answer to the following question: How do we render accounts of subjectively intended meanings objective in the face of the fact that they are mediated by the interpreter's subjectivity?

The answer to this question will force us to understand (1) *hermeneutical theory,* (2) *hermeneutical philosophy* and (3) *critical hermeneutics.* Hermeneutical Theory will take us to the problem of the general theory of interpretation as the methodology of human sciences. Hermeneutical Philosophy will compel us to reflect on link between the interpreter and the object, which (link) is pre-established due to the context of tradition and renders neutrality impossible. And Critical Hermeneutics reflects on the causes of the distorted understanding and communication which operates underneath normal interaction.

The best way to understand of what constitutes hermeneutical philosophy is to reflect on *classical hermeneutics*[2] which can be recognized as *objectivist* hermeneutics. With F.D.E. Schleirmacher hermeneutics took a major turn from being merely 'specific hermeneutics' to 'general hermeneutics' (as the art of understanding). Understanding for Schleirmacher involves experiencing of the author's mental process. Schleirmacher's formulation of canons for psychological interpretations stress around investigating the roots of the thoughts from within the totality of the author's or speaker's life. Whereas the canons for grammatical interpretation lays emphasis on the linguisticality of understanding. With Schleirmacher, hermeneutics became the art of understanding.

An analysis of Wilhelm Dilthey's and Emilio Betti's works brings to light the objectivist aspect of their philosophy. Dilthey while rejecting Schleirmacher's contention, that understanding has its roots in language and man's linguistic nature, traced the beginning of understanding to 'category of life'.[3] This is because beyond life thinking cannot go. While trying to gain objectivity in methodical reconstruction, Dilthey developed hermeneutics as the foundation for *Geisteswissenschaften.* Man can understand himself only through history and what man is, only history can tell. Though opposed to the tendency of the human sciences to use the methodology of the natural sciences, he engaged himself in the task of formulating a methodology for gaining objectively valid interpretations of inner life; and failed to rise above the familiar subject-object relationship which is considered the hall mark of the natural sciences.

Betti like Dilthey argues for a comprehensive general hermeneutics for the *Geisteswissenschaften.* While attempting to provide a general theory of how objectivations of human experiences can be interpreted, he argued for autonomy of the object and the interpreter and the possibility of historical objectivity in making valid interpretations. Though his attention centered primarily around the nature of objective 'interpretation' he did not neglect the subjective aspect of interpretation. Betti attempted to make a clear distinction between *understanding* and *explanation.* Betti's formulation of four hermeneutical canons illustrates his defence of objectivity.[4] Betti views interpretation as a means towards understanding. It is a triadic process in which the meaningful forms mediate between the mind objectivated in them and the subject's mind. Betti's hermeneutics, while taking as its goal a systematic *organon* of forms of interpretation supplied us with arguments in favour of the possibility of *verstehen* as a methodically disciplined form of understanding.

Reflection on Hermeneutical Philosophy takes us to the Hermeneutic Theory of Dilthey, Betti and others who tried to keep subjectivity out of the objective interpretations. As opposed to this, hermeneutical philosophy asserted the preunderstanding on the part of the interpreter while interpreting the object which makes neutrality impossible. Hermeneutical Philosophy concerned itself with the interpretation of *Dasein* in its temporality and historicality. Here attention shifts from the objective interpretation to a transcendental analysis of understanding from the view point of active existence. Hermeneutical Philosophy thus indicates a new way of being.

Rudolf Bultmann, following Heidegger, attempted to carry out the deepening of *Dasein's* methodical analysis. He was concerned with the dialectic problem between the existential understanding of the interpreter and the mythological language in which *Kerygma,* found expression in the New Testament. The hermeneutic circle which was much apparent in *hermeneutical philosophy* resurfaces here in the sense that the interpreter in order to understand, has to be a believer, and understanding the message is necessary for acquiring beliefs.

Bultmann believed that the message of the holy texts lies in its existential appeal and it is the task of the interpreter to explicate 'the existential core of the text'.[5] Bultmann's demythologization of the New Testament is an effort in this direction. However, this is not to be confused with the task of eliminating myths as meaningless but to bring out its original meaning.

In interpreting any document, Bultmann argues that we need to take into account the vital existential relationship between the author and the interpreter. The way we interpret a document depends upon our interest and our pre-understanding of the subject. Our idea of the object or standpointless meaning seems to be an impossibility since the meaning arises only out of the interpreter's relation to the future and also because history can be known only through historian's subjectivity. This forms the central contention of Bultmann's philosophy.

Later on, with Hans-Georg Gadamer the hermeneutical problem took a language-philosophical turn, concerned with achieving an agreement with somebody else about our shared 'world'. Concept of understanding is of primary importance in Gadamer's philosophy. But unlike other philosophers he retains the *historical nature of understanding*. It is impossible for an interpreter to get rid of his 'prejudices' for they constitute, according to Gadamer, all historical and other understanding. The 'effective history' is the ultimate cause of our prejudices. Language forms the basis of understanding because it is through language that we achieve a 'fusion of horizons' of the interpreter and the historical object, which characterizes the act of understanding.[6] Gadamer by referring to the universal aspect of hermeneutic philosophy was able to overcome dogmatic metaphysics and scientific restrictions of knowledge.

The third stage takes us to Critical Hermeneutics. The mediation between tradition and the understanding of subjectively intended meanings has been the prime concern of hermeneutics discussed in hermeneutic theory and hermeneutic philosophy. However, the two differ when discussing the question of 'how such understanding was possible and to what extent would it constitute objective knowledge?' But while both approaches placed conflicting emphasis on the role of the interpreter, they share the exclusion of one dimension: the questioning the content of the object of interpretation. Any reflection as to the truth of a text or of tradition, meaning was excluded as falling outside the concerns of an epistemology and methodology of the understanding process. This led to distorted or incomplete understanding of understanding. Critical Hermeneutics arose to seek out the causes of distorted understanding and communication which operate underneath seemingly normal interaction. Critical understanding contains an element of causal explanation because of its references to empirical contingencies underlying intellectual process. Apel and Habermas, the two exponents of critical hermeneutics, combine the methodical and objective approach to arrive at practically relevant knowledge. Though Apel accepts that there is a common ground for natural and social sciences, refuses to reduce them to 'unified sciences'.[7] For him the scientific and hermeneutic attitudes complement each other. He is against Gadamer's fusion of horizons and defends the idea of objectifying role of interpretation in the human sciences as he regards interpretation as a process by which knowledge is achieved.

Apel calls for a 'normatively-methodologically relevant philosophical hermeneutic' to reassert the possibility of progress in interpretation. A free society which allows an open discussion remains a precondition for better understanding. Apel claims that our understanding of texts and authors allows us to criticize and go beyond the truths contained in them because we are in possession of the idea of a more truthful way of life. Progress in human communication can be achieved, according to critical hermeneutics, only when we develop a free society.

Jürgen Habermas like Apel makes use of psycho-analysis as the model for an emancipatory science that dialectically relates both interpretative and explanatory approaches. The critical hermeneutics of Habermas aims to mediate the objectivity of historical process with the motives of those acting within it. According to him, the modern positivist turns history into a static present and reduces it to a mere empirical fact.

Hermeneutical dispute between Habermas and Gadamer which primarily centred around 'depth' or 'critical' hermeneutics also serves as a starting point of Habermas' philosophy. Gadamer's effective history had, according to Habermas, all the earmarks of a methodological principle applicable to textual interpretation in the human sciences. However Habermas felt that Gadamer tried to reduce hermeneutics to a mere investigation of the transcendental conditions of understanding.

In order to bring to light the shortcomings of the other interpretative approaches Habermas introduced hermeneutical thought into the methodology of the social sciences. This he did with an aim to fight the objectivism in scientific approaches to the social world. Through an *aughbung* of psycho-analysis and hermeneutic philosophy, he arrives at an outline of a dialectical-hermeneutical theory of action. Psycho-analysis provides Habermas with the model for a theoretical framework that allows him to transcend the communicative consensus meta-hermeneutically.

The concept of truth, according to Habermas provides no criteria for distinguishing between true and false consensus since we can arrive at truth via a consensus in discourse. In conjoining truth and favourable conditions which help its emergence, allows Habermas to get away from the ontologisation of language and tradition of a philosophical hermeneutic.[8]

Paul Ricoeur acts as a mediator in both the hermeneutical and the hermeneutic disputes, brings to light the important role played by the structuralist analysis of a system of a sign in relation to the hermeneutical interpretation of a text. Hermeneutics deals with symbolic texts which have multiple meanings. They may constitute a semantic unity which has (as a myth) a fully coherent surface meaning and at the same time a deeper significance which is brought to light through hermeneutics. Ricoeur felt the impossibility of forming universal canons for exegesis - this is because of irreconciliability of totally different approaches to the interpretation of myths (represented by Bultmann and Freud).[9] We can have, according to Ricoeur, separate theories regarding the rules of interpretation.

CONSENSUS AND TRUTH

The problem of hermeneutics can be reviewed in a new context wherein it is pointed out that the understanding fails not because of 'complexity of universality' nor 'amenability of contradictory interpretations'. The intellect's capacity to view things partially, renders it incapable of a proper understanding. Intellect's past (without which it does not exist) is both an asset and a liability. As Zygmunt Bauman put it: "Thanks to its past, the intellect is able to see; because of it, it is bound to remain partially blind".[10] The concept of right and wrong understanding makes sense only in a given context. In other words, there is no understanding without experience to which the object can be referred. But the observed relation holds as well: the meaning is accessible only together with experience. Hence with varying experience, the meaning varies. Is not the meaning, therefore, subject to a 'double bind' constrained simultaneously by the text and the reader? And if this is so, can the meaning ever be conclusive, final, ultimately borne out once and for all? The answers to these two questions are of significant importance partially because they will depend upon what is regarded as an essential distinction between natural and social sciences.

Bauman puts the whole issue in an appropriate metaphor when he says "... that what transforms 'looking at the text' into understanding is the act of placing the text in a context".[11] Although what Bauman is referring to is 'understanding' in cultural or human sciences we notice that the same applies to natural sciences, though in a lesser degree. We shall come back to this later on. We shall have to look at the whole argument to observe the 'disturbing;' feature of human knowledge that is both 'context-dependent' and context-defined'. And this compelled thinkers to seek 'context-free-meanings, methodologically neutral understanding of the 'text'. But this search leads to an 'uneasy feeling' which is not due to a notional intrinsic superiority of context-free over the context-bound knowledge. It is an urge to come to an understanding, which once acquired, is immutable and immune to contingencies of fate. This, thinkers feel, will give one the feeling of genuine mastery over the object.

The strongest (and the strangest) point of Zygmunt Bauman's thesis is his claim that the problem "... is not the endemic structure of theoretical understanding, but *the practical lack of control over the life situation* which a most perfect interpretation will still be helpless to redress. The objective understanding appears, so to speak, as a substitute for practical control over the situation, as an 'intellectual socialisation' of the conditions of actions which in reality are privately owned. This is why attempts to gain objective understanding will always be repeated: and this is why they will be never successful, that is, unless and entirely different situation of action deprives them of their goal. Paradoxically, a truly objective understanding would be accessible only in conditions which do not require it; which do not posit such an understanding as a problem."[12] What we called 'strange' in his view that '*lack of consensus*' in social sciences is not so much due to 'professional frailties' of social scientists but due to the very nature of understanding.

Natural science by its very nature is dependent on what constitutes its practices. And what constitutes its practices has to be accepted by consensus among the scientists thereby creating an 'authority of interpretations'. The acceptance of specialized instruments, new theorems of deduction, etc. is not 'once for all recognition' of a new discovery. Instead, a 'new scientific discovery' tends to come into conflict or dispute with the already established 'authority' of science—which in due course of time, after mutual interactions, often acrimonious, is accepted as part of scientific understanding.

Michael Polyani analyses this quasi-sociological position regarding the formation of scientific authority when he writes:[13]

> Any attempt to define the body of science more closely comes up against the fact that the knowledge comprised by science is not known to any single person. Indeed nobody knows more than a tiny fragment of science well enough to judge its validity and value at the first hand. For the rest he has to rely

> on views accepted at second hand on the authority of a community of people accredited as scientists. But this accrediting depends in its turn on a complex organization. For each member of the community can judge at first hand only a small number of his fellow members, and yet eventually each is accredited by all. What happens is that each recognizes as scientists a number of others by whom he is recognized as such in turn, and these relations form chains which transmit these mutual recognitions at second hand through the whole community. This is how each member becomes directly or indirectly accredited by all. The system extends into the past. Its members recognize the same set of persons as their masters and derive from this allegiance a common tradition, of which each carries on a particular stand.

The question that remains uppermost in our minds is: Does this *consensus* (in natural sciences like that of Polyani or in social sciences like that of Bauman) reject the objectivity of scientific findings? We shall come back to this issue and understand why human sciences create 'consensus' and that objective understanding seems to be possible only under conditions which does *not* require it.

Hermeneutically viewed, 'the truth of sociology' (and *pari passu*, that of other social sciences) has to be negotiated in the same way the ordinary agreement is arrived at. It is comparable to the 'truth' by consensus among the physicists which is reached by an agreement. The difference between the two sciences (physics and sociology)—the phenomenon of physicists is fully controlled by physicists; whereas that of sociologists is not fully controlled by sociologists. The reason for this lies in the fact that sociological language is tied up with the contexts of *meaning-understanding*. And however much the sociologists have tried to fulfil Scheleirmacher's objective of an interpretation which is both *conclusive* and *apodietically true*, the sociologists failed to give up the historically, socially and culturally relative understanding. This is so because the standards of understanding as well as valuation are by definition internal to the particular culture which is being analysed. It is obvious that interpretative social sciences are condemned to relativism.

But are natural sciences different from this? History of Science reveals (as Karl Popper and other philosophers of History of Science reveal) science has developed only 'negative standards' by means of which we can at most determine the falsity of theories. Science, in the Popperian sense, progresses by an endless effort of elimination of false theories. In Michael Polyani's words: "There is no assurance that we shall be able to make progress towards better theories."[14] Popper's falsificationism, therefore has a very important critical element—particularly with regard to inductivist conception of development of scientific knowledge. Scientific statements, for him, cannot be verified once-and-for-all. They are accepted only after *rigorous* attempts at falsifying them have failed. These 'corroborated' statements are still provisional till they have been accepted by the *scientific community*. Scientists are able to come to this consensus on account of their mutual application of rational criteria as embodied in logically coherent argumentation. In this sense, the 'rationalism' advocated by Popper is a 'critical' one in that any statement purporting to be scientific is made available, and tends itself, but the rationality of this procedure is itself not amenable to further justification resting, as it does, on the 'irrational' opting for reason as an 'act of faith'.

But Popper does not reduce scientific theories 'to each according to his faith'. The rules of science are such that they are "subject to the general aim of rational discussion, which is to get nearer to the truth".[15]

One can understand the Popperian 'volte face' from *consensus* to *truth* from the following. On the one hand truth becomes an unrealistic objective if it is to be derived from hypothetical propositions. On the other hand, there will be no direction for the on-going rational discussion if truth is not posited as its *objective*. Bauman reasserts this when he says: " ... if it were not for the ideal of truth as the supreme standard of belief, no agreed interpretation of meaning would be conceivable. Truth is perhaps unachievable as a state of knowledge. But truth is *indispensable for knowledge to exist*." [16]

The notion 'consensus' appears not only in acceptance of scientific conclusions/results but prior to that in the scientific method itself. Lehrer and Wagner in a seminal study, point out that "scientists (not only) disagree about experimental outcomes, obtain different results ...(but also) disagree over which methods are appropriate."[17] Scientists, therefore, have to be consensually committed to a method—if not, then whatever may be intrinsic value of the method, agreement amongst the scientists is unexpected. Prior consensus on 'legitimacy' of method is imperative. Lehrer and Wagner refer to Galileo's method (use of telescope) and how his contemporaries did not 'see' the moon of Jupiter which he saw. Galileo's contemporaries were not committed to his method and consequently could not accept the results. To put in Lehrer and Wagner language: "When we claim that the results of science are rational, when we refer those results to prejudice and superstitions, the rationality of our claim rests ultimately upon our agreement, our consensus, that those methods lead us to truth or at least expose error in a reliable way. The application of method may itself produce agreement, but such agreement presupposes a prior consensual commitment to the methodology itself."[18]

What Lehrer and Wagner calls the *consensus*, Bauman calls *truth*—and both function as rules of rational discussion as well as the pursuit of objective understanding. What distinguishes Bauman and other social scientists from that of Popperians is that the former have their existential moorings. Bauman for example, clearly expresses his existential inclinations when he says: "The pursuit of truth and objectivity, as guiding principles of human technical and practical activity—human work and communication—are anthropological, not historical features of human existence: they are transcendental conditions of the specifically human mode of existence."[19]

If the empirical-analytical sciences cannot guarantee the truth of scientific statements, how can we expect guarantee of truth of inter-subjective agreement, asks Bauman. The sociological hermeneutics as a method of criticism can maximally expose conditions of communication that lead to an invalid or untrue consensus. Bauman points out that "sociology is 'socially engaged' not in spite of, or in violation of, its truth-seeking motives, but in consequence of those motives. Conversely, sociology may pursue its aim of true, as distinct from merely consensual, understanding only thanks to its active engagement with the task of promotion of equal opportunity and democracy ... (and) in the same way as science employs the model of ideal experiment to expose and eventually eliminate flaws in the practice of scientists, so sociology employs the model of ideal communication to lay bare and eventually help to eliminate the flaws in the practice of societal consensus."[20]

What Bauman 'conjectures' about sociology (and *mutatis mutandi*, social and human sciences), namely, "the practical success of sociology understood, can be only measured by the degree to which the opposition between consensus and truth is gradually reduced, and the problem of understanding as an activity distinct from communal life gradually disappears,"[21] recognizes the possibility of a new dimension to natural or empirical-analytical sciences. The practical success of natural sciences did not only reduce the degree of opposition between 'consensus' and 'truth' but they were deemed to be one. How else can one explain why Popper did not develop the notion of 'consensus' in any other work except for his 'passing' reference in *The Open Society and Its Enemies*?

There seems to be a dialectical relationship between consensus and truth, namely, truth makes consensus possible; and consensus legitimizes and reinforces truth commitment of a scientific proposition. Or are they two different hermeneutical expressions decoding "The Book of Nature"?

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The 'interpretation' is used with reference to science as against 'hermeneutics' with reference to social sciences.
2. Classical Hermeneutics in general is recognized as beginnings of modern understanding of hermeneutics and can be identified with the works of F. D.E. Schleirmacher.
3. Rudolf A. Makkreel & Frithjof Rodi (eds.) *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works, Volume I: Introduction to the Human Sciences*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.
4. E. Betti, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften." in *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique,* by Josef Bleicher, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980. 51-94.
5. Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," *Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate,* 144 (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1961).
6. H. G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (2nd. revised edition) trans. J. Weinsheimer & D. Marshall, New York: Continuum, 2000
7. Karl-Otto Apel, *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective,* Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984.
8. J. Habermas, J. 'The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality', in *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Method, Philosophy and Critique,* (ed) J. Bleicher, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 245-272.
9. Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation,* trans. Denis Savage, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2008.

10. Zygmunt Bauman, *Hermeneutics and Science*, London: Hutchinson and Co, 1978, p. 225.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid. p. 231.
13. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge*, London: Rougledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, p. 163.
14. Ibid. p. 238.
15. Karl Popper, *Objective Knowledge*, Oxford: Clerondon Press, 1972, p. 17.
16. Zygmunt Bauman, *Hermeneutics and Science*, p. 239.
17. Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner, *Rational Consensus in Science and Society*, London: D. Reidel, 1981, p. 8.
18. Ibid. p.9.
19. Zygmunt Bauman, *Hermeneutics and Science*, p. 239.
20. Ibid. p. 246.
21. Ibid.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Bhagat Oinam

A Plea for the Cultural Foundations of the Moral

PROBLEMATISING THE ISSUE

This paper proposes to engage with some issues on the relationships between word principles (guidelines) and conduct and, further investigate the place of cultural beliefs and practices as foundations of moral principles. It is important, I believe, to also understand the nature of moral principles (and beliefs) and certain external factors that shape the moral principles.

The position of the strong moral anti-foundationalists that one does not require a moral principle in order to pass a moral judgement faces serious problems with its further claim that goodness or badness of a conduct is decided not at the moment the action is performed but at the time of evaluation.[1] So it is evaluation alone that decides the moral dimension of an action. For it is on being evaluated (on moral ground) that an action is supposed to become a conduct. Let me problematise further. Suppose that there are no moral principles to guide an action, and also similarly no judgement of right or wrong is ever passed on a particular action, then going by the above line of argument, it will imply that an action by mere performance cannot become a conduct. This argument will also imply that an awareness of the moral on the part of the evaluator is prerequisite for an action to be a conduct, and not so much on the performer and the act. So the issue of morally good or bad is supposed to be a post-facto affair. But this view is difficult to accept, as the core of the moral in this case seems to be based outside the purview of the act, that an act of judgement passed by someone else determines the rightness or wrongness of an action (performed by another). This argument will further suggest that an action will become a conduct only when morally judged by an evaluator. This is problematic in the sense that if a moral evaluation is not passed, the action does not become a conduct. This looks odd, for the status of a conduct is solely dependent on moral evaluation and not on the act. However, I shall argue that moral judgement passed on an action is not a sufficient criterion to make an action a conduct.

An act of moral judgement as an act of evaluation of a conduct must at least fulfil two conditions: (i) an awareness of what is good as desirable and what is bad as undesirable, and (ii) in addition to the awareness there is a need to *believe* in what is considered as desirable and what is considered as undesirable. The two conditions have to be necessarily fulfilled. Merely being aware of what is good or what is bad does not fulfil the criterion of having the ability for moral evaluation. To fulfil the first criterion implies accepting some pre-given conception of good and bad, desirable and undesirable. But the second criterion, too, needs to be fulfilled, i.e. to have belief in those principles. Unless the two conditions are fulfilled, one cannot be expected to perform a conduct. If these criteria are ignored, we have to accept that moral judgements are passed without an awareness of what is moral. This too sounds strange. So the position stated above that an action becomes a conduct at the time of evaluation must pass through further scrutiny. That is, we need to ask the question: can a moral evaluation be passed (by whosoever) without an awareness of what is good—at least in a minimal sense? The answer obviously is in the negative, which will imply that a minimum awareness of what is good and desirable must serve as precondition for both performing a moral act as well as passing a moral judgement. Further, one needs to believe in what is considered as good and desirable in order to be able to pass a moral judgement.

An anti-foundationalist position highlights a weaker version of the initial argument pleading for a conception of normative justification as a non-formal demonstration of coherence between moral beliefs and settled convictions, traditions, or a final vocabulary.[2] This position shifts away from the question of relationship between moral principle and judgement, and focuses on the domain of moral principle without exactly mentioning so. According to this position, moral judgement will be based on the coherence between one's moral beliefs with what one's traditional norms and practices provide. This is to suggest that moral principles cannot be universal, but are matters of personal preferences and collective conscience. It sounds interesting to argue that our moral judgements may be passed by moral beliefs, non-formally or in-formally influenced by our moral convictions, religious authority or a cultural tradition, yet need not have a necessary and formal relationship. This argument, even if it turns softer than the usual strong anti-foundationalist position, is primarily intended to safeguard its epistemological position. Hence, it continues to deny the formal space to moral principles as pre-given.

The relationship between moral beliefs and other factors (moral conviction, cultural tradition, or religious authority) has to be linked through an "operating rationality". This operation has to be demonstrable, reasoned, and shared. So a moral judgement if said to be passed merely through personal inclinations, or by chance, cannot be said to be a right moral evaluation. If moral judgements were passed through convenience and chance, it would mean (i) that there is no consistent idea of what is morally good, and (ii) what is morally good would depend on the fleeting personal opinions and beliefs. This would lead to the sceptic positions highlighting non-existence of moral principles. If there were no consistency in the idea of the moral then there would be very little sense in talking about the moral judgement of what is right or wrong. So, what is being known as "non-formal or informal relationship" cannot at least be guided by convenience and chance.

We cannot conceive of a moral judgement passed merely on a moral belief. Moral beliefs are guided by some rationale—one's personal conviction, religious authority, or collective cultural belief. Neither can we call it as "non-formal" nor "informal." A rationale has always a basis or criterion that can be justified, crosschecked, and demonstrated with some inseparable continuity. A cultural belief, a collective conscience, and a personal conviction are not products of mere arbitrariness and flux. These take shape over a long period of experience, contemplation and judgements, and as such cannot be called informal or non-formal. If this argument is acceptable, then there is no need to divide between formal and non-formal relationship for the sake of emphasis. Without calling it a non-formal relationship, we can talk meaningfully about a relationship of moral belief with convictions, authority and patterns as forming criterion of moral evaluation. This is to suggest that criteria for evaluation will serve as the guideline for the moral in whatsoever minimal form. This guideline is the other name for moral principle. It may not be a universal guideline, but may be driven out of practical life world of a person and community, and may have wider acceptability and appeal. That is how the idea of moral principle is conceived that is socially and culturally rooted.

A relationship between moral belief and settled convictions/traditions/final vocabulary has to be already preconceived prior to evaluation of a moral conduct. In such a case, the weak anti-foundationalists' disguised version of non-formal relationship makes very little sense. The second set of arguments against this position is equally significant. Those are: (a) the relationship should address to the issue of inter-personal relationship and not merely confine to first person experiences and accounts, and subsequently (b) it must also be able to address the issue of conflicts that forms an integral part of moral choice and judgement. Moral choices are not isolated internalist celebration. An action becomes moral conduct only and only if the action significantly affects not only the performer but also other individuals closer to the performer, and also any other possible individual who can come to the picture associating himself in the situation. When one makes a moral choice, one does so not in isolation from the other in connection with whom the choice is so made. When one chooses, one chooses for all mankind.[3] There is no doubt that the moral choice will be individually made. But the principle that guides a conduct is churned out of continuous engagements of individuals at the collective level. So a pre-given moral principle is neither God-given nor beginningless. A moral conduct is not only judged through moral assessment, but also guided by at least a minimal form of a principle. And these principles are not intrinsically good in themselves, but these serve as the guideline to bring well being of the community and individuals as a whole.

The idea of non-formal relationship as propounded by the weak anti-foundationalists seems to lack conviction at two counts. First, the kind of non-formal relationship it propounds seems to be more of a flux than an order. Secondly, it does not seem to show concerns for the existence of the other as not only co-inhabiting one's space but also one's psyche. It does not seem to acknowledge the role of others even in one's private sphere. The "non-formal relationship" does not seem to be well equipped to handle this issue, not to mention providing an answer. There is more to be seen to understand the relationship between moral belief and other societal factors that shapes a moral principle. The idea of contextualism has to be seen within this framework where it includes peoples (as agent) within what it propounds as context or situation.

The above discussion on inevitability of certain preconceived or pre-given idea of the moral brings us to a domain where we avoid both the positions of the moral foundationalist and moral anti-foundationalist, and look for positions that can be both reasonable and negotiable. This of course is easier said than done.

EXPLORING MORAL CONTEXTUALISM

The idea of moral contextualism brings about a reasonable ground where both the hardened positions of moral foundationalism and moral anti-foundationalism are avoided. It tries to establish a coherent connection between moral principle, conduct and moral judgement within the ambit of a situation;, so is certainty of the moral judgement within the same ambit. It can also be that what is considered as good conduct can be seen as equally good in a similar situation. So, significance of a situation or a context is the hallmark of a moral conduct and judgement.

A "context" enriches the trilogy of moral principle-conduct-moral judgement. The context is not exclusive of the trilogy. The three are guided and supported by several factors, such as, moral agency (directly or indirectly related with the conduct and judgement), moral belief, and other conditions of judgement (settled convictions, traditions, or a final vocabulary). These conditions can be illustrated through religious authority, cultural tradition, moral conviction, collective conscience, etc. Moral contextualism, thus, takes into account the entire gamut of constituents that play roles in formulation and evaluation of the moral within a situation. An individual derives his/her choices out of a given social and cultural environment within which the individual grows up and his moral commitments and conscience nourished. To this extent this theoretical position acknowledges the significance of socio-cultural surroundings in shaping the sense that is carried by moral principles. Anthropologically speaking, moral principles emerge through human insights contemplating over long drawn collective experiences. These principles are not utopian ideals in the sense of being otherworldly. But these emerge out of embeddedness[4] of humans in the world as they exist, and also towards one another living in the same world. To the extent that moral principles are rooted in the socio-cultural world and collectively drawn, these not only emerge out of a world of embeddedness, but also are objective.

Let me take up the case of "speaking the truth" as a complicated yet objective act. Often many scholars are of the view (as done in philosophy) that speaking the truth is desirable because truth speaking has some intrinsic value in itself. Yet many more people believe (as taught by religions) that speaking the truth is desirable because it is a value that God would like humans to follow. Still many are of the view (learnt through acculturation) that we should speak the truth because that is what our elders have taught us to do. So there is more than one explanation of truth speaking. There does not seem to be one universal reason or principle to guide a moral action (as Kant thought).

There could also be a practical reason to explain the basis for speaking the truth. It could be that truth speaking is important because human communication will break down if worked on the contrary. Let me illustrate this further through an example. Imagine I am in a room with some friends. Let us also imagine that all of us are aware of the fact that we shall all be telling lies to one another, and no one shall speak the truth. Now, each one talks to the other and that will be a lie. Imagine such an environment! In an environment where everyone is telling lies, there will be no scope to *learn* or *believe* from communication of any kind. That would be pathetic!

The above example takes us to believe in the seemingly universal foundation of truth speaking. The *need for communication* is seen as the reasonable explanation for the practice of truth speaking. This is extended further towards *desirability* to speak the truth to ensure human communication. The reason is simple: without truth-speaking being practiced human communication will break down and thus collective human life cannot be assured. Therefore, going by the surface level explanation, "speaking the truth" becomes a desirable moral guideline (a minimal principle). Here, a two-fold argumentation can be put forth to restrict the notion of universality of truth speaking: One, the overarching desirability of "speaking the truth" has several explanations to trace its basis. It starts from philosophical explanation to religious foundations, and even to commonsensical explanation. Not only that different persons can have strong beliefs in either of these explanations, but also there can be reasonable arguments to support either of these explanations. So, a universal basis for the principle of speaking the truth cannot be ascertained. Two, even if we accept an overarching desirability of the principle to the extent of presuming that we shall most often speak the truth as guided by one of those explanations, truth speaking cannot be said as to be a universal and inalienable necessity. The story of *The Bishop's Candlesticks* is an explicit case where "telling a lie" prevails over "speaking the truth."[5] I have just taken up the narrative from a story but there are several such narratives that one finds in one's life. While speaking the truth is a generally desired act, expectation in the case of *The Bishop's Candlesticks* is to save the life of the thief who is already being victimised by insensitivity of the society. So the need for honest communication as a possible *universal* requirement breaks down. The point for focus is: what is considered as a practical necessity primarily emerges out of a situation. As long as the situations demand the general need for communication, speaking the truth remains a desirable requirement (a principle). But if the situation demands something other than general communication, speaking the truth no more becomes desirable. Here in this case it is about saving the life of someone. So, the idea of "universal foundation" of truth speaking is a misnomer.

The foundation of the moral, if any, will be shaped by the nature of the situation. With the change in situation the status and requirements of the moral will subsequently change. This will equally apply to another seemingly universal principle—the "respect to life" understood in the liberal discourse. Considering that man lives in the collective (religious, political, cultural, national, etc.), human history has witnessed that procreation and maintaining of one's family and society has been part of human endeavour. While many battles (and wars) are fought, to destroy and control the other, there is an inherent human tendency to protect and nourish one's own community members. Desire to sustain life has been one of the most primal desires of the most primitive communities, and the same still continues to be so for the big nation states. Today the "war against terror" is simply an American war to sustain its supremacy and, as they say, "to protect the interest of America." What is significant here is the inherent desire to sustain life for a group of people that claims to have a collective self. So does the most primitive tribes think of themselves. The respect for life has been a value that remained confined to collective selves only for themselves, without applying to others (collective selves). Its universality was never there. It is with United Nations Charter on Human Rights (1948) that today nation states are expected to respect the "right to life" of human beings, particularly its citizens. In spite of the charters and covenants, respect for life as a universal phenomenon is still wanting. That does not in any case belittle the significance of respect for life as a value. It becomes a moral value because it is minimally prerequisite for a community to survive. Talking of "universality" (to read as universalizability) is to expand this desire to protect and nourish life from the confines of one's own community to every possible community and person. So, the objectivity in "speaking the truth" or "respecting the life" emerges out of the very dynamics of embeddedness in which humans are inseparably juxtaposed with one another.

The idea of embeddedness shows that moral beliefs and commitments are culture specific. But this should in no sense carry the meaning of moral determinism. It is within a cultural milieu that individuals learn what is morally desirable and undesirable. And it is also within such a cultural milieu that individuals learn the ways of accepting or disagreeing with a projected social belief. Society is a complex whole consisting of several individuals having diverse opinions and predicaments, and as such the same society (consisting of such diverse opinions) cannot be expected to give a straight and unproblematic moral dictum that will be a ready-made recipe for moral conduct for all individuals in society. Thus, a society will have within itself different ways open to an individual for making alternate choices. In the words of Jean Paul Sartre, it is part of human facticity that man is always open to at least two ways of responding—of saying '*yes*' or '*no*,' of choosing or not choosing. Though Sartre has given full emphasis to the individual choice and freedom, I would suggest that a society is not a monotype entity to have only one identity and voice;

it will have multiple voices. The platform for saying 'yes' or 'no' is also provided by the social dynamics itself.

The idea of embeddedness does not remain confined to the specificity of a life experience. Moral values and principles are both embedded as well as transcendental.[6] These are embedded for these emerge out of man's lived experience in the world—in his constant struggle within himself, with others and the world. These are deeply rooted in social reality in which humans exist. But at the same time these values also have potential to be transcendental—to be able to move beyond the specific confines of the embeddedness. That is how moral values are both embedded and transcendental at the same time. The possibility of transcendence emerges out of the embeddedness.

The possibility of moral principles to be transcendental shows the broader nature of moral values. These values emerge out of human experiences, and also elevate themselves, beyond the specificity of a context or situation. "Respect for life", as moral value, did not remain independent of the human world, nor were these found out as a universal value from the beginning. These emerge out of specific experiences, only to be seen through that these values have some generalizable tendency. Gradually, it is realized that such values would be as much desirable by any other individual faced with similar such situations.

PROBLEMATICS OF CULTURAL FOUNDATION

The generalizable appeal of most moral principles throws open a significant question if all moral values are both embedded and transcendental. The question becomes significant because in the general sense all moral principles do not seem to carry generalizable appeal. Another issue that relates to the question is on the nature of embeddedness, particularly the role of the factors that shape a principle. I have in mind practices of *jauhar, harakiri,* and many more practices of South and South-East Asia.

Let me take up the issue of embeddedness first. Conceding that moral principles are shaped by factors that need not necessarily be moral (settled convictions, traditions, or a final vocabulary), it is important to raise the question about the nature and coherence of those non-moral values to the moral values. Suppose a moral principle is influenced by a religious value; then one of the pertinent questions is: are the two values (moral and religious) synonymous, or is it that one merely influences the other? Take for instance, the idea of *jihad.* It is about waging a holy war to protect one's own religion. This religious value arises out of a perception that one's own religion is under threat. However, the philosophical narrative is that it is a purification process of engaging violence, both to oneself as well as to the other. How does one handle such an idea derived from religion and politics? Can one see *jihad* as a moral concept? A moral value should possess a transcendental nature, and preferably a generalizable appeal. That is, if a particular value is desirable in a context, then the same value must appeal to a similar context, say, where the point of reference is another religion and people. True that the *jihad* as a religious value has generated appeal over sections of Islamic population, but it is worth comparing if such a value would find similar appeal in other religions, such as *jihad* by the Hindus or the Buddhists. It is hard to visualize the transcendental nature of *jihad* as a possible moral value.

On the contrary, there are doctrines of the Vaisnavas and the Sufis, of compassion and resilience towards the others, that include people of other faiths. Gandhi's ethico-political strategy of *satyagraha* was driven from the Vaisnava religious ethos of non-violence (*ahimsa*) and love. In fact, *ahimsa* can be seen as a moral value derived from a religious value. So, *ahimsa* can be seen both as a moral and a religious value. One is not sure if the same can be said of *jihad.* Contrary to *jihad*, *ahimsa* becomes a moral value with a generalizable appeal.

If one deconstructs the concept, *jihad* can be presented in a crude way as killing of others that do not belong to you. This, however, is not so unfamiliar in human history. All battles among the tribes are based on this dictum. The same has been witnessed in larger quantum in other parts of the world. Hundred years of war between two European colonial powers, two deadliest world wars yet again fought on European soil, are also exercises in the same spirit of *jihad.* In fact, these types of violence are more complex, those being driven by several factors like nationality, trade interest, imperial projects, etc., in addition to religion.

Jihad does not seem to carry generalizable appeal. The appeal it has to sections of Muslim communities cannot be seen as transcendental, as the concept is yet to receive appeal in different contexts and people. But *ahimsa* does. Both, however, derive their praxiological basis from religious doctrines. But the latter gains generalizable appeal as it propounds sustenance of life rather than destruction. Peace and harmony are about sustenance of life. Greeks had imagined about such a state of affairs in "good life."[7] Different traditions have different names for this philosophical idea of a good life, viz. *vasudaivakutumbakam*, "well being," *summum bonum*, etc. Following this line of argument, *jihad* does not seem to qualify being called a moral value. Somewhere down the line, reciprocity of the idea of peace, harmony, good will, etc. seem to shape what is called morally desirable.

The above position, however, takes us to a more complex and difficult situation. That is, the definition of what is morally desirable may also be subjected to contestation. While it is found in most of the traditions, i.e. the primacy of the ideals of peace, harmony and happiness for all as morally desirable, it is worth investigating if these are the only ideals that human lives have struggled for. Or is it our privileging of a few traditions and ignoring many others.

In some traditions, for instance, the goal of human life may be to have a "dignified life" rather than a mere "peaceful life." In many of the Far East and South East Asian traditions "dignified life" or "life of honour" is considered a greater goal than "life of peace". Can we privilege one over the other, or should we treat all of these as carrying generalizable appeal? It is certainly true that these ideals carry a large appeal over many societies in these parts of the globe. And it is worth investigating singularly the dynamics of each of these ideals rather than providing sweeping statements on these values and ideals.

Let me problematize the issue further with illustrations of some of the Asian social experiences. "Respect for life" is a generalizable moral value; and its prominent outcome emerges from the modern western liberal tradition to the extent of the state controlling and nurturing the life of its citizens.[8] There are also doctrines in the Vedantic and Buddhist traditions of highlighting respect for life as a whole. But to be more focused, many Asian experiences[9] show much more prominence given to "dignified life" than to mere "respect for life". An undignified life cannot be worth living, thus cannot lead to a happy life.

Let me highlight several instances across Asia where adhering to values that aim at dignified life can be illustrated. Take the case of *jauhar*[10] exercised voluntarily by the Rajput widows in Rajasthan to protect their honour in the face of advancing enemy soldiers. Though this act may be considered as suicide from the liberal discourse, the practice is specific to the context; but it also tends to carry a generalizable tendency. It seems also to carry transcendental value. The act of burning oneself in fire is to protect oneself from being physically violated and spiritually shattered. The moral position here is of leading a dignified life. Let me also highlight another example. The Japanese practice of *harakiri* was widely witnessed by the world during the World War II. This also highlights restoration of self-pride in the face of defeat. "Ability to give up life" is one of the highest dispositions to restore the value of "dignified life". Value of life is restored through embracing death. The case is not only peculiar to the Japanese. This seems to be a South-east Asian experience, too. The traditional Manipuri practice of "losing one's head" (sacrificing life by getting killed) has been considered the highest form of moral courage. Where one fails to keep one's word, often "losing of head" had been a practice. By embracing death bravely, one restores one's lost pride and dignity. This traditional Manipuri value and moral belief finds similarity with Japanese *harakiri*. That is how in the Japanese tradition one often asks how one died rather than how one lived.

What is important for us is that each of these values is deeply embedded in the life world of these communities. And these also seem to carry a transcendental nature. True that some of these values subscribe to violence—of engaging with death. But death need not always be ugly and undesirable. That is what many of the Eastern philosophies like Buddhism and the Upanishads teach us. For the Buddhists, fear of death comes out of *avidya*. So are life and death different phases in the unending cycle of the *atman* (Upanishad). My bringing in Buddhism and the Upanishads is not to digress from the issue of death and violence. This is to make a point that death is inevitable for every human being and thus need not be discarded as undesirable. But we still despise death which is unnatural and driven by violence. And we are focusing here on those unnatural deaths as "violence to life".

I see that there are two ways in which this violence takes place. One form of violent death is what one witnesses in *jihad* and similar such practices, where physical violence is inflicted on the other. The other form of violent death is in the sacrifice one makes for a higher value (without inflicting physical violence to the other). The Japanese practice of *harakiri,* Manipuri practice of *luren katpa* (losing one's head), Rajasthani experience of a particular episode of *jauhar* as mentioned above—all these are performed not with any selfish ulterior motive, but with a desire to go closer to some other supposedly higher values. It is inflicting physical violence on oneself to the extent of giving up life, and not about inflicting physical violence to the other as witnessed in *jihad.*

Let me also bring here Gandhi's idea of *satyagraha* as a mode of protest against colonial rule. Conducting fast by voluntarily abstaining from food is certainly committing violence on one's own body. The "fast unto death" is in principle a violent act. It is about inflicting violence to one's own body, but with the expectation to arouse moral conscience of the exploiter (the other). No doubt, embracing violence to one's own body is not a pleasurable act, but it is an act with a higher moral conscience and disposition that requires an enormous amount of moral courage. Irom Sharmila's[11] fast unto death for more than eleven years is yet again a continuation of the Gandhian method of purification of the soul and arousing the moral conscience of the other (here the Indian state). I also see this in a Foucauldian sense as a challenge to the state to take away one's own life which the state otherwise supposedly nourishes (bio-power). So, I strongly believe that violence to one's own body for the achievement of a higher moral goal is a desirable act.

It would therefore be unfair to pass an immediate comment on the goodness or badness of moral conduct, but one needs to see both (i) the nature of the moral principles that guides that conduct, and (ii) the life world in which those principles/values are embedded. Once a coherence of these conditions is established through reasonableness, the moral value as both embedded and transcendental can be ascertained.

If some form of minimally established moral principle is a prerequisite for passing a moral judgement, one pertinent question is about the basis or foundation of such a principle. This is a question about moral ontology. Kant's definition of "good will" as unconditionally good sounds more like a tautology than denoting any significantly meaningful basis of good will. Explaining what is morally good in terms of what is morally and unconditionally good has its own limitation. "To be unconditionally good" makes very little sense when located in a context. It is important to note that each community/society has its own notion of what is good and desirable. And what is good and desirable for the community is that which bring wellbeing to the society and its members. This comes closer to what Aristotle saw "goodness" in terms of good life. Conduct that brings wellbeing to the people will be a valuable act. A community can construe wellbeing in terms of what is called "dignified life". Another community may construe good life in terms of "peaceful life". It may vary from community to community. While it may be *eudemonia* (Aristotle) for the Greeks, and "respect for life" for the modern western world, it may be "life of dignity" for many Asian societies. Each of these life worlds has embedded values driven by different factors. The question is of identifying those values that are transcendental to qualify becoming moral values, and subsequently set forth moral principles.

To conclude, the idea of moral goodness as source of evaluation for our conduct emerges out of our embedded life-worlds. As discussed above, the conception of goodness *may be* generic and desirable, yet the content of "what is good" is shaped by the cultural life-worlds that are multiple and varied. The contents of what is good may at times be conflicting and at times complementary. However, what is significant for us is to look out for those moral values, which are not only desired by an individual or a community, but those which carry general appeal. One such way is to look for a desirable impact of our conduct on others. While *jihad* as a conduct may be appealing among the followers of a religion, it certainly cannot be appealing for others. The concepts like love, care, well being, sacrifice, dignity, etc. are such that values associated with these concepts shape the idea of "good" in a community. Objectivity of "good" is thus to be counted on the general appeal carried by an idea of good. In spite of being culturally located, certain ideas of goodness can produce general appeal and thus be objective, and even universalizable. While on the one hand, the idea of goodness emerges out of specific embedded life-worlds, the general appeal that such an idea may carry enables certain forms of acceptability (objective) cutting across cultural locatedness. Objectivity of moral goodness does not come out as *a priori*, but from the specific life-worlds. Cultural rootedness of moral values is thus the beginning point for any discourse on the moral.

NOTES

1. This view has been already criticised by scholars like Fairfield. See his *The Ways of Power*.
2. Ibid.
3. This view is closer to what Jean Paul Sartre stated that when one chooses, one chooses for mankind, thus showing moral responsibility of the individual for the entire human race. For details, see his *Existentialism and Humanism*.
4. I am taking the idea of embeddedness from Maurleau Ponty. See his *Phenomenology of Perception*, pp. 346–50.
5. See Norman McKinnel, *The Bishop's Candlesticks*.
6. The term "transcendental" suggests emerging out of that embeddedness, yet not losing ground at the same time.
7. Aristotle's idea of "good life" or "happy life" is a desirable state of affairs, a goal towards which all Greek citizens should aim. What is desirable is the goal of human pursuit. This is so with other Greek philosophers as well. The Greeks did not see the idea of "good" in isolation, but as a qualifier to a form of life. So, they saw the idea of "goodness" in practice of a good life.
8. I am referring to Foucault's idea of bio-politics where the modern state no more highlights its power to take away the life of its citizens, but shifts towards controlling the very act of creation of life and its nourishment. See his *The History of Sexuality*, p. 141.
9. Though I have put the Asian experience in one basket, there cannot a singular notion of Asian experience. There are contrary and contradictory Asian viewpoints on morals. I have only framed the concept in a loose sense.
10. I am referring to a specific case in the practice of *sati* when war widows jumped into the funeral pyre to avoid loss of honour at the hands of invading Khilji soldiers under Alauddin Khilji. The story of Padmini is well known in Indian history.
11. Irom Sharmila has been fasting since November 2, 2000 for the repeal of the draconian law, Armed Forces Special Powers Act (1958), enacted

by the Parliament of India and operative in places in the country that are declared "disturbed". The act carrying the British legacy enables army personnel to shoot to kill anyone on mere suspicion (of being anti-national). The act further ensures state impunity by closing down legal options to the victim. So far Sharmila has been charged by the Government of Manipur of attempting to commit suicide, and hence is being confined to a hospital room for more than eleven years and force fed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* (Oxford World's Classic), trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925, 1998).

Barlingay, S.S. *Beliefs, Reasons and Reflections* (Pune: IPQ Publications, 1983).

Fairfield, Paul. *The Ways of Power* (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 2002).

Findlay, F.N. "The Constitution of Human Values," in Godfrey Vesey (ed.), *Human Values* (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978).

Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality,* Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1990).

Gandhi, M.K., *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings,* edited by Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time,* trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Basil Blackwell, 1962).

Kant, Immanuel. *Moral Law: Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,* tr. and analysed by H.J. Paton (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1948, 1998).

Kant, Immanuel. *The Metaphysics of Morals,* translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, intro. Roger J. Sulivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 2004).

Krishna, Daya. *The Art of the Conceptual: Explorations in a Conceptual Maze Over Three Decades* (New Delhi: ICPR, 1989).

Maurleau Ponty, Maurice. *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962, 1986).

Oinam, Bhagat. "Reason and Moral Action," in R.P. Singh (ed.), *Reason, Dialectics and Post-Modernism* (New Delhi: Om Publications, 2000).

Sartre, J.P. *Existentialism and Humanism* (London: Methuen, 1974).

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Theophila Dominica de Souza

On Ascribing Morals to Animals: A Study in Evolutionary Ethics

The present paper attempts to understand grounds of possibility of ascribing moral rights to animals other than humans. The traditional criteria for moral considerability discussed by scholars are self-consciousness, possession of linguistic skills, and capacity for rational thought. But it is a fact that some people have greater reasoning capacities than others. So, does this mean that moral worth increases as you move up the I.Q. scale? And what about the brain damaged human infants who have no rational capacities and yet there are very few people who would be willing to deny moral considerability to the very young or senile and mentally enfeebled due to Alzheimer's disease? Again, consider the criteria based on the principle of equal consideration of like interests i.e. all entities with capacity to suffer have an interest in avoiding suffering, of equal moral consideration. This principle does not mean equal or identical treatment, because interests differ across living beings.

It is only in recent times that there have been some reflections that include individualistic consequentialism, individualist deontological and holistic environmentalist ethics. Individualistic consequentialism covers a spectrum of positions broadly in the utilitarian traditions of J. Bentham and J. S. Mill. For individualistic consequentialism the unit of ethical concern is always the individual organism rather than the ecosystem or the species as a whole. It is important to make a distinction here. While the individual organism is a unit of ethical concern it is state of affairs within the organisms rather than the organism itself which generates value. In consequentialist ethical systems it is always states of affairs rather

than things-in-themselves that are valuable. The aim of ethical behaviour is to maximize pleasure over pain thus to be morally considerable an organism must have the capacity to feel pleasure or pain or more fundamentally to have subjective experience.

Individualist deontological focuses on individuals rather than on wholes. These environmental ethicists consider that individual organism have value in themselves and value that is not linked with experience nor to do with states of affairs within organism. It is the organism itself which is valuable and not what it is doing. In *The Nature and Possibility of Environmental Ethics* Tom Regan[1] suggests that all natural objects have inherent goodness, whether living or not living. In case of animal rights he concentrates on "rights that are possessed by those who are subjects of life". Albert Schweitzer and Paul Taylor developed the deontological approach to environmental ethics in the books *Philosophy of Civilization, Part II: Civilization and Ethics2* and *Respect for Nature: Theory of Environmental Ethics,3* respectively. A consideration of these positions highlights the central divide between the deontological individualist and environmental ethicist. Some suggest that all morally considerable individuals are of equal value while there are some who argue for hierarchy of values within the individual deontological framework.

Some environmental ethicists focus on ethical considerations of ecological wholes rather than individuals. By ecological wholes we refer to ecosystems and the species of biosphere as a whole. These holistic approaches to environmental ethics tend to be consequentialist rather than deontological aiming at the good of the whole. Aldo Leopold's *Ascent Country Almanac* is often cited as a foundational work in holistc environmental ethics. Leopold's guiding principle is expressed as "a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability of beauty of bioethic community. It is wrong if it tends otherwise". It is important to note that this is a principle of extension and not replacement, i.e. human ethics is extended to include land. Land ethics does not replace human ethics. The stress on the importance of integrity, stability and beauty of the bioethics community contrasts with both individualist deontologists and individualist consequentialists. First the community rather than the individual is the focus of moral significance. For the individual deontologist the community has moral significance as a collection of morally valuable individuals, while for the individualist consequentialist, the community is valuable only in as much as it contributes to the improvement of individual experience. Secondly, ecological qualities such as integrity and stability are of primary value. Such qualities cannot be value in either kind of individualist systems where individual living organism or their experiences are the whole locus of values.

The dominance of anthropocentrism in environmental ethics has been the root cause of some forms of extreme ethical considerations reflected in land ethic. Anthropocentrism has an instrumental value to nature and non-human beings as well as humans. In case of anthropocentrism, there is an implicit denial that all members of species are equal or that humans are superior because they realise a greater range of values through culture compared to non-human species. But such a position requires a principle of self-defence that allows humans to defend themselves from harmful aggression, to the extent that might necessitate killing or harming animals and plants. Secondly, such a position requires a principle of human preservation that allows human actions that are necessary for meeting the basic needs of humans while harming the basic needs of animals and plants.

In human ethics when the basic needs of some are in conflict with the non-basic or luxury needs of others, the distinction between failing to meet and aggressing against basic needs seems to have little moral force. But in environmental ethics, whether we adopt an anthropocentric or a non-anthropocentric perspective we have grounds to morally distinguish between two cases—against those needs in order to meet our own non-basic needs or luxury needs, but not simply failing to meet those needs in order to meet our own non-basic needs. We shall return to these issues at a later stage after clarifying the notion of 'intrinsic values', as it is on the basis of such a distinction that a justification for extending 'moral consideration' to animals will be provided.

The notion of 'intrinsic value' presupposes a distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, and consequently we must inquire into how nature is recognized as intrinsically valuable, *mutatis mutandi*, animals. John O'Neill's[4] position, though not exhaustive, provides, for the present study a foundation to justify ascription of 'values to non-humans.' Whether the problem is finally solved will depend upon our acceptance of the distinction made by O'Neill as philosophically adequate and logically tenable or whether further refinement is possible in this analysis.

Traditionally, philosophers distinguished between intrinsic and instrumental values. And in the tradition of rationalists, philosophers of the modern period and Kant, it is only the human or man who has the intrinsic value or is an end-in-himself. All other things were regarded as means to an end, primarily, for the well-being of the human. Even in the classical philosophy of Greeks, humans are the only entities that were regarded as of intrinsic value. Of course, there were some aberrations such as when Plato and Aristotle accepted slavery and accorded status of instrumental value to them when they argued that 'slaves are instruments of well-being' of citizens. However, animals and nature were never recognized as having intrinsic value.

O'Neill recognizes three different basic senses of 'intrinsic value':

(1) 'Intrinsic value' as synonym for non-instrumental value';
(2) 'Intrinsic value, to refer to an object having 'intrinsic properties' and
(3) 'Intrinsic value' as a synonym for, objective, value.

'Intrinsic value' as a synonym for non-instrumental value is defined in terms of whether an object is a means to an end or not. In O'Neill's words: "**Intrinsic goods are goods that other goods are good for the sake of it**". One cannot fall into the trap of infinite regress, as not everything in the universe can be of instrumental value. There must be some objects that have intrinsic value. Some environmental ethicians such as A. Naess[5] argue that *among these objects* that have such non-instrumental value are non-human beings and states. The second sense of intrinsic value is the one used by G.E. Moore[6] who uses the term with reference to 'intrinsic properties'. Moore argues that an object has 'intrinsic properties' if the thing has such an 'intrinsic nature' that the properties are of a non-relational kind. Third sense of intrinsic value is as a synonym for 'objective value', i.e. value that an object possesses independently of the valuations of valuers. There are some sub-varieties of this third sense, depending upon the meaning of 'independent' valuation. For instance, when one claims that non-humans have 'intrinsic value', the claim is meta-ethical, in the sense that it attempts to reject the subjectivist view that 'valuing' lies in the valuers, their attitudes, preferences, likes and dislikes, etc.

O'Neill provides an extensive analysis and critical evaluation of the three different uses of 'intrinsic value'. He finds that the uses of 'intrinsic value' have been interchanged in various philosophical discussions in general and environmental ethics in particular. This is particularly so of the first and third sense of use of 'intrinsic value'.

O'Neill highlights the fact that most of the discussions in the first sense of 'intrinsic value' can be evaluated from the emotivist point of view as in the case of C. L. Stevenson who argues: "X is intrinsically good' asserts that the speaker approves of X intrinsically, and acts emotively to make the hearer or hearers likewise approve of X intrinsically."[7] O'Neill concludes his analysis by pointing out that while subjectivism does not rule out non-humans having non-instrumental value, objectivism does not rule it in.

O'Neill analyses the claim of 'non-relationality' of properties of an object because of which the object is intrinsically valuable. He recognizes two interpretations of 'non-relational' properties: (i) Weak interpretation assumes that non-relational properties of an object are those that persist, regardless of the existence or non-existence of other objects. (ii) Strong interpretation assumes that non-relational properties of an object are those that are characterized without reference to other objects. O'Neill points out that the argument for both the interpretations lead to the fallacy of equivocation.

The third sense of 'intrinsic value', namely, ethical objectivist position, tries to argue for nature as a non-instrumental value and at the same time not committing to an objectivist meta-ethics. It must be recalled that the ethical objectivist holds that the evaluative properties of objects are real properties of objects, that is, they are properties that objects possess independently of the valuation of valuers.

There are two interpretations of 'independently of the valuations of valuers': (i) weak interpretation which assumes that evaluative properties of objects are properties that exist in the absence of evaluating agents; and

(ii) strong interpretation which assumes that the evaluative properties of objects can be characterized without reference to evaluating agents.

O'Neill's analysis points out that weak objectivism fails to support objectivism about values as it serves no argument for an objectivist theory of values. It is only in the case of strong objectivism that O'Neill argues that there are uses of evaluative utterances about the natural world that provide the clearest examples of values. It is obvious from the above that O'Neill recognizes a third use of 'intrinsic value' and that too, in the second interpretation, namely strong objectivity, for a useful justification for recognizing values in the nonhuman or natural world.

Many philosophers who endorse an autonomous environmental ethic are uneasy with the philosophies of Peter Singer[8] and Tom Regan. They see the central focus on animals as not much better than the traditional moralist's obsession with humans. These critics agree that an environmental ethic will require better treatment of animals, but this concern for animals follows from a larger concern for nature. The trouble with Singer and Regan is that they have it the other way around: whatever concern they have for nature comes from their concern about animals. The pre-eminent value of nature is still not at the centre of the ethical discourse, where it belongs.

According to critics, Singer and Regan make the following mistake. They suppose that either sentience or being the subject of life is a necessary condition for moral considerability. For biocentrists, sentience and being the subject of a life are only part of the story. The rest of the story is the value of life itself.

The view that all life is morally considerable goes back to the extraordinary Nobel prize-winning humanitarian, theologian, missionary, organist, and medical doctor, Albert Schweitzer. In his 1923 book, *Philosophy of Civilization*, he wrote: "True philosophy must start from the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness: 'I am life that wants to live, in the midst of life that wants to live'." [9].

The appropriate moral response to this insight, Schweitzer thought, is reverence for all life. According to Kenneth E. Goodpaster, "nothing short of being alive seems to me to be a plausible and nonarbitrary criterion."[10] He claimed that there are good reasons to be suspicious of the sentience criterion at the outset, and the strongest argument for it is unconvincing. Moreover, understanding why the argument is unconvincing reveals the strength of the case for the life criterion, according to Goodpaster. Finally, Goodpaster provides an explanation for why the sentience criterion seems so plausible even though it is false (this is what philosophers call an "error theory").

Goodpaster thinks that we should be suspicious of sentienism because the capacity for pleasure and pain is simply a means that some organisms use to realise their ends. It provides a way of obtaining information about the environment. More precisely, sentience is a biological adaptation that occurs in some organisms that is conductive to fulfilling their biological functions. When seen in this way, Goodpaster thinks that we should find it implausible that some particular adaptation directed towards solving some particular biological problems faced by some organisms should be seen as the criterion of moral considerability.

According to Goodpaster, the most plausible argument for the view that sentience is the criterion of moral considerability is the following:

(1) All and only beings who have interests are morally considerable.
(2) Non-sentient beings do not have interest.
(3) Therefore, Non-sentient beings are not morally considerable.

Goodpaster agrees that the argument is valid and that the first premise is true. It is the second premise,

(4) "the capacity for experience is necessary for having interests"

which he denies. In his view, there are beings that have interests that do not have the capacity for experience. Plants have interest, he observes, that are based on their needs for such things as sun and water. Indeed, Gary Varner[11] has claimed that some of our interests are based on needs and are independent of the fact that we are experiencing creatures.

He cites the example of vitamin C, which it is in the interests of all humans to absorb whether they are in anyway conscious of this fact. In this respect, we are like plants: we have certain biological needs and it is in our interest to satisfy them. Robin Attfield[12] claims that plants, like humans, can flourish and it is in their interest to do so.

The sentience criterion seems so plausible, because we are inordinately concerned with pleasure of organisms that are like us in this respect. According to Goodpaster, the life criterion is the only one which is not based on privileging some morally arbitrary feature, because without sentience, there is nothing for morality to take into account, for nothing that happens to organism i.e. sentience as the criterion for moral considerability, is not arbitrary.

Compare a well-watered plant to a well-oiled car. In both cases we can say that each is good of its kind, that they function at a very high level, and we can say that it is in the interest of trees to have adequate hydration and nutrition; and we can say that it is in the interest of cars to have their oil changed regularly and to be kept in good shape. **With reference to cars, there is no dispute that this is a non-literal use of the word 'interest'. We can speak** as if cars had interest, but we don't really believe that they do. What is at issue between sentienism and biocentricism is whether the sense in which plants have interest is in this sense in which humans have interests, or whether the fact that we speak in this way regarding plants is non-literal, as it is in the case of cars.

Those who favour a life criterion say that plants have interests in the same sense as humans, those who support sentientism say that talking about interest of plants is non-literal, and as it is when we talk about interests of cars. For the sentientist, the reason a person has interest and a car does not is that what happens to the person matters to him, while nothing matters to the car. In this respect the car and the tree are similar, but a person is different; it matters to the person that his interests are respected, but not to the tree or the car. We may prefer that the car or the tree be in tiptop condition, but that is our preference, not theirs.

In reply it might be pointed out that trees and other plants have various mechanisms for responding to threats and noxious stimuli. There is a sense in which they seek to flourish, or, it might be said to satisfy their interests. But so, arguably, do many machines.

The elevator in the building shuts down rather than putting itself at risk whenever its sensors tell it that it is under **some stress. But the biocentrist might say in** reply that these are not really responses to the interests of the machine, but responses to those of its designers. Living things on the other hand, have interests of their own. But the question is whether this distinction can be maintained?

Imagine two organisms, duplicate in all respects. They have exactly the same requirements for nutrition, hydration, sleep, and so on. One was constructed by natural selection, the other by Haliburton Biotech Inc. While it might be reasonable to say that one is an artefact and the other is not, it seems weird to suppose that one has interest and the other does not. What the sentientist says is that nothing about a being's origin affects whether or not he/she has interest. What is essential for having interest is that it matters to the being what happens to him/her. This is what is true of humans and many other animals and what is not true of plants. Suppose one observes that plants not only respond to threats and noxious stimuli, but that they actually care what happens to them. To put the point positively, suppose that not only do plants play, grow better when you play Mozart to them, they actually like it and want you to do it. If this were the case, it would not prove biocentrism. Rather, it would show that the domain of sentience is vastly larger than we had thought.

Some philosophers and environmental theorists claim that neither sentientism nor biocentrism succeed in capturing the moral lessons of ecology. Rather than giving us a new outlook which respects the ecological insight that "everything is related to everything else" they give us nothing more than the moral episode in the long march of "moral extensionism". Starting from the traditional idea that humans are morally considerable and have rights, sentientists and biocentrists have struggled to extend these concepts to animals and the rest of the biosphere. The result is a lawyer's paradise in which every living thing has rights against every other living thing. Can a wild beast sue a lion for violating his right to life? Do elephants have rights to take acacia trees or do acacia trees have rights to be protected from elephants? This is of course, a parody that is quite unfair to both sentientists and biocentrists. Nevertheless, it makes vivid the criticisms of the ecocentrists. What is needed, they think, is a new way of looking at morality that recognizes the moral primacy of the ecological wholes of which we are a part.

The central debate in contemporary environmental ethics is between those who defend an anthropocentric ethics (which holds humans to be holders of moral values and hence superior to nonhuman animals) and nonanthropocentric ethics (which holds that all animals have same moral worth). James Sterba provides a pragmatic foundation for conflict resolution between the two positions as the practical requirements of the two positions are the same, and hence have the same environmental principles that achieve environmental justice.

The differences between various members of species do not provide grounds for thinking that the members of one species are superior to the members of the other. Nonanthropocentric perspective does recognize that humans have qualities that members of other species do not have, e.g. rationality and moral agency. But members of nonhuman species also have traits that humans do not possess. For example, the speed of the cheetah, vision of the eagle.

We cannot claim without begging-the-question that distinctive human traits are superior to that of distinctive traits of nonhuman species. Humans assume that they would not be better off if they were to trade off their traits. However, the same can be said of nonhuman species. It may be that a species could be better off if it were to acquire the traits of another species.

Judged from a non-question-begging perspective, members of all species should be regarded as equal. James Sterba[13] provides a six steps argument:

1. "We should not aggress against any living being unless there are either self-evident or non-question-begging reasons for doing so." (equals be treated equally, unequals unequally)
2. "To treat humans as superior overall to other living beings is to aggress against them by sacrificing their basic needs to meet the nonbasic needs of humans".
3. "Therefore, we should not treat humans as superior overall to other living beings unless we have either self-evident nor non-question begging reasons for doing so."
4. "We do not have either self-evident or non-question-begging reasons for treating humans as superior over to other living beings."
5. "Therefore, we should not treat humans as superior overall to other living beings."
6. "Not to treat humans as superior overall to other living beings is to treat them as equal overall to other living beings."
7. "Therefore, we should treat humans as equal to other living beings."

In spite of the above argument Sterba justifies human preference on the grounds of *defence,* i.e. actions that defend oneself and other human beings against harmful aggression are permissible even when they necessitate killing or harming animals or plants—justified by the *principle of human defence.* There is another principle that justifies human preference, i.e. *principle of human preservation.* The principle can be defined in following terms: actions that are necessary for meeting one's basic needs or basic needs of other human beings are permissible even when they require aggressing against the basic needs of animals and plants. However, there is the third principle, namely, *principle of disproportionality.* The principle can be defined in the following terms: Actions that meet nonbasic or luxury needs of human are prohibited when they aggress against the basic needs of animals and plants. On the basis of this principle preference goes beyond bounds, and is compatible with the non-anthropocentric perspective.

One can analyse alternatives to nonanthropocentrism in the following: Humans are superior because (1) they realize a greater range of values than nonhumans and (2) they have unprecedented capacity to create ethical systems that impart worth to other life forms.

What will follow from this are: (a) the principle of human defence favoured by non-anthropcentrics provides adequate protection to humans. **There is no need to adopt a different principle** over and above the principle of human defence. (b) Again, the principle of human preservation favoured by nonanthropocentrics provides adequate protection to humans. There is no need of adopting a different principle to justify actions of human beings, over and above the principle of human preservation. (c) What deserves attention is the principle of disproportionality.

One may distinguish between two degrees of preference: (1) Preference to basic needs of animals and plants over the non-basic needs of humans - otherwise would involve aggressing against basic needs of animals and plants (by an act of *commission*). (2) Preference to basic needs of animals and plants over the non-basic needs of humans—otherwise would involve simply failing to meet the basic needs of animals and plants (by an act of *omission*). In human ethics when the basic needs of some people are in conflict with the nonbasic or luxury needs of others, the distinction between *failing to meet* and *aggressing against* basic needs have little moral force. However, both ways of not meeting needs are objectionable. This theoretical distinction would have little practical force since most of the ways that we have of preferring our own nonbasic needs over the basic needs of animals and plants actually involve aggressing against their basic needs to meet our own nonbasic or luxury needs rather than simply to meet their basic needs.

The above considerations provide grounds to justify various positions. For example, the claim that humans are superior to the members of other species, if it can·be justified at all, is something like the claim that a person came in first in a race where others came in second, third, fourth, and so on. It would not imply that the members of other species are without intrinsic value. In fact, it would imply just the opposite—that the members of other species are also intrinsically valuable as humans, just as the claim that a person came in first in a race implies that the persons who came in second, third, fourth, and so on are also meritorious, though not as meritorious as the person who came in first. Consider also the fact that many animals and plants are superior to humans in one respect or the other: sight of eagle, smell of wolf, speed of cheetah. So any claim of human superiority must allow for the recognition corresponding to human excellences. In fact, it demands recognition. Again, if the claim of human superiority is to have any moral force, it must rest on non-question-begging grounds. And finally, if human needs, even non-basic or luxury needs, are always preferred to even the basic needs of the members of the human species, we would not be giving any recognition to the intrinsic value of nonhuman nature.

The fourth argument to defend attribution of morals to animals is based upon an understanding of an evolutionary theory of morality. Frans de Waal in his book *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved* argues that modern-day evolutionary biology does a disservice to the natural world, reinforcing our habit of labelling the good things we do as "humane" and the less civilized as "animalistic".[14]

Most secular philosophers accept the standard scientific account of biological evolution as based on random natural selection. None suggests that there is any reason to suppose that humans are different from other animals or at least none base their arguments on the idea that humans uniquely possess a transcendental soul. A second important point that de Waal makes is that moral goodness is something real about which it is possible to make truth claims.

Goodness requires at a minimum level taking proper account or care of others, whereas badness by the same token includes the sort of selfishness that leads us to treat others improperly by ignoring their interests or treating them as mere instruments.

Evolutionary science and consequently, evolutionary morality has to deal with the origins of goodness. Religiously inclined moral philosophers believe that humans have been uniquely endowed with special attributes like **moral sense, whereas** moral philosophers committed to a secular interpretation argue for a rational agent theory that regards the essence of human nature as an irreducible tendency to choose selfishness over voluntary cooperation. The third type of moral philosophers such as moral relativists believe that an action can be judged as right or wrong only locally by reference to contingent and contextual considerations.

The point of departure for evolutionary moralists is based upon the fact that there are strong scientific reasons to suppose that selfishness is a primary mechanism of natural selection. How then did humans come to acquire the value of goodness? In other words, why do humans think it is good to be good and bad to be bad and not vice-versa? To provide a theological answer would amount to denying the very evolutionary basis of science and scientific growth. Hence, we need to address the question of "whence morality".

De Waal's aim is to argue against a set of answers to the "whence morality" question that he describes as the "Veneer theory".[15] If the Veneer theory of moral goodness is based on a myth, then the phenomenon of human goodness must be explained in some other way. Humans are, he suggests, by nature good. Our "good nature" is inherited along with much else from our nonhuman ancestors through the Darwinian process of natural selection. Now we have to look carefully at the behaviour of our closest nonhuman relatives like chimpanzees, at first instance, and then at other primates more distantly related to ourselves and finally at non-primate social animals. Relying on the methodological principle of parsimony, we may argue if our closest relatives do in fact act as if we were good, then we could suppose that 'goodness' is real and natural and that the morality of both humans and their evolutionary ancestors has a common source. It is obvious that human behavioural goodness is more fully developed than non-human behavioural goodness. But the simpler non-human morality must be regarded in a substantial sense, as the foundation of more complex human morality.

De Waal bases his argument on fundamental emotional response of empathy to explain why humans act well (good behaviour as against bad behaviour) at least sometimes rather than badly all the time, and further argues that this trait has evolutionary origins as it is found in other animals. He concludes that human morality would be impossible without certain emotional building blocks that are clearly at work in chimps and monkey societies. He sees human morality as having grown out of primate sociality, but with extra levels of sophistication. De Waal concludes that morality is actually a gift from animal ancestors and that people are good not by choice but by nature.[16] The crisis for theoretical studies on morality is that scholars fail to recognize that while animals are not humans, humans are animals.

We could sum up the above study in the following. Firstly, O'Neill's analysis of intrinsic value provided us with a notion of three different senses of intrinsic value where he recognises the third sense, namely, that nature should be given non **instrumental value, while** at the same time, not falling into the trap of infinite regress that all things in the universe hold instrumental value. Secondly, Kenneth Goodpaster provides us with an argument to justify sentience as a criterion of moral considerability, i.e. as the capacity to experience pleasure or pain simply means that only beings who have interest would be morally considerable. Thirdly James Sterba, while negotiating between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethic, provides an argument why humans cannot justify aggression on the grounds of principle of human defence as well as a broad definition of principle of human preservation. The analysis provided above when juxtaposed on the canvas of evolutionary ethics renders impossible treatment of animals as non-moral agents. And finally, de Waal using elements of evolutionary theory of morality, provides us with the answers to "where from morality comes", namely, from certain emotional building blocks that are clearly at work in chimps and monkey societies, having grown out of primate sociality with sophistication. The framework within which morality is ascribed to animals, does not impact on religious beliefs that humans are endowed with immortal souls and that that they have a unique teleological end.

NOTES

1. Tom Regan, (1981) "On the Nature and Possibility of an Environmental Ethic", *Environmental Ethics,* Vol. 3, pp. 19-34.
2. Albert Schweitzer, (1923) *Philosophy of Civilization,* Part II: Civilization and Ethics, trans. J. Naish, A and C. Black, London.
3. Paul Taylor, (1986) *Respect for Nature: Theory of Environmental Ethics,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4. John O'Neill, (2003) "Varieties of Intrinsic Values", *Environmental Ethics* (eds.) Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp.131-142.
5. Arne, Naess, (2005) "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary", *Environmental Philosophy,* Vol. II, pp. 51-56
6. G.E. Moore, (1922) "Conception of Intrinsic Value" in *Philosophical Studies,* London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul.
7. C. L. Stevenson, (1944) Ethics and Language, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, p.178.
8. Peter Singer, (1975) *Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Treatment of Animals,* New York: Random House.
9. Albert Schweitzer, (1923), p. 66.
10. Kenneth E. Goodpaster,(2005) "On Being Morally Considerable", *Environmental Philosophy,* Vol. I, pp.117
11. Gary E. Varner,(1998) *In Nature's Interest? Interests, Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics,* N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
12. Robin Attfield,(2005) "The Good of Trees", *Environmental Philosophy,* Vol. I, pp. 132-150
13. James Sterba, (2000) "Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics", in *Ethics in Practice: An Anthology* (ed.) Hugh LaFollette, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
14. Frans de Waal, Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober (eds.) (2006), *Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
15. Veneer theory assumes that humans are by nature bestial and therefore bad, narrowly selfish and thus should be expected to act badly, that is, to treat others improperly.
16. De Waal rejects social contract theorists such as Thomas Hobbes who believe that humans are fundamentally asocial or antisocial. De Waal also does not accept the oversimplification of the principle of natural selection as exclusively based upon the instinct of 'selfishness'.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Sreejith. K.K.

Justification as Social Practice

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to provide a brief explication of the notion of 'justification as social practice' maintained by many epistemological contextualists[1]. In section 1 of the paper, I examine the notion of 'justification as social practice'. Section 1.1 analyzes the notion of *challenge arising*. Section 1.2 provides the criteria for *challenge arising*. Section 1.3 examines the thesis discussed in the literature as 'Justification as *Meeting Objections/ challenges*' (the JMO thesis)[2]. Section 1.4 attempts to adapt Bas C. Van Fraassen's account of why-questions to the JMO thesis as an attempt to make JMO thesis more precise. In section 2, I examine some of the possible criticisms of the model of 'justification as a social practice' and attempt to defend the contextualist position. I argue that the threat of evidentialism need not mitigate the social dimensions of justification.

SECTION 1: JUSTIFICATION AS SOCIAL PRACTICE

Epistemological contextualism in general maintains that justification is to be considered as a social practice. According to this view, beliefs and judgments have the epistemic properties (such as justification) they do, at least in part, because, in a given context, they are more or less defensible within an on-going discursive practice. As it will be discussed in the following sections, many contextualists maintain that 'being justified' is being able to defend one's claim in an on-going discursive practice. According to David Annis, both foundationalism and coherentism overlook contextual aspects which are essential to justification.[3]

According to the contextualist's view, a judgment is justified, in a particular context, just in case each of the *challenges*, to the judgment under consideration, which *legitimately arises* in that context, *can be met. Challenge, challenge arising,* and *meeting* a *challenge*[4] are thus important concepts to be analyzed in providing an understanding of the notion, 'justification as social practice'.

1.1 *Challenge Arising*

A *challenge* is best thought of as a *language-game* 'move' that is directed against a claim, thereby putting the latter as an *issue.* It suspends the claimant's right to employ the claim in further reasoning. Andrew Norman identifies two types of *challenges.*[5] One type of *challenge* is *argumentative challenge.* It raises questions of the form, 'how can that be, given that X and Y'? Suppose that a geologist makes a claim that earth is 4.54 billion years old. Further suppose that there are geologists who hold the position that the age of the earth is 80 to 100 million years as John Jolly of Trinity College held in 1900. The latter group of geologists have arguments to show that the age of the earth must be between 80 and 100 million years and John Jolly's calculation is correct. Suppose that they also have arguments to show that the radiometric dating technique which was used for determining the age of earth as 4.54 billion years is not reliable. In this scenario, they can raise the following *argumentative challenge* against the claim that the age of the earth is 4.54 billion years old. They can ask 'how can it be that the age of the earth is 4.54 billion years provided that the best calculation of the age of the earth tells us that it is 80 to 100 million years old and the radiometric technique used for determining the age of the earth is not reliable?' Another type of *challenge* is called a *bare challenge. Bare challenges* ask for justification. A *bare challenge* raises questions of the form 'how do you know'? A *bare challenge* to the above mentioned claim in the example that 'the earth is 4.54 million years old' would be: 'how do you know that the age of the earth is 4.54 billion years old?' Both the *challenges* demand the claimants to provide justification for the claim they have made.

Both kinds of *challenges* mentioned above can be viewed as questions which need an answer. A proper answer will justify the claim in question. The *argumentative challenge* seems to make an argument that there are instances such as X and Y which will make it impossible for the claim in question to be justified. Therefore, it requires one to provide an answer which can show that instances such as X and Y are not a threat to the claim in question. For example, an answer to the *argumentative challenge* raised in the above example should be able to show that radiometric technique is a reliable technique for determining the age of the earth since it is the best method for determining the geological time scale. The *bare challenge* is asking one to provide an answer without offering any argument against the claim in question. Providing a satisfactory answer to the question will address a threat posed by the *bare challenge*. To the *bare challenge* raised in the example mentioned above, the following would be a proper answer: 'I know that the age of earth is 4.54 million years old because it is calculated by using radiometric technique'. We need to consider the details of the situations where we can consider a question as an instance of *legitimate challenge arising*. We also need to consider what are the situations in which a response can be considered to be a proper answer to the *challenge* and thus the claim is justified. Let us first discuss what are the conditions in which a question can be considered as a case of *legitimate challenge arising*.

1.2 Criteria for *challenge arising*

According to David Annis, following are the criteria which determine what many contextualists call *legitimate challenge arising*.[6] Three important criteria for *legitimate challenge arising* are:

(a) For a *challenge* to *legitimately arise*, it should be based on the current evidence available.
(b) For a *challenge arising to be legitimate*, it should be raised in the context of a real life situation.
(c) For a *challenge arising to be legitimate*, it should be raised by critical truth seekers.

(a) For a *challenge to legitimately arise*, it should be based on the current evidence available. Therefore, as Annis has argued, one has to respond only to the current *objections*, i.e., *objections* based on the current evidence available. This is what he calls *real objections*. He would maintain that it would be too strong a condition to require a person to be able to *meet* all *possible objections* falling under *argumentative challenge* and *bare challenge* mentioned in section 1.1. Merely uttering a question that falls under *argumentative challenge* or *bare challenge* category does not make it a *legitimate challenge* which *S* must respond to. For example, suppose one is raising an *argumentative challenge* which is not based on the current evidence available. In such a situation the claimant need not respond to the *challenge* since the *challenge* is not a *legitimate* one.

Suppose that one is raising an *argumentative challenge* against the claim that the age of the earth is 4.54 billion years old. The *challenge* could be that it is possible that there could be rocks that are more than 4.54 billion years old. It will suggest that the earth is more than 4.54 billion years old. This *challenge* is not *legitimate* since it is not based upon *current* evidence. The *challenge* is made on the basis of the possibility of future evidence against the claim regarding the age of the earth. The possibility of a future counter-evidence cannot be considered as a *legitimate challenge* against a particular theory in science. One is justified in holding the theory until the counter evidence is observed. When one is considering a possible counter-evidence, one is considering a counter-evidence which is not yet available and therefore does not *challenge* the claim under consideration.

(b) For a *challenge* to be *arising legitimately*, it should be raised in the context of a *real life situation*. Annis argues that to demand a response, the *objection* must be an expression of a 'real doubt'. That is, the doubt should be the result of a confrontation with real life situations. If an *objection* must be the expression of a 'real doubt' caused by a real life situation, then such *objections* will be primarily *local* as opposed to *global*. Global *objections* question the totality of beliefs held at certain time or a whole realm of beliefs. Local *objections* call into question a specific belief. However, this is not to say that a real situation might not occur that would prompt a global *objection*. Annis says that "*S* is not required to respond to an *objection* if *in general* it would be assigned a low probability by the people questioning *S*".[7]

For example, consider a *challenge* raised against a claim on the basis of the supposition of a 'Cartesian demon'. That is, the *challenge* is raised on the basis of the assumption that there could be an 'evil demon' which systematically deceives us and therefore our claim could be wrong. According to the contextualists, this *objection* is not raised on the basis of a 'real doubt'. It is not a *legitimate challenge* since it is not raised as result of the confrontation with a real life situation. This *challenge* under consideration is not *legitimate* also because of the fact that even the people who are raising the *challenge* will assign only a very low probability[8] for the assumption that there is an 'evil demon' which systematically deceives us.

(c) For a *challenge arising* to be *legitimate* it has to come from - what Annis calls—'critical truth seekers'.[9] That is, *objections* have to come from those who have the epistemic goals of truth and the avoidance of error. Annis says that if they were not 'critical truth seekers', they would not raise appropriate *objections*.

1.3 Justification as *meeting objections challenges*

According to Andrew Norman, being justified is nothing but *meeting the challenges* raised by two kinds of *challenges: argumentative challenges and bare challenges. Meeting a challenge* involves responding to a *challenge* in a way that dissolves the threat posed by the *challenge* to the acceptability of the claim at issue. This is sometimes done directly by offering evidence or reasons from which the disputed judgement can be inferred. Offering a justification can be thought of as *meeting* an actual or anticipated *challenge* directly. It is also possible to *meet a challenge* indirectly, by employing a *counter-challenge* to undermine the force of the original *challenge*.

Steward Cohen and David Annis have argued that what would count as appropriate justification depends on contextual factors.[10] According to them, justification is a *practice* of *meeting objections*: The relevant level of *objection* of a believer is decided by the context. Annis has analyzed, 'being justified' in one's belief that p, as being able to *meet* two types of *objection*. According to Annis, two categories of *objections* which need to be *met* for a claim to be justified are the following.

Category A: Those *objections* which in effect claim that one is not in a position to know.

If *S* claims to see a brown book on the table, we usually believe the claim. But we can raise *objection* if the person is not in a position to know. For example, one can object to someone's claim that "this table is red", if the person has a defective vision. One can argue that since the person's vision is defective, her/his claim is not reliable and therefore not justified.

Category B: The claim that what one purports to know is false.

It may be the case that when S claims that (s)he sees a book, actually there is no book at all. Her vision might be the result of a hallucination.

In the contextualist account, the *objections* one needs to be able to *meet* are relative to the context. According to Annis, when we are asking whether *S* is justified in believing *h*, this has to be considered relative to, what he calls an *issue-context.*[11] Thus relative to one *issue-context* a person may be justified in believing *h* but not justified relative to another context. For example, suppose that Meera is at a party and wonders whether her friend Rahul is there. Nothing of great importance hangs on his presence; she simply wonders whether he is there. She might not mind to have a chat with him. She asks some guests about Rahul. They have not seen him there. In such a situation, Meera is *justified* in believing that Rahul is not there. Imagine now that Meera is a police officer, looking for Rahul at the party, who is suspected to have connection with a bomb blast. Merely looking around casually and asking few guests is not enough. If Rahul turns out to be hiding in one of the closets, we will not conclude that Meera was justified in her belief. This example shows the importance of context in construing justification.

According to Andrew Norman, if we want to understand the epistemic status *of being justified,* we must first understand the linguistic practice of *justifying.*[12] According to Contextualists, "...we can no more understand what it is for a belief to be reasonable apart from a grasp of reason giving practice, than we can understand what it is for a rook to occupy a defensible position within a game of chess, without some understanding of the game of chess."[13]

1.4. *Meeting* the *challenges/objections*: adapting an account of why-questions

This section attempts to clarify some of the concepts involved in the thesis called 'Justification as *Meeting Objections*' (JMO thesis) with the help of an account of why-question proposed by Bas C.Van Fraassen.[14] As we have seen above, in JMO thesis, justification of a claim is construed as *meeting* the *objection* raised against the claim. Van Fraassen's account of why-questions seems to be usefiil to make some of the notions in this account more precise.

As we discussed in the previous section, in the JMO thesis, to be justified in a claim, one need to *meet* two categories of *objection*:

Category A: Those *objections* which in effect claim that one is not in a position to know.

Category B: The claim that what one purports to know is false.

Example of an *objection* that will fall in category A is the following. Consider the following claim made by a person. The claim is: 'all the tables in room number 203 of the Philosophy department of the University of Hyderabad are brown in colour'. Suppose the person who made this claim has a defective vision. Now an *objection* to this claim would be that the person who made this claim is not in a position to make this judgement properly since (s)he has a defective vision. *Meeting* this *objection* will consist in providing an answer which is proper to the why-question raised in the particular context. The *objection* raised can be viewed as asking the following why-question. The *objection* can be formulated as, 'why is it that you think that the chairs which you are referring to are brown in clour, provided that your vision is defective?' The claimant might answer, though (s)he has a defective vision, (s)he can see things clearly in bright light and there was bright light in room number 203. The answer can be put briefly as 'because there was bright light'. Providing this answer helps her/him to *meet* the *objection* raised. The claimant might also answer that though (s)he has a defective vision, (s)he has no difficulty in seeing things clearly from a close distance, and in this case (s)he saw the table from a close distance. In this case, the *objection* fails since the background assumption involved in the question is not correct. The why-question raised presupposes that 'the claimant is not in a position to perceive objects in any situation', which is incorrect.

According to Van Fraassen's account, a why-question has the following form. A why-question has the form Q Pk, X, R; where P is the topic of question, K is the background assumptions, X is the contrast class and R is the relevance relation. According to Van Fraassen, *because A* is an answer to Pk, X, R only if A bears R to Pk, X. Here in this example, the answer A 'because there was bright light' has a relevance relation R to the topic of question that the 'claimant thinks that the table is brown in colour', to the background assumptions and to the contrast class. Here the contrast class X can be a set of tables with various colours-including the brown one- chairs etc. Several background assumptions are involved here. The set of background assumptions and information K can consist of assumptions such as: a person with defective vision might not identify an object correctly and may not perceive its clour correctly, a person with a defective vision might be able perceive objects only in some situations.

Suppose that the person who has raised the *objection* is not satisfied with the answer and is asking for further explanation. In such a situation a better answer might be needed for *meeting* the *objection.* Van Fraassen's account provides three criteria for selecting the better answer.[15] The better answer will have more explanatory value. Criteria for selecting a better answer are the following.

C1. The likelihood that A is true.
C2. The extent to which A favours the topic Pk over the other members of the contrast-class X.
C3. A comparison of how successful *because A* is in relation to other answers.

These criteria are applied on the basis of a body K of accepted background theory and factual information. Here the content of K is a function of the context in which the particular why-question arises.

In the case of C1, if K implies not-K, then *because A* is automatically rejected as an acceptable answer. Otherwise, the probability of A given K, prob (AK), is recorded and it is then a matter of applying (C2), the favouring criteria. The extent to which A favours Pk as opposed to other members of X is measured on the basis of the background knowledge K. However, all of the background knowledge cannot and need not be used. K includes the information that Pk is true and that other alternatives in X are false. Only a certain part of K(Q) (question Q with background assumptions and background information K) of K is relevant in applying (C2). According to Van Fraassen, how K(Q) identified is a contextual feature of explanation. According to him, K(Q) is that part of the background information which constitute the general theory about [Pk and X] and other auxiliary facts which are not known but do not imply the fact to be explained.

Van Fraassen's notion of 'screening off of answers' makes the idea of selecting the better answer more precise. According to Van Fraassen, *because A* screens off *because A** from the topic Pk if and only if prob (Pk|A and A*) Prob (Pk|A). Suppose that answer A is screened off by A*, and A* is not screened off by A, then, according to Van Fraassen, the latter is a better answer.

Objections that fall in the category B are of the type that states that 'what one purports to know is false'. This kind of *objections* can be seen as claiming that provided that X and Y, it is not possible for the claim to be true. Suppose that one has made the claim that C is the case. Then an *objection* can be raised in the form of the following why-question. The *objection* can be raised as 'why is it that C, given that X and Y?' The question presumes that the presence of X and Y is a threat to the claim that C is the case. To *meet the challenge* the claimant has to give an answer that will help her/him to dissolve the threat of the *challenge*. The answer will show that the presence of C is not a threat to the claim or it has to show that X and Y are not the case.[16]

SECTION 2: SOME POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF THE CONTEXTUALIST MODEL OF JUSTIFICATION

In this section I attempt to examine some of the possible criticisms against the contextualist position. As it has already been explicated, many maintain that justification should be considered as a social practice. 'Being justified' is nothing but 'being able to defend' one's claim in an on-going discursive practice. In the account of contextualism provided by David Annis, one's claim is justified if s(he) is able to defend the claim. But the question is, what makes it possible for her/him to defend a claim? The answer in Annis' account is that the claimant will have some reason(s) to support her/his claim and if those reasons are accepted by the community then the claim is justified.

In this case, 'defending' a claim is nothing but 'providing reason(s)' for that claim. Here, one can say that one is justified in believing a claim because one is able to defend that claim. But one is able to defend the claim since (s)he has reasons to support the claim. Hence, one might argue, justification is ultimately a matter of having reasons to support a claim. One might argue that it is true that what is an appropriate reason is determined by the community and in that sense justification is social and contextual. But, to decide that what 'appropriate reasons' are, they must be falling back upon some evidence. And therefore, one might argue, this will amount to saying that the practice of justification, which is thought to be *social* by the contextualists, is ultimately based on evidence. Thus one might argue that this dependence upon evidence will mitigate the force of the social dimension of justification which contextualists think it has.

The above mentioned criticisms ignore the fact that justification is a practice. The practice of justification necessarily involves *interaction* and is in that sense social.[17] Apart from that, the criticisms fail to see that the *evidence* is determined by the context. What counts as an evidence for a claim is closely related to the context in which the claim is made. Evidential relation makes sense only in the light of certain background assumptions. As Helen E. Longino[18] has pointed out, non-cognitive values such as social/cultural values can play a legitimate role in an evidential relation. Arguably, background assumptions can work at the level of hypotheses formation as well as justification.[19] Therefore, though there is a dependence upon the evidence, it need not deny the contextual and social nature of justification. As we have seen, in the contextualist account, justification is a matter of defendability. To put it in a different way, if one is able to provide an appropriate answer to the *challenge* raised in the form of a question then the claim is justified. As the criticism points out, the answer to a *challenge* might depend upon some evidence. But since the evidence itself is construed in the light of the background assumptions present in the context, the dependence of thè answer on the evidence need not mitigate the cotextual and social dimensions of justification.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the central notion of epistemological contextualism called 'justification as social practice'. In the contextulaist account, 'being justified' is nothing but 'being able to defend' one's claim in an on-going discursive practice. In examining this notion, I have mainly presented the views of David Annis and Andrew Norman. This paper has analysed important concepts in epistemological contextualism, such as *challenge arising, meeting a challenge* etc. It has attempted to clarify the thesis of contextualism called 'justification as *meeting* the *objections*' with the adaptation of Van Fraassen's account of why-questions. It also argues that the threat of evidentialism need not mitigate the social dimensions of justification.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. For the sake of convenience, henceforth I will call 'epistemologial contextualism' simply as 'contextualism' and 'epistemological contextualists' as 'contextualists'.
2. D. Annis, "A Contextualist theory of Epistemic Justification". *American Philosophical Quarterely,* Vol.15, No.3. 1978. pp. 213– 216. 1978. A. Norman, "Epistemological Contextualism: its Past, Present, and Prospects". *Philosophia,* Vol. 27, 1999, pp. 408–416.
3. D. Annis, 1978, p.213.
4. In this paper, I am using the terms *challenge* and *objection* interchangeably. Among the contextualists, some authors seem to prefer the former terminology and some others the latter.
5. A. Norman, 1999, p.385.
6. D. Annis, 1978, p.214.
7. Ibid.
8. The *challenge* made against a claim on the basis that 'there could be an evil demon which systematically deceive us' has a low probability because of various reasons; one important reasons among them is the following.

The assumption that 'there could be an evil demon which systematically deceives us' has a very unlikely to be true. One important reason for the unlikeliness for the existence of a systematically deceiving evil demon is that, this assumption hardly has any explanatory power. Since the assumption involved in the challenge is very less probable, the *challenge* is very less probable and even the challenger will assign only a very less probability on the *challenge.*

9. D. Annis, 1978, p.214.
10. D. Annis, 1978, pp.213-219. S. Cohen, "Knowledge, Context, and Social Standards". *Synthese*, Vol.73, 1987, pp. 3-26.
11. The context, in which justification occurs, where the participants are interested in knowledge, is called as an "isseue-context".
12. A. Norman, 1999, p.385.
13. Ibid.
14. B. C. Van Fraassen, *The Scientific Image*, Oxford, Clarendon press, 1985, pp.141-153.
15. T. R. Grimes, "Explanation and the poverty of pragmatism" *Erkenntnis* 27, 1987, p.81.
16. *Answers* provided to the *challenges* of category B also can be made clearer with the application of Van Fraassen's line of thinking in a similar fashion as that of category A.
17. For a defense of this position, see H. E. Longino, *The Fate of Knowledge*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2002, pp.124-144.
18. H. E. Longino, *Science as Social Knowledge*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, pp.38-81. Longino argues that the relation between hypothesis and evidence is mediated by background assumptions that themselves may not be subjected to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation.
19. Kathleen Okruhlik points out a case where social value plays a crucial role in justification. She points out that theories of human reproduction, for a very long time held that sperm is active and egg is passive. This view was influential ever since 1795. From 1979 onwards some rival accounts have challenged the older one. In this account, egg has an active role in fertilisation. By using electron microscopy, it has been showed that the sperm does not just burrow through egg, as previously thought. Instead, the egg directs the growth of small finger-like projections called microvilli, and these clasp the sperm into the egg. What is interesting is that, this mound of microvilli extending to the sperm was discovered in 1895; but it had been largely ignored until recently. It can be argued that the stereotypes and ideals of *feminine* and *masculine* roles had been assigned to the egg and sperm, and those presuppositions made the observation of microvilli irrelevant and thus

the justification of the thesis that egg is passive and sperm is active in fertilization. K. Okruhlik, "Gender and the Biological Sciences". *Philosophy of Science - the Central Issues*, Martin Curd and J.A. Cover, N.Y., W.W.Norton and Company, New 1998, pp.192-206.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Manidipa Sen

Understanding Intersubjectivity

INTRODUCTION

The questions concerning the socio-cultural dimensions of language and meaning are closely associated with the intentional character of meaning and of mind or mental states. The Wittgensteinian objections to private language and an alternative view of linguistic usage as forming part of other forms of activity, and the subsequent development of various kinds of speech act theories, have, either directly or indirectly, emphasized on the intersubjectivity of meaning and the mind. Wittgenstein's famous remark in the *Philosophical Investigations,* "...meaning something is like going up to someone" (section 457) succinctly brings out this feature of language which remained largely ignored by early philosophers of language in the analytical tradition. Recognition of the intentional character of meaning and mind also lead to an emphasis on this aspect of language. The development of philosophy of mind as an offshoot of philosophy of language in the analytical tradition has contributed immensely to answering the question as to how meaning is to be understood and apprehended. The dilemma that a lot of contemporary philosophers of language and mind face is how to reconcile the subjective dimensions of the mind with the intersubjective dimensions of linguistic meaning. In the process of integrating subjectivity within a broadly intersubjective framework, many philosophers (like Davidson, McCulloch) have changed the contour of subjective-objective dichotomy itself. It is precisely this debate that we will take up for consideration in this paper. A relook into the distinction between the inner and the outer, the subjective and the objective, has brought into the forefront the role of the other in forming the notions of meaning and subjectivity. This is an aspect which, though not explicitly present, can be found in various remarks on meaning and the mind in Wittgenstein. Taking clue from Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition, the paper will try to question the above-mentioned dichotomies. Also, it will try to formulate a notion of the intersubjective which would go beyond these dichotomies.

SECTION I: CHARACTERIZING THE MENTAL

The traditional or the Cartesian picture of the mind as being self-contained with regard to the mental states and processes suggests that these are facts about individuals which hold independently of their relation to the external world, and hence they may be individuated independently of the individual's contact with her external environment. That is why individuals are said to have a privileged and authoritative access to their mental states and processes, as opposed to the access they have to that of others. The anti-Cartesian picture of psychological states, on the other hand, is motivated by the views that since mind and world are not two independent categories, the world enters constitutively into the individuation of mental states. Hence to have a full understanding of such states or to individuate them it would not be sufficient to know what goes on inside the head.[1] As opposed to this way of looking at the mind, we can take clue from the Phenomenological tradition and characterize mind in the following way:

- Mind is essentially intentional, and hence is directed towards objects.
- Mind is essentially embodied, and hence cannot be studied in isolation from the body.
- Mind is essentially interactive, and hence is constantly negotiating with other minds and the external world.
- Mind is essentially a 'being-in-the-world', and hence is on a par with other things in the world

Though the traditional Cartesian picture of the mind as distinct from that of the body has been more or less given up by philosophers and psychologists in general, a large number of philosophers still adhere to an internalist account of mind, where mental processes are said to be explainable in terms of certain internal structures, either linguistic, or computational, or neural etc. This has lead to the emergence of what may be termed as 'materialist Cartesians'.[2] So the self-containedness of mind is a thesis which is neither archaic nor completely ostracized. Hence there is still a need to emphasize on the above characteristics of the mental. In the domain of language we see philosophers like Fodor vehemently arguing for private language (See his *Language of Thought*, 1975, Thomas Y.Crowell Company, New York).

If the mind or the mental is to be conceived in the above way, then one may legitimately argue that understanding and individuation of mental content cannot take place without taking certain external factors into account. That is why it is important to ask the question: what sense can one make of the inner/outer, the subjective/objective dichotomy? and what picture of the mind as well as the world emerges from a rejection of the traditional distinction between these two domains.

Wittgenstein's sustained attack on the traditional inner/outer distinction has influenced philosophical views concerning the very nature of the inner. There is no doubt that in *Philosophical Investigation* Wittgenstein strongly endorses the fact that being conscious about our own intimate, so-called subjective mental states and processes is an indubitable part of our being human. Wittgenstein's rejection of behaviourism in the strongest possible terms in *Philosophical Investigations*[3] (see $$307, 308) is also well-known. However, he categorically rejects the existence of a private language referring to private sensations on the ground that acceptance of such a language will preclude the possibility of the distinction between what seems right to me and what is really right. That is why he gave emphasis to expressive and meaningful behaviour as a visible manifestation of the mental. He also states 'the human body is the best picture of the human soul'.[4] Taking these apparently disparate remarks of Wittgenstein about the inner as our starting point, we shall try to weave them together into a coherent picture of the mind and world leading to a form of intersubjectivity of experience and meaning. In this regard we shall focus on, apart from Wittgenstein, some of

Donald Davison's essays and draw some further conclusions from Gregory McCulloch's rather recent work *Life of the Mind.*

SECTION II: QUESTIONING THE SUBJECTIVE

Donald Davidson, through a whole range of writings on self-knowledge and self-ascription, developed a notion of the subjective which strikes at the essence of the traditional Cartesian picture of the subjective or what constitutes the mental. Here we shall try to develop Davidson's view on the subjective by looking into the three essays, 'First Person Authority', 'Knowing One's Own Mind' and 'The Myth of the Subjective', on the notion subjective published in the collection *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective* (2001, OUP, Oxford).

In order to understand Davidson's position on the subjective we may start by stating his position regarding the nature of self-knowledge as articulated in self-ascriptions. Do we have a privileged access to our own mental states and processes as opposed to that of the others? The obvious answer seems to be in the affirmative. We might very well be mistaken about what another person believes, wants, fears, desires etc., but we really cannot be mistaken about what we ourselves think, believe, desire, want etc. However, due to obvious contrary evidences to the above claim many philosophers have, in fact, rejected this sort of authority and have claimed that there is no really first-person authority regarding our own mental states or propositional attitudes. Davidson, however, does not accept this point of view. Neither does he accept a pure form of the subjective as argued for by Descartes and modern Cartesians.

Ascriptions of beliefs, desires, intentions etc. to oneself is based on a presumption of not being mistaken, a kind of presumption that does not attach to ascriptions of the same kind to others. This is the crux of first-person authority, and the question that Davidson poses in this context is: 'What accounts for the authority accorded to first person present-tense claims of this sort, and denied to second or third person claims?'[5] The peculiarity of the first person attitude ascriptions can be brought out by noting that though they are authoritative these ascriptions are neither incorrigible nor indubitable. So the obvious question is: what guarantees authority about our first person propositional attitude ascriptions? According to Davidson we do not require evidence to justify claims about our own propositional attitude ascriptions. Neither are we asked for providing such evidence. However, he goes on to saying, 'This feature of first person authority, suggestive as it may be, does not help explain the authority.'[6] Why not? Because of the caution employed by the use of such terms as 'normally', 'usually' etc. in characterizing first person authority. In spite of this Davidson thinks that even when we justifiably ask someone why he believes what he does first person authority persists in some form or the other. The reason for this is that this person can remove the doubt by answering this kind of question from a vantage point from which nobody else can. So he says, 'first person attributions are not based on better evidence but often on no evidence at all.'[7]

According to Davidson, first person authority cannot obviously be explained in terms of some special way of knowing our own minds, like introspection. Thus the first step towards a solution to this problem lies in becoming clear about the entities to which first person authority applies. Davidson further points out that a speaker who sincerely uses a certain sort of sentence to express his own attitudes must be presumed to be right in what he says unless there is some external reason to doubt his saying so. However, Davidson thinks, and rightly so, we hardly need or appeal to evidence or observation in order to find out what we believe. 'Even when I have evidence I seldom make use of it'.[8] He goes on to saying 'the possibility that one may be mistaken about one's own thoughts cannot defeat the overriding presumption that a person knows what he or she believes, in general, the belief that one has a thought is enough to justify that belief'.[9]

Because we usually know what we believe without needing or using evidence, our sincere avowals, that is, first-person present-tense ascriptions have an authority 'no second or third person claim, or first-person other tense claim, can have.'[10] Recognition of this fact, of course, does not amount to explaining it. However, recognition of this fact does suggest that there is an asymmetry between first and third-person avowals. After having taken note of this fact, Davidson puts forward the question concerning first person authority in the following way: 'Setting aside self-deception and other anomalous or borderline phenomena, the question is whether we can, without irrationality, inconsistency, or confusion simply and straightforwardly think we have a belief we do not have, or think we do not have a belief we do have'.[11] Many philosophers in recent times think that this is possible. For example, Putnam in his paper "Meaning of 'meaning" suggests such a line of response by arguing that meanings are not in the head. If meanings are not in the head, and thus are externally individuated, beliefs and other propositional attitudes that embody meaning are also not in the head. And hence the agent cannot have an authoritative access to these propositional attitudes. Putnam's argument tries to establish that the following two claims about mental states cannot go together:

1. Psychological states like belief are 'inner' in the sense that they do not presuppose the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom the state is ascribed.
2. These are the very states that we normally identify and individuate in terms partly of relations to objects and events other than the subject.

According to Davidson there is no reason to suppose that ordinary mental states do not satisfy both (1) and (2). And, therefore, contrary to what is often assumed, first person authority can, without contradiction, apply to states that are identified externally.

Those who are convinced of the external dimensions of the contents of thought as ordinarily identified and individuated have reacted in different ways to the problem. Their main point has been to make a distinction between the contents of the mind as subjectively and internally determined and ordinary beliefs and desires which have social and other outward connections. But those who draw such a distinction either ignore the problem of first person authority or think that the problem cannot be solved. Davidson belongs to neither of these two camps. According to Davidson the crux of the conclusion drawn by philosophers making a distinction of the above kind may be stated thus: 'admitting the identifying and individuating roles of external factors seems to lead to the conclusion that our thoughts may not be known to us'.[12] But one can legitimately ask does this conclusion really follow? This is the question that Davidson wants to address.

Davidson's answer to the above question is in the negative. And he tries to justify his answer in the following way. One of the main reasons why a lot of philosophers hold that first-person authority leading to a form of subjectivity cannot be consistent with the externalist individuation of the mind/mental is due to what Davidson takes to be an extremely faulty picture of the mind that has been handed down in the philosophical tradition to which they belong. This familiar picture, as put forward by Davidson, is this: 'the mind is a theatre in which the conscious self watches a passing show... The show consists of ... what is given in experience.'[13] This is the representational view of the mental which holds that what we grasp or entertain or have before our minds are not objects of the outer world but some form of representations of them. But this position has been attacked by many including Davidson. The central idea that he wants to attack is 'that these are entities that the mind can 'entertain', 'grasp', 'have before it', or 'be acquainted with'.'[14] It is only when this distinction between what is presented to the mind and what is outside in the world is made that the concept of the subjective takes two different meaning, that is, 'on the one hand, there are the true inner states, with respect to which the mind retains its authority; on the other hand, there are the ordinary states of belief, desire, intention, and meaning, which are polluted by their necessary connection with the social and public world'.[15] Hence we have to conclude that we lack authoritative knowledge about these second kinds of mental states.

How can one deal with this problem? Davidson's answer to this problem is two-fold. He, in the first place says that the best way to solve this problem 'is to get rid of the metaphor of objects before the mind'.[16] Just as many philosophers in recent times have given up the notion of a sense data in perceptual knowledge, one can give up propositional objects in the same way. This really amounts to a suggestion that the objects to which we appeal to in order to describe our propositional attitudes may not be psychological objects. According to Davidson, once we get rid of this idea of mental representations as psychological objects of the attitudes most of the problem with first person authority can be taken care of. Once we get rid of mental/psychological objects, it is not very difficult to see how 'mental states as we commonly conceive them are identified in part by their natural history.'[17] (p.37) This fact that what a person's words mean depends upon the kind of objects or events that have caused the person to apply the words in a particular context and what a person's thoughts are about depends upon external factors also provides an explanation of first person authority. Davidson proceeds to say that in contrast 'an interpreter of another's words and thoughts must depend on scattered information, fortunate training, and imaginative surmise, in coming to understand the other.'[18] Davidson does not deny the fact that in some cases the agent is mistaken about her own mental states, but never can this mistake be systematic and universal. Hence he famously concludes his argument thus: 'unless there is a presumption that the speaker knows what she means, i.e. is getting her own language right, there would be nothing for an interpreter to interpret. ... First person authority, the social character of language, and the external determinants of thought and meaning go naturally together, once we give up the myth of the subjective, the idea that thoughts require mental objects.'[19]

According to Davidson the distinction between the inner and the outer, the subjective and the objective, content and scheme is a deep-rooted fallacy having, what he calls 'a common origin: a concept of the mind with its private states and objects' (p. 43). This picture of mind is the outcome of the idea of a mind as a passive spectator of what is given before itself as uninterpreted content. This insulation of the mind from the rest of the world was thought necessary in order to 'guarantee the authority of the evidence for the subject. Since we cannot be certain of what the world outside the mind is like, the subjective can keep its virtue ... only by being protected from contamination by the world.'[20]

This is the point where we can strengthen Davidson's position by taking clues from Wittgenstein's understanding and critique of the metaphor of the inner-outer. Wittgenstein's private language argument is a direct attack on the nature of the inner as it has been traditionally understood. If subjectivity consists in having certain intrinsically inner experience which determines oneself as the subject of that experience as opposed to others, then the only way of expressing those core inner states would be in terms of a private language. Wittgenstein's position on such a language is amply clear '.... could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experience ... - for his private use?' He goes on to saying in the same passage 'The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So , another person cannot understand the language'[21] (PI 243) Not only that, Wittgenstein goes on to saying that for a solipsist of this variety it is even impossible to acquire his own language because he cannot even get started to apply the word such as pain to every sensation of a certain kind. Otherwise we have to say 'everything that seems right is right'! For a word to have a meaning is for there to be rules for its use. This implies that we can misapply/ misuse a word, because we may think that we are following a rule when, in fact, we are not. And if that is the case, a solipsist cannot concentrate on his original sensation (of say pain) to give meaning to his later similar sensations. This is Wittgenstein's new way of articulating the relationship between language and the different concepts we attach to our private experience. This way of understanding rules of use of expressions, as it is well-known by now, is connected with Wittgenstein's notion of a language game and form of life. Both these ideas may be used to show that the traditionally conceived idea of inner life as interior realm of representations may be replaced by demystified notion of inner processes. In this sense the mental realm is articulated in terms of bodily doing and sayings. Neither is our internal mental states separated from our body nor are they identical to them. For Wittgenstein our inner life, its expression through language and behaviour, are integrated into our human form of life. Since to 'imagine a language is to imagine a form of life'[22] (PI 19), to imagine a language for expressions of our private mental states and processes is to imagine a form of life.

SECTION III: QUESTIONING THE SUBJECTIVE AGAIN

Greg McCulloch's book *The Life of the Mind* (2003) also questions this inner-outer dichotomy and tries to argue for what he calls 'behaviour-embracing mentalism'. According to him this is the only way to steer clear of both an extreme form of physicalism as well as mentalism. It is a view of the mind where mind is constantly in negotiations with the world, and in and through these negotiations making the distinction between the mental and the physical disappear at the ontological level. According to McCulloch, the main issue in philosophy of mind is to account for mind's intentionality, and satisfactory account of intentionality can be given only when we recognise that the distinction between the mind and the body is merely apparent.

The view that the mind is not in the head and that agent's consciousness, therefore, must refer to factors in the agent's environment is, by now, an orthodoxy in the analytical tradition. What distinguishes McCulloch's form of externalism is the fact that it does not say that mental states are relational in nature in the sense that there is some intrinsic feature of the mental that is related essentially to something outside of it. As Tim Crane in the foreword to the book points out, this form of externalism 'attempt(s) to give up this whole way of thinking in terms of intrinsic and extrinsic features of mind at all'.[23] The reason being that for externalism of this variety, far from mind and world being metaphysically independent entities with mind being essentially related to the world, what we require is that a subject's subjectivity and embodiment not be abstracted from the world. Subjectivity is essentially being-in-the-world, and is phenomenologically constituted. This is where McCulloch's idea of content being phenomenological as well as externalistic needs highlighting.

According to physicalists about mind and mental states, not only are there no facts over and above physical facts, a full understanding of the mental phenomena are possible by taking it to be an aspect of a physical system. McCulloch's argument against the physicalist hinges on what really is meant by 'a full understanding' of a conscious mental state. For him 'it involves a knowledge of what it is like to be in them', which, in turn 'requires knowledge of their contents', that further 'requires one to share the relevant concepts'[24] or one shares a form of life. But it can be shown that knowledge about the physical nature of these conscious mental states 'does not equip one with those concepts and hence does not yield a full understanding.'[25] Understanding a person's conscious intentional states involves knowledge of their content. But that is possible only when one is able to interpret those states such that one finds out at least an aspect of what it is to be that person, and that, in turn, amounts to possessing the concepts that the person uses in their conscious life. And no physicalistic account will be able to explain this phenomenon. Hence knowledge of content as figuring in the person's phenomenological domain in a significant way is essential for this understanding to occur.

McCulloch's main objective is to show that there is a closer link between consciousness and intentionality than what has been accepted by philosophers of mind in recent times. Mind's phenomenological domain contains 'visual experiences and bodily sensations'[26] as well as 'episodes of thinking or reasoning'.[27] Contents have a phenomenological dimension both in the first-person as well as in the third-person cases. So, the conclusion that McCulloch arrives at is that mental content is both external and phenomenological.

This idea that content is both phenomenological as well as externalistic prompt a lot of philosophers to conclude that this idea of content is incoherent. Phenomenology is to do with the subjective aspect of our consciousness while externalism is concerned with the objective aspect of consciousness. This apparent contradiction can be accounted for, according to McCulloch, if we radicalise our notion of subjective as well as the objective and conceive of them not to be excluding one another. In chapter 3 of the book he argues why 'subjective does not exclude the objective: much less is it inside our head; much less is it out there'.[28]

The reason why this kind of incoherence in the notion of content is not acceptable in the analytical tradition is that it threatens eliminativism, which is an extremely influential position in the philosophy of mind. Eliminativism with respect to the mental is the view that the intentional is reducible to the physical. It starts with meaning-skepticism and goes on to arguing in the following way: Without meaning there cannot be intentionality, and without intentionality there cannot be any mind, and thus, without meaning there cannot be mind. Now, since content is what provides meaning to intentionality, and since content is incoherent (being both phenomenological and external), the conclusion follows. McCulloch's diagnosis here is that this sort of position depends upon a particular conception of mind which is naturalistic and modeled in accordance with 'indisputably physical or mechanical processes'.[29] First and foremost we need to abandon the naturalistic/physicalisic conception of mind. This kind of a picture of the mind depends upon two contradictory notions of the subjective: one where 'subjective states such as seeing that ... have objective intentionality', another where 'subjective excludes the objective'.[30] So, the upshot is that physicalism can be avoided only when a traditional notion of the distinction between the subjective and the objective is gotten rid of.

Does this denial of the traditional distinction between the subjective and the objective domain imply a complete denial of the mental-physical dichotomy? At one level it definitely does. According to McCulloch, this radicalization of the notion of the subjective as not excluding the objective does imply denial of the Cartesian ontological picture of the mind as being a distinct and self-contained substance *viz* the body. But this ontological distinction very often implies or, in McCulloch's words, at least encourages 'the further thought that knowledge of minds as minds is fundamentally different from knowledge of body.'[31] This is the 'epistemological Real Distinction'. McCulloch's main aim is to show that the ontological and the epistemological Real Distinctions do not really stand or fall together, and to emphasize further that one can adhere to the epistemological Real Distinction without adhering to ontological Real Distinction.

According to McCulloch, in order to launch a systematic attack on the physicalistic (or eliminativist) position it is important, in fact, essential to show that the way we come to know the physical world is not the way we come to know our mental world. The idea of interpretation in the full understanding of the mental indicates that an epistemic Real Distinction is imminent. Here, following Blackburn, McCulloch points out understanding minds is radically different from understanding the objects of the physical science as such, '...doing the latter means invoking causal dependencies, law, objective relations ... doing the former involves interpretation, reason, empathy ...'[32] McCulloch is of the opinion that a sympathetic interpretation involves a way of understanding through a 'dramatic enterprise'[33] of 'getting in tune'[34] with the thinking associated with the alien language by imagining what it would be like to be in that mode of thinking, then repeating the words in accordance with that imagination, and seeing what the reaction of the native is. In order for this to happen a two-way negotiation takes place: 'On the one hand, the aliens have to be brought closer to us if we are to understand: on the other, we have somehow to be nudged towards *them* if it is them we are to end up understanding, ...'[35] This is how the subjective and the objective could be brought closer to each other. In order to understand the alien's subjectivity, that is, in order to understand the content of alien's thought and talk we are required to modify our way of looking at the objective states of affairs and try to see them from the alien's point of view. This kind of mediation through dramatic enactment is neither available nor needed in the understanding of the different levels of physical science. Thus McCulloch concludes 'knowledge of bodies as *minded* is fundamentally different from knowledge of bodies as *physical objects.*'[36]

There are two major philosophical positions that have been questioned by McCulloch in this work. One, of course, is the traditional Cartesian concept of mind as distinct from matter, and hence the life of the mind being independent of the life of the physical world. The other is the view that mind is material, and the main task of philosophy of mind consists in showing how a physicalistic account of the mind can be given. McCulloch distances himself from both these approaches to the mental by trying to argue for an account of intentionality which is both phenomenological as well as externalistic, and by further pointing out that both the approaches he questions have faulty notion of the subjective/objective dichotomy.

What notion of the mental are we left with in McCulloch's thesis? McCulloch's conclusion is that what we have may be called 'behaviour-embracing mentalism'. This is a description of the mind, as the very name suggests, which though gives mental states and content a privileged position, but at the same time highlights its close connection with behavioural manifestations associated with the body. Hence mind is essentially embodied and also environmentally embedded. In this sense this position may be contrasted with both behaviourism and behaviour-rejecting mentalism. McCulloch provides us with a graphic picture of how these three positions may be distinguished: 'Think of the box: for behaviourists, the inside is black, the surface is real; for behaviour-rejecting mentalists, the inside is the real, the surface is mere container; and for the behaviour-embracing mentalists, both *surface* and inside are part of the real.'[37] According to McCulloch the life of the mind comprises three parameters connected with each other in an appropriate manner: 'the right causally efficacious insides; the right kind of body; the right kind of environmental embedding'. This provides us with a portrayal of a dynamic, interactive form of subjectivity in line with the continuity that exists between the so-called mind and the world, the subjective and the objective, the inner and the outer.

SECTION IV: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERSUBJECTIVE

According to both Davidson and McCulloch interpretation, which is at the core of understanding, presupposes intersubjectivity. So is it the case with Wittgenstein. Now the question that arises is: What is this notion of intersubjectivity that all these philosophers are working with? How are we to understand this idea of the intersubjective? Here we may take clues from the phenomenological tradition and try to weave in some of the ideas of the intersubjective into the contemporary debates in analytic philosophy regarding the nature of interpretation in particular, and the nature of mental states in general.

One way of understanding the problem of intersubjectivity is to understand it as the problem of other mind—that is, how we come to know the minds of the other. And the suggestion seems to be that we come to know the minds of others in and through an interpretation of their various kinds of overt behaviour. Now, the reason we are very often, though not always, correct in our interpretation, lies in a kind of analogical reasoning. We, by comparing our own experience and the connected bodily behaviour with that of the others, come to ascribe certain mental states to others. This comparison goes as follows: Since my own bodily manifestations are similar to that of the other and since my bodily manifestationas are manifestations of my particular mental states, hence other's similar bodily behaviour must be connected to the similar kind of mental state. But this argument immediately presupposes that mind is an entitity which is only visible to one person, and thus brings back the subjective/objective dichotomy into the forefront.

Instead of the above form of inferential account of knowledge of others' minds, we need to and have to accept that we experience the other as the other, and hence, it is wrong to think that other people's mental lives are radically inaccessible to us. Here we may buttress our point by noting that the body of the other is not given to us like the way an inanimate body is given to us (say a table or a chair). The experiencing of a minded body is not like an ordinary perception of an object. Our encounter with the other and hence, our encounter with the body of the other is always in a meaningful context. It is a distinctive mode of consciousness where empathy plays a unique role. It is this empathy with the other, and not a form of inference, which helps us to get at her feelings through an interpretation of the obvert behaviour.[38] This is an attractive way of understanding the idea of intersubjectivity. In the phenomenological tradition this relation of empathy has been taken to be an intentional relation.

However, the question that has bothered many phenomenologists is whether empathy is the fundamental way of cashing out the idea of intersubjectivity. One can say, according to Husserl and many other phenomenologists, that empathy is derived, rather than a fundamental form of intersubjectivity. Let us try to make this point clear. The question of empathetically understanding the other takes place only in circumstances where there has been a breakdown in the understanding of the other. But this situation obviously is an exception rather than a rule. That is why Zahabi says, 'If this is so, then an investigation of intersubjectevity that takes empathy as its point of departure and constant point of reference is bound to lead us astray.'[39] Our encounter with and understanding of the other in a day-to-day situation involves an intersubjective experience which does not need to be understood in terms of empathy and it would be a mistake to do so. So, the idea of the intersubjective, which is presupposed in empathy, may be understood in terms of two notions: (a) embodiment, and (b) form of life. It is an embodied subject who is internally related to the world that is around him/her. Now, the structure of this world contains essential reference to the other. It is this structure which can be understood as a form of life—a public and communal life, to which a subject enters. It is in this sharing of the form/structure of life that we are able to understand each other keeping intact the subjectivity of the subject and the otherness of the other. It is this kind of intersubjectivity which gives meaning to language and mind. In line with Wittgenstein's famous remark '... to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life' (Section 19), we can say that to imagine the subjective means to imagine the intersubjective.

NOTES

1. This is the main contention of the famous internalist/externalist debate in the philosophy of mind.
2. This position will be discussed in detail in section III.
3. See $$ 307, 308
4. Wittgenstein 1958 p.178
5. Davidson 2001, p.3
6. Ibid., p.5
7. Ibid.,
8. Ibid., p.15
9. Ibid.,
10. Ibid., p.16
11. Ibid., p.18
12. Ibid., p.25
13. Ibid., p.34
14. Ibid., p.35
15. Ibid.,
16. Ibid.,
17. Ibid., p.37
18. Ibid.,
19. Ibid., p.38
20. Ibid., pp.42-3
21. Wittgenstein 1958 $$243
22. Ibid., 19
23. McCulloch 2003, p.xiii
24. Ibid., p.34
25. Ibid., p.34
26. Ibid., p.9
27. Ibid., p.10
28. Ibid., p.55
29. Ibid.,
30. Ibid., p.66
31. Ibid., p.13
32. Ibid., p.75
33. Ibid., p.74
34. Ibid., p.79
35. Ibid., p.80
36. Ibid., p.18
37. Ibid., p.94
38. For a detailed account of the different notions of the intersubjective, see Zahabi 2005, pp. 147-77.
39. Zahabi 2005, p.165.

REFERENCES

Burge, Tyler 1979, "Individualism and the Mental" in P.A. Finch, T.E. Uehling and H.K. Wettstein (eds.) *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Cassam, Quassim (ed.) 1994, *Self-Knowledge*, Oxford, OUP.

Davidson, Donald (2001), *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, Oxford, Clarendon Press

Fodor, Jerry 1987 *Psycosemantics*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.

McCulloch Greg (2003), *The Life of the Mind: An Essay in Phenomenological Externalism*, London, Routledge.

Putnam, Hilary (1975), 'The Meaning of Meaning' in his *Mind, Language and Reality*, vol.2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Ryle, Gilbert 1966, *The Concept of Mind*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958), *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell.

Wright Crispin, Smith, Barry, McDonald, Cynthia (eds.) 1998, *Knowing Our Own Minds*, Oxford, Clarendon Press

Zahabi, Dan (2005), *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective*, Cambridge, Mass, The MIT Press.

REFERENCES

Block, Ned. 1978. [illegible] and the Mental' in [illegible] Dennett and [illegible] Minnesota Studies in [illegible] Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Cassam, Quassim (ed.) 1994. *Self Knowledge*. Oxford: OUP.

Dennett, Daniel. [illegible] Chicago.

Fodor, Jerry [illegible] Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

McCulloch, Gregory. 2003. *The Life of the Mind: An Essay on Phenomenological Externalism*. London: Routledge.

Putnam, Hilary (1975). 'The Meaning of Meaning' in his *Mind, Language and Reality*, vol 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. *The Concept of Mind*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wright Crispin, Smith, Barry, McDonald, Cynthia (eds.) 1998. *Knowing Our Own Minds*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Zahavi, Dan (2005). *Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First Person Perspective*. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

K. Srinivas

In Defense of Metaphysics

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, philosophy as a discipline is said to include the branches such as metaphysics, epistemology, logic and ethics. All other branches of philosophy are somehow brought under either of these branches. Even the modern branches of philosophy like philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and so on are no exception to this view. And it has been the practice of philosophers and various schools of thought of the East as well as the West to devote some space for discussion on the nature of reality. Depending upon their philosophical position with regard to the nature of reality and the sources required for obtaining knowledge of such reality, a philosopher or a school of thought is branded as idealistic or realistic, rationalistic or empiricistic, monistic or pluralistic and so on. One comes across, to cite a few examples, hard-core metaphysics in the writings of Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkara, and Rāmānuja in the East and in the writings of Plato, Hegel, Bradley, and Heidegger in the West. Their concern for reality and its relation to the world of existence dominates their philosophical thought. Thus epistemology of a philosopher or a school of thought follows from the metaphysical presuppositions of a philosopher or a school of thought. Therefore, the starting point of our epistemological discussions and debates must be preceded by a discussion on 'what there is'. This 'what there is' may be viewed differently by different philosophers and different schools of thought. Philosophers like Nāgārjuna called it *sūnyata* or void.

A cursory look at Western philosophy reveals that even a hard-core empiricist (tough-minded philosopher) like Hume could not but commit to metaphysics of certain sort in spite of the fact that he wanted all metaphysics (speculative philosophy) to be consigned to the flames for it 'contains nothing but sophistry and illusion' by positing sense impressions as the ultimate constituents of reality. Even Kant in his *Critique of Pure Reason* held that metaphysics of certain sort is impossible, but he did not totally deny the possibility of metaphysics. In fact, Kant tried to prove the existence of space and time, as forms of intuition, through the transcendental and metaphysical methods. Similar is the case with the modern empiricists like logical atomists and logical positivists who followed the legacy of Hume. In their enthusiasm to bring about a revolution in philosophy the modern empiricists attempted to dispense with all the speculative and dogmatic elements found in philosophy. In the process of eliminating metaphysics from the sphere of philosophy, the logical atomists like Russell and early Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle had to arrive at a queer kind of metaphysics which regards the simples that are presented in one's sense-experience as the ultimate constituents of reality. Each perceptible simple is called 'sense-datum' or 'sense-content' by these philosophers. These sense-data or sense-contents are neither mental nor material. They are discrete, unconnected, neutral entities. Such a thesis is called neutral monism. It is Hume who held that sense impressions are neither mental nor material. The reason for advocating such a position is that Hume was averse to the notion of 'substance' for it is inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of empiricism. He did not want substance to exit either in material form as held by Locke, or in spiritual form as held by Berkeley. According to Hume, both Locke and Berkeley did not realize that the very existence of substance robs empiricism of its chastity. The substance free metaphysics of Hume has to posit such entities which are neither mental nor material. These neutral entities constitute reality for Hume (sense impressions) and the followers of his legacy, namely, logical atomists and the logical positivists. All physical objects are ultimately reduced to these neutral entities. Such a view is predominantly found in the writings of Russell's logical atomism and in Ayer's logical positivism.

There is another extreme form of anti-metaphysical stand taken up by materialists, especially by Marxists. According to them, any anti-dialectical way of thinking is metaphysical. The peculiarity of the Marxist doctrine is, fortunately or unfortunately, that it treats every other doctrine as anti-dialectical other than its own. The natural consequence of such a view is that all other philosophical doctrines being anti-dialectical in their nature are metaphysical. But the question is: Did Marxism really dispense with metaphysics? The answer to this question is negative. Like other philosophical doctrines, the philosophy of Marxism is also committed to metaphysics of some sort. According to Marxists, the reality is made up of matter. But they are quick on their feet to defend their position by claiming that we are committed to ontology of a sort by accepting matter as the ultimate constituent of reality, but not to metaphysics. For my part I do not agree with the view that ontology is totally distinct from metaphysics. At the most one can say that it is a sophisticated synonym for metaphysics that came into vogue due to the controversial nature of the term 'metaphysics'. In fact, the existentialists like Sartre made a distinction between the questions of metaphysics and the questions of ontology. He claims that the questions of former are of 'why sort' and the questions of latter are of 'how sort'. The questions of 'why sort' are unanswerable for they belong to the domain of metaphysics, and the questions of 'how sort' are answerable for they are concerned with existential matters. It is likely that Sartre made such a distinction because of his leanings towards Marxism during his early phase.

Whatever may be the case the supposed distinction between metaphysics and ontology does not have any rational base for both metaphysics and ontology are concerned with the nature of reality although the conception of reality may change from one school of thought to another or from one philosopher to another. Therefore, one has to start with metaphysics or ontology of some sort whether one likes it or not. But, what kind of metaphysics is needed? This is a debatable question. As aptly remarked by Aldous Huxley in his *Ends and Means*: "Men live in accordance with their philosophy of life, their conception of the world. This is true even of the most thoughtless. It is impossible to live without a metaphysic. The choice that is given us is not between some kind of metaphysic and no metaphysic; it is always between a good metaphysic and a bad metaphysic".[1] In what follows I shall attempt to provide a solid ground for pursuing metaphysics as an important branch of philosophy.

What is metaphysics?

Well, although the philosophers like D.W. Hamlyn claim that it is not all that "easy to set out what metaphysics is..."[2], I do not think that it is really the case at all. The philosophers of the past were very clear in their expositions while dealing with the subject-matter of metaphysics. Just as philosophers are unanimous in holding the view that epistemology is concerned with the theory of knowledge, although there is no one single theory of knowledge that satisfies every philosopher and every school of thought, philosophers also say that metaphysics is concerned with the ultimate nature or constituents of reality, although there is no general agreement among the philosophers and the various schools of thought as to what really counts as reality. Thus it is perspectivism that dominates our philosophical discussions and debates on any subject-matter in general for there is no final word in philosophy.

But before we attempt to answer the question: 'What is reality?' we must also look into the very genesis of the expression 'metaphysics'. It appears that the expression 'metaphysics' is the title of one of Aristotle's works. This compilation is so called for it contains works that came after physics (*meta ta phusica*). In this sense the title was merely a library classification. It is also true that Aristotle never treated metaphysics as a distinctive discipline. As a matter of fact, "under the title *Metaphysics* Aristotle discusses matters which have, to say the least, a considerable overlap with those discussed in the *Physics* and other works of his."[3] In a sense, the contents of metaphysics are not really divorced from the supposed contents of physics. As a matter of fact, the former supplement the latter. The prime objective of Aristotle in his work on *Metaphysics* is to establish a science of being-*qua*-being. Of course, the pre-Socratic philosophers were also concerned with the ultimate source of everything. Similarly, Plato in his *Sophist* made an attempt to distinguish the world of Being from the world of becoming. The former, according to him, is eternal and consists of real entities called Forms or Ideas or Concepts. These eternal entities participate in the world of becoming. In other words, the objects of the world of becoming being non-eternal are mere carbon copies of the Forms. Thus those who are pursuing an inquiry into the being in general are said to be interested in *metaphysics generalis* as opposed to those who are pursuing *metaphysics specialis.*

It is a commonplace belief that the expression 'metaphysics' somehow represents a form of reasoning which is "excessively general, abstract, and subtle. Among philosophers, from Descartes onwards, it has come to have the distinct sense of having to do with what lies beyond what is available to the senses-with what is not merely abstract but in some sense transcendent too".[4] Kant is not an exception to this view for he identified metaphysics in terms of its subject-matter and also in terms of the judgments that it involves. According to him, the chief concerns of metaphysics are God, freedom, and immortality. From this account it is clear that, by and large, the expression 'metaphysics' is exclusively reserved to signify those entities that transcend the ordinary level of sense-experience and commonsense. These entities constitute a reality of a distinct kind that cannot be brought under the purview of appearances. But how does one grasp such reality? How can anyone account for such reality that lies beyond our ordinary sense perception? One immediate reaction to such questions is not to accept anything that is imperceptible and consequently incomprehensible. Such reaction came from Hume when he held that a book on divinity or metaphysics must be consigned to flames for it does not contain either formal reasoning or matters of fact. The modern empiricists (logical positivists) like Ayer, following the legacy of Hume, held that: "If we go by appearances it can hardly be disputed that metaphysics is nearly always in conflict with common sense".[5] If this yardstick, which is very naïve in its conception, is applied to certain sort of entities in modern physics like atoms, electrons, neutrons, positrons, protons, quarks, sound waves and so on, then those branches of science may tend to lose their scientific identity. In other words, their subject-matter would be as speculative as that of a metaphysician. No doubt, as aptly pointed out by Kant, all our scientific and philosophical discussions start with ordinary sense-experience, but they do not end up by merely satisfying our ordinary sense-experience and commonsense. The techniques and methods adopted in one sphere of science to arrive at rationally justifiable scientific knowledge may not work well in another sphere of science. Also, scientists alter their methods of inquiry to dwell deep into the finer structures of knowledge in a given field of inquiry. If this were the case, how can anyone claim that since the nature of transcendental realty is inaccessible to the methods of science, then there is nothing called transcendental reality? Even if it is there, how does it matter to anyone since it is inaccessible to our ordinary ways of knowing, leave alone the scientific ways of knowing? The point I try to drive home here is that instead of dubbing 'something' non-existent for it is inaccessible to our ordinary ways of knowing, we must resort to some extraordinary ways of knowing that 'something'. It is true that these extraordinary ways of knowing that 'something' do not satisfy our commonsense. Consequently, the whole exercise of knowing that 'something' through extraordinary ways is dubbed as non-rational, if not irrational and dogmatic. Thus we look for some sort of uniformity in our approach, and any approach that deviates from the rigid uniform approach is claimed to be logically ill-founded. But we fail to notice that even among our ordinary ways of knowing things the knowledge that is acquired by one source cannot be acquired by another source. If the colour of a thing is provided by visual sense, it cannot be provided by other four senses. Analogously, the knowledge provided by ordinary ways of knowing cannot be provided by the extraordinary ways of knowing and vice-versa. This argument serves as a major premise for our defense of metaphysics.

The expression 'commonsense' is a bit ambiguous one. What does one mean by commonsense? How do analysts explain it? Just as Quine attacked the analysts in his "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" for taking the meaning of the expression 'analyticity' for granted, the analysts must also be attacked for taking the meaning of the expression 'commonsense' for granted. We tend to attribute the adjective 'commonsensical' to any view that is generally accepted by the majority. Is commonsense the commonest sense that is shared by all the human beings? I feel so. Every normal human being is endowed with this commonsense which helps human beings to pass judgments in our day-to-day life on the objects, events, processes, relations and so on. In other words, it helps us in providing a descriptive account of the world. But in another sense the expression 'commonsense' is identified with rationality and it is the belief of many, if not everyone's, that science and scientific knowledge alone is rational therefore it satisfies our commonsense. The natural consequence of such a position is that anything that is approached by any un-commonsense (extraordinary sense) is treated non-rational and non-scientific, if not irrational and unscientific. But, this monolithic or unilateral understanding of rationality makes one bypass or overlook the methods other than the so called scientific ones, and restricts our scope of knowledge in general and reality in particular. One must keep in mind that there are both rational and non-rational approaches to reality. A non-rational approach to reality has its own logic, but it certainly involves reasoning of a different sort. If our reasoning is bound by the laws of thought, then our logic becomes formal in its nature. On the contrary, if our reasoning is not bound by any laws of thought, then our logic becomes non-formal or philosophical. The non-formal or philosophical logic was employed by Jainism in the form of *Syādvāda*, by Nāgārjuna in the form of *catuṣkoṭi*, and by Śaṅkara in the form of *vivarta-vāda*. Also we come across the instances of employment of non-formal logic or philosophical logic in the writings of Hegel, Bradley and others in the West. The non-formal logic has its own set of categories and they are primarily derived from the philosophical position that one advocates. Also, one requires a different type of mental make up or faculties to pursue non-formal or philosophical logic. A common man with his ordinary faculties of understanding cannot know the implications of $E=MC^2$. He has to develop his faculties of understanding in order to gain any access to that brand of knowledge. Similar is the case with any person who wishes to have access to the nature of reality. Once the decks are cleared for the possibility of pursuing metaphysics, then we can show how it can be pursued.

Coming to the distinction between the types of metaphysics, it is held by Hamlyn that Strawson's classification of metaphysics into descriptive and revisionary lines in his *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* is highly misleading. In fact Strawson holds that the kind of metaphysics that he pursued in the above mentioned work is of descriptive kind and it was already practiced by both Aristotle and Kant. The speculative metaphysics practiced by the philosophers, according to Kant, can be characterized as revisionary one. Of course, Strawson claims that the very purpose of descriptive metaphysics is to describe our conceptual schema. On the contrary, a revisionary metaphysician aims at revising the given ontological position with suitable explanation. For instance, Rāmānuja's metaphysics can be dubbed as a revisionary kind. for he tries to revise the fundamental ontology of Śaṅkara by claiming that Brahman is always with auspicious qualities (*saguṇātmaka)*. Similar instances are also found in the Western tradition. For instance, Leibniz revises the entire concept of 'substance' as found in the doctrines of his rationalist predecessors Descartes and Spinoza by replacing it with the notion of 'monad'. Hamlyn's charge against Strawson is that Kant did not merely describe his conceptual schema which is required for obtaining the knowledge of reality, but went beyond it to hold that the genuine knowledge consists in synthetic *a priori* judgments. Similar view can be attributed to Aristotle too. The claims to necessity do not merely describe 'our conceptual schema' but demand something that is necessary for obtaining knowledge of reality. Similarly, Leibniz did not engage himself in pursuing revisionary metaphysics. Instead he rejected the notion of 'substance' as expounded by his rationalist predecessors and arrived at his own metaphysical doctrine.[6] There is one more kind of metaphysics which is often neglected by the analysts is transcendental metaphysics. Whatever may be the case, what follows from the above discussion is that just as there are types of epistemology, there are also types of metaphysics. We cannot ignore this fact.

Appearance and Reality

As indicated earlier, metaphysics as a branch of philosophy is concerned with the nature of reality. One of the most important distinctions that we make in philosophy while pursuing metaphysics is the distinction between appearance and reality. In other words, what we call reality has both these aspects within it. They are like the two sides of the same coin. The general tendency is to accept and admit only those aspects of reality that have immediate access to our faculties of sense as real. By doing so, one can do away with the distinction between appearance and reality. In other words, reality is reduced to mere appearances. Such an exercise is found in the philosophical doctrines of Cārvāka, Hume and modern empiricists. Especially the modern empiricists (logical atomists and logical positivists) claiming to be scientific in their taste dispensed with everything that is unverifiable. But "verificationism is no longer the force that it was and it is probably no longer necessary to justify the pursuit of metaphysics on grounds of meaning".[7] As aptly held by Hamlyn, there are some pieces of metaphysics that are rubbish not because that they are unverifiable, but because they contain arguments which are not at all illuminating. This may not be the case with metaphysics in general. We accept or reject a given epistemological position based upon the arguments that it involves. Similar is the case with metaphysics.

Whether one accepts the distinction between appearance and reality or not while dealing with the nature of reality, as normal human beings we do pass judgments about the objects of existence in terms of real or unreal. We distinguish a sham diamond from a real one. Here in this context the expression 'real' signifies only that which is phenomenally real. And we do construct the world views based on mere appearances which we mistake for realities. The root cause of such a mental set up is "our ordinary experience, as well as our education in the rudiments of the sciences...".[8] In the process we often fail to get rid of our habit of reconciling the course of our ordinary experience with the demand of our intellect for consistency in thinking. We must know that things are not always what they appear to be. Similarly, what is real may not always appear. A real world view is that which is not constructed on the basis of mere appearances. The first objection normally raised against such a stance is that it is impossible to construct a world view based on the reality which is trans-empirical. Before rejecting such a claim, one must at least try. Without making a trail one cannot sit on the judgment on those who pursue the construction of a world view differently. The second objection is that in what way this knowledge of reality helps us in our day-to-day life when sciences with the help of our practical experiences give us everything that is required in the form of knowledge. Therefore, any attempt to pursue metaphysics is highly superfluous and otiose. But to call an inquiry into reality by a metaphysician is a meaningless exercise is akin to say that the inquiry into the distinction between real and unreal in ordinary day-to-day life. Why cannot one take unreal as real and get satisfied with it? Do science and our ordinary experiences allow the identity between real and unreal (appearance)? I do not think so. If it is unacceptable to a scientist, so also to a metaphysician. Therefore, one should not forget the fact that the distinction between appearance and reality is not only confined to our ordinary day-to-day experience but can also be extended to trans-empirical realm.

An anti-metaphysician holds that since what is beyond appearances cannot be grasped by our ordinary sense-experience, there is nothing beyond this veil of appearances. Therefore, all that appears is real. Consequently, metaphysics is impossible and all the questions concerning metaphysics are meaningless for they admit of no solutions. If this argument is taken on its face value, then the distinction between appearance and reality is also meaningless. But our ordinary empirical experience proposes such a distinction whenever we face contradictions. Either we have to accept this distinction or deny this distinction. If we deny this distinction, then we are indirectly admitting contradictions about the things as ultimate truth about things. But, "if the self-contradictory can be true, there is no rational ground for preferring a coherent scientific theory of the world to the wildest dreams of superstition and rationality".[9]

Another important objection against the possibility of metaphysics is that it cannot form part of our knowledge scheme, for all the intelligible questions that we ask about reality fall under one science or other. The sciences deal with all facts of existence and they hardly leave any scope for any serious metaphysical inquiry. Where there is no factual knowledge there is no scope for intelligible questions. Similarly, where there are no intelligible questions there is no knowledge. But this argument is fallacious (*petition principii*) for it assumes that there is no science that deals with ultimate reality or general principles of reality. A metaphysician does not deny that specialized branches of experimental science do deal with the facts of existence, but there are facts that cannot be approached by experimental sciences. They are the facts about reality. These facts are more general in nature. In defense of metaphysics as an independent branch of knowledge one can argue that the sciences differ from each other not because they deal with different facts of existence rather they deal with the same facts of existence from different points of view. Similar is the case with metaphysics.

Even if metaphysics is admitted as a science it in its own right, yet the questions raised by a metaphysician cannot be solved for they are unintelligible to our ordinary human faculties. Therefore, it is waste of time to deal with such a science. All that we can do is to look for general laws or uniformities of the given phenomena. This is the position of a phenomenalist. If phenomenalism is the best answer to metaphysics, then there is also a danger for phenomenalism itself. The statement of phenomenalist that all that we know are phenomena presupposes that there is something other than phenomena whether it is accessible to our faculties or not. Let us say that something is unknown and unknowable, yet it is there. It is a positive contribution of phenomanlism to philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. This unknown and unknowable something becomes the subject-matter of metaphysics.

Conclusion

Although early Wittgenstein made a distinction between 'what can be said' and 'what cannot be said' in the *Tractatus*, yet he did not dismiss metaphysics as something nonsensical. He cleverly brought all metaphysics under 'what can be shown'. Even in his later work *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein maintains that: "The results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that our understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language. These bumps make see the value of the discovery".[10] Here the expression 'nonsense' does not necessarily refer to metaphysics rather it is extended to all our unintelligible ways of expressing things. As a matter of fact, metaphysics finds its due place in the *Philosophical Investigations*. The recalcitrant nature of a metaphysician is not always due to his wrong priorities. The prejudice of a metaphysician is "not a stupid prejudice". The confusions of a metaphysician reveal the deep human condition. Therefore, the prejudices of a metaphysician cannot be simply brushed aside since the problems "arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language".[11] Therefore, it is only in the context of given language-game the problems are understood and put in their proper perspective. There are several methods, but there is no philosophical method, according to Wittgenstein. A philosopher is expected to engage in the activity of "*assembling reminders* for a particular purpose".[12]

To put it in a nutshell, a philosopher in addition to rearrange our problems in order to put them in proper linguistic use must arrange them in an order so that the arrangement provides us with a complete landscape. This is possible through the use of ordinary language. It appears that once Wittgenstein asked himself: Why is philosophy so complicated? He happened to say that it so because it "unites knots in our thinking, which we foolishly put there; but to do that it must make movements which are just as complicated as those knots. Although the *result* of philosophy is simple, its method cannot be if it is to arrive at that result. The complexity of philosophy is not in its subject matter, but in our knotted understanding".[13] It is interesting to note that the Whitehead's fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness' holds good here. Normally we tend to attribute whatever features we locate in parts to the whole. If the knots are viewed in isolation from each other, then the complexity of our problem increases. The disjoined knots lead us nowhere. The knots have to be seen as a whole in order to get the right picture. The jigsaw puzzle remains a problem unless the pieces of the jigsaw are properly arranged. Often the metaphysics practiced by the Indian philosophers is targeted by the critics by saying that it is something speculative, dogmatic, and unrealistic. Unless one plays the game of metaphysics with its own rules justice is not done to the game. We tend to abandon it in the middle for we do not know how to play that game. There is no point in finding fault with the bat that you use to play cricket when you do not know how to play the game of cricket.

After a careful examination of the subject-matter of metaphysics, it is a well-known fact that the knowledge obtained by specialized sciences restricted to what is presented to our observational and experimental methods. Whenever the methods of observation and experimentation fail to yield knowledge, we normally resort to thought experiments. Even in modern science, especially in quantum physics, such thought experiments are employed. Is an electron a wave or a particle? The dilemma is not yet broken, but as a principle of compromise the thought experiments in quantum physics show that it exhibits both the properties. Does science question the rationality of these thought experiments although they do not have empirical base? I do not think so. Similarly, the thought experiments employed by a metaphysician have their own rational base while dealing with issues such as appearance and reality, relative ontologies, substance, particular and universal, space and time, minds, persons and personal identity and so on. These issues are as important as the issues taken by any natural scientist. Why should a metaphysician adopt the methodology of natural science? The structure and content of the natural sciences requires ad different tools of inquiry. It is the structure and content of a given discipline which determines our tools of inquiry, but not the vice-versa. Reality does not change whereas our tools of inquiry change from time to time so as to grasp the finer aspects of reality. What was unknown and unknowable at time t1 becomes an open secret at time t2. If our tools of inquiry have to determine 'what there is' then we are bound to miss the wood for the trees. Although I personally disagree with Ayer's critique of metaphysics, especially of transcendental kind, his remarks on metaphysics are worth mentioning, He opines: "It is indeed better to tabulate the milestones along the highway of ordinary usage than to rhapsodize on Nothingness or the Essence of Man; but it would be a mistake to forego the more imaginative kinds of conceptual exploration, merely because of the greater risk of getting lost. In philosophy, nothing should be absolutely sacrosanct: not even common sense".[14] It is highly laudable that a professed logical positivist like Ayer had to concede the point that there are other ways of philosophizing.

NOTES.

1. *Cf.* A.C. Chatterjee & D.M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1984), eighth reprint; p.1.
2. D.W. Hamlyn, *Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984), p. 1.
3. Ibid., p.2.
4. A.J. Ayer, "Metaphysics and Common Sense" in his *Metaphysics and Common Sense* (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 64.
5. Ibid.
6. D.W. Hamlyn, *Metaphysics*, pp.4-5.
7. Ibid., p.10.
8. A.E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, (London: Mathuen & Co Ltd., University Paperbacks, 1961), p.2.
9. Ibid. p.9.
10. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E M. Anscombe (trans.) (Oxford: basil Blackwell, 1953), Sec. 119.

11. Ibid., Sec. 111.
12. Ibid., Sec. 127.
13. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, Norman Malcolm (trans.) , p.52, *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXXVI, p.239.
14. A.J. Ayer, "Metaphysics and Common Sense" in his *Metaphysics and Common Sense*, p. 81.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Jaison A. Manjaly and Sumitava Mukherjee

Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology: A Prospective but Temperate View

INTRODUCTION

Great minds like Charles Darwin had long understood the importance of viewing humans through the lens of evolution and environmental necessities. Both cognitive and evolutionary psychologists propose that most (if not all) of our behaviour can be explained by appeal to internal cognitive mechanisms. Evolutionary psychology is more biologically informed whereas cognitive psychology is more contextual. Recently, a mingling of both the branches has produced a plethora of scientific experimental literature that could guide global framework designs of the mind in the future.

There are at least two types of evolutionary processes relevant for the social and behavioural scientists. One is borrowed from Darwin's idea of natural selection of genes wherein some beneficial selective genetic variants are transmitted to later species, if it increases biological fitness and that in turn affects brain functions. The second one is based on *memes* (a coinage by Richard Dawkins) meaning 'units of cultural transmission', which are the vast array of cognitive tendencies that become widespread in a population. Memes are transmitted through social exchanges (like communication) affecting belief systems and subsequent behaviour. Susan Blackmore calls memes 'information virus, that construe beliefs to be formed based on selectionist principles suitable for a population. Both are analogous to genetic evolution and are compatible with each other.[1]

The Evolutionary Psychology programme rests on a meta-theory of evolution encompassing animal behaviour, paleoanthropological studies, neurology, neurobehavioral genetics and evolvable computation. It can also be viewed as a framework on which multiple hypotheses can be designed and tested. Most of evolutionary psychology has been associated with a specific interpretation of evolution—the Darwinian one. Darwin's idea was this: variations in a given trait would increase the probability that organisms would survive environmental threats and if these variants are heritable, then traits that increase the probability of surviving and reproducing will be transmitted to the next generation more frequently and will become more common. This is true not only for physical traits but also for psychological characteristics. Here we shall focus on the general evolutionary approach centered on the idea of inclusive fitness (gene frequencies change due to environmental factors and only the "fit" ones get propagated) without going into details of the processes. Evolved psychological mechanisms were suggested to be the bridge between fitness theory and behaviour by Cosmides and Tooby.

Evolutionary psychologists working on the 'selfish gene' model of selection suggest that, although an understanding of the causal functional architecture and processing of the brain could fundamentally alter the social sciences, most of the scholars in political and social sciences remain unaffected. The standard model in social and behavioural sciences assume that humans are born with a blank slate on which general purpose cognitive mechanisms (like learning and memory processes) enable things to be written. The blank slate lack special circuits and modules designed by natural selection to respond differently. This conceptualization is faulty. "The blank-slate assumption removes the central causal organizers of social phenomena—evolved psychological mechanisms—from the analysis of social events, rendering the social sciences powerless".[2] This has implications for studies in civilizations.

It is imperative that the foundations of Evolutionary Psychology be reviewed to judge suitability of including the concepts and implications for each of us. The logic of psychologically evolved mechanisms could contribute to social and cultural phenomenon. Perhaps we need to re-visit existing explanations and theories of human development in light of an evolutionary framework because brains and behaviours are somewhat shaped through evolutionary processes. A theory which doesn't take into consideration this overarching reality could be incomplete or misguided. Diverse domains from history and anthropology to economics and consciousness-studies are all affected by the standard cognitive framework we assume including its development and causal circuitry. After summarizing the concepts, we discuss philosophical implications of evolutionary psychology and explicate the strong criticisms against the research programme.

CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

The goal of Evolutionary Psychology is to study human behaviour as the product of evolved psychological mechanisms that depend on internal and environmental input for their development, activation, and expression. Paul. E Griffiths[3] points out that the field is historically indebted to sociobiology (that assumes social behaviour has stemmed from evolution) and ethology (that talked about instinctive drives). Evolutionary Psychology studies the cognitive computational processes of brain that has been adapted through environmental pressures. Human behaviours are a product of psychological computational mechanisms that were selected for serving fundamental biological motives (and are not a direct product of natural selection). Evolutionary Psychology is based on the premise that psychological characteristics evolved to ensure the survival of the species in the ancestral environment. Darwin used the concept of 'struggle' to convey the logic of selection in light of environmental pressures where struggle could be literal (like avoiding diseases or predators) or metaphorical. His ideas of natural and sexual selection when applied to behavioural sciences, gives rise to evolutionary psychology. These concepts could actualize not only Darwin's prediction of an improved psychology but also usher a new interdisciplinary research agenda cut across theoretical biology, psychology, sociology, computer science and philosophy.

However, because of a fragmented behavioural science and a dearth of cross-talk between neurobiology, psychology and computer science; evolutionary psychology is still not into mainstream behavioural sciences. The condition has improved over the last two decades with psychological and mind sciences realizing the profound influence of environmental pressures. Neuroscientists have started documenting differing brain functions based on genetic, cultural and individual history. Hippel, Haselton & Forgas[4] provide examples of converging evidence that genes contribute significantly to high level social cognitive processes that shape our strategies. Nobel winning computer scientists like Herbert Simon stated that we need to understand both the individual and the environment to unravel computational mechanisms in our mind/brain.[5] Moreover, research has suggested large-scale cross-cultural universality of sophisticated social behaviour like selecting partners, emotional communications, gender differences and economical preferences.

We constantly struggle against the hostile forces of nature. David Buss discusses the myriad of struggles which come to humans and most other organisms, big and small, struggle for existence and self-protection, saving oneself from natural environmental conditions (weather, food shortage, falls, earthquakes), fights between members of one's own species (including preferred mating strategies) and other species(spiders, snakes, tigers). Natural selection results in three products: adaptations, which are inherited characteristics that reliably helped the organism survive by solving environmental problems; by-products, which are traits that have survived without functional value because they are inherently coupled with adaptations; and noise-variations that are random.

Downes explicates the concept of adaptation quite elegantly. "characteristic *c* is an adaptation for doing task *t* in a population if and only if members of the population now have *c* because, ancestrally, there was selection for having *c* and *c* conferred a fitness advantage because it performed task *t*".[6] Traits can be adaptive without it being an adaptation and it could be adaptations without being currently adaptive. Some adaptations occur over long evolutionary times and some occur during lifetimes. But, adaptations and functions are related: asking about functions is also to ask why it is present in the species.

For most evolutionary psychological research explanations, adaptations play a pivotal role. Some think that 'exaptations', a feature not arising as an adaptation for its current function but rather co-opted for new purposes; is a more important concept than adaptations. According to Gould (43), an exaptation is "a feature, now useful to an organism, that did not arise as an adaptation for its present role, but was subsequently co-opted for its current function" and was not evolved by natural selection. Without going into that debate, it suffices us here that "all [Adaptations and exaptations] invoke selection at some point in the causal sequence. All invoke function. All must meet conceptual criteria for the proposed function– the hallmarks of special design, including specialization of function for solving a particular adaptive problem. And all must meet evidentiary standards, such as generating specific testable empirical predictions and parsimoniously accounting for known empirical findings." Thus, both fit in the global Evolutionary Psychological research programme.

All Evolutionary psychologists share the view that psychological adaptations solve adaptive problems (such as obtaining nutritious food, avoiding predators, finding safe shelter and solving reproductive challenges). Rampant everyday social phenomenon has also been successfully explained. Social evolutionary psychology has explained aggression, status hierarchies, cheaters and free riders behaviour, friendship, kin selection, incest avoidance and a variety of others. We now know why we have skills that help us live in complex social groups (such as language and the ability to detect cheaters) and fear certain kinds of environmental threats that killed our ancestors (snakes, spiders, heights, rotten food). Evolutionary psychology can also explain some apparent dysfunctions in modern human behaviour like cravings for fat and sugar.

There are many other implications for other related disciplines. Evolutionary computation is a method based on the metaphors of evolution that has bred many dynamically evolving solutions to complex problems in generic computational algorithms, artificial intelligence, artificial life and gaming. It is possible to model artificial neural networks which changing characteristics based on evolutionary algorithms. Based on a functionalist understanding, software expert systems based on virtual machine architectures have been successfully built which are motivated by evolutionary principles. They are engineered based on cognitive functional architectures and machinery designed by natural selection. Even deep philosophical issues could be seen in new light within the evolutionary framework.

PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

The above discussions primarily focus on the interface between biological and psychological evolution. However, there are some philosophical issues which we think would add value to discussions in this paper. Evolutionary psychology, in some format, assumes a complimentary two way interaction between the brain and behaviour. But we seem to have missed the 'phenomenal features' in between. How and when the phenomenal features such as consciousness/ experience might have evolved? Do they co-evolve with brain? Does the increasing complexity facilitate emergence of phenomenal features? Are they adaptations or exaptations? These are some of the questions which might be interesting for an evolutionary psychologist and his/her metaphysical commitment would influence the answers when these questions are committed to philosophical scrutiny.

There are diverse opinions about the evolution of consciousness. Flanagan claims that there are evolved/adaptive and non-evolved/ epiphenomenal forms of consciousness. For example, pain is an adapted behaviour whereas dreams are epiphenomenal. Both are evolved but the former enhances your fitness whereas the later does not have fitness enhancing abilities. Dreams are spandrels of evolution. This evolutionary account of consciousness is more aligned to a physicalistic metaphysics, which support epiphenomenalism and emergentism. Epiphenomenal features do not have any causal influence on evolution whereas the emergent phenomenal features affect the evolution of the physical and vice versa.

Irrespective of the metaphysical commitments almost all agree that consciousness emerged from the increasingly complex neural architecture of higher order organisms. In other words, human beings with state of the art bio-architecture and highly complex brains are capable of hosting macro conscious experiences. This trajectory of evolution assumes that organic matter is the minimal criteria for the evolution of consciousness. However, the problems could emerge when you subscribe to a specific metaphysical position. If you are a materialist or an identity theorist, the evolution of consciousness won't make as much sense as to a dualist. Identity theory would not subscribe to the evolution of consciousness because consciousness is identical to brain functions. If it is identical to brain functions, then it does not have an independent ontological existence and what we have is only the evolution of biology (neuronal connections).

A more serious issue with evolutionary psychology is its covert commitment to a dualistic metaphysical framework. It is often presupposed that there is a separate path of evolution for the physical and the phenomenal and at the same time there is a complimentary interaction: the evolution of complex neural functions facilitate complex mental functions and vice versa. This dualistic presupposition could bring back the daunting problem of interaction and causality back to life and open up plethora of endless discussion. Evolutionary psychology therefore needs to rethink about subsuming psychological realm into the biological realm of evolution. There are other generic criticisms regarding the framework which we discuss next and also offer our submissions regarding the debates.

DEFENDING THE CRITICS OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Given our long history of group-living and changing bio-socio-economic pressures, logically there should be a link between biological theorizing and social behaviour. Of course, we should not be too enthusiastic in explaining behaviour through genes because genes facilitate, but might not be a necessary and sufficient cause for a psychological trait in an individual. There is no disregarding of the facts that (a) human development is often multi-determined, (b) there is a big impact of socio-cultural variables, and (c) although there are modular organizations, causal integrative networks could exist in between modules. Having said this, let us take a look at the common objections raised including the counter-objections based on Confer et al. In the process, we would also mention our views.

Criticism 1: Too many modules?

According to evolutionary psychologist Stephen Pinker and most others, the human mind contains "hundreds or thousands" of functionally specialized modules whose "basic logic is specified by our genetic program" (Buller 307). The contentious issue is not modularity but (a) the extent of modularity and (b) the contribution of genetics to brain-behaviour development. Hardly anybody would challenge a basic idea of modularity. We know for example, face recognition occurs mostly at a specific brain area (the fusiform gyrus). In fact, according to Barrett & Kurzban (644), modularity is a fundamental property of organisms and a useful one indispensible for understanding cognition which is compatible with evolutionary theories and other approaches.

The evolutionary psychologists provide examples of modularity from a wide variety of research and methods. An example for domain-specific adaptation is sex differences in romantic jealousy (males are triggered by cues to sexual infidelity whereas females are triggered by cues to emotional infidelity). There are hundreds of empirical findings to conclude that domain-specific adaptations might have taken place. Confer et al. (115) point out that domain-general rationality cannot explain sex differences. Rational decision making has to be coupled with auxiliary hypothesis about motivational priorities that seem clearly to be guided by evolutionary principles to start with. Moreover, they also argue that domain-specific rationality ends up being deliberative and slow which is not the case for jealously. For example, seeing one's wife in bed with another man ends in anger and rage instantaneously. Others like Haidt[7] has proposed intuitionist models of moral decision making challenging long established view of morality as a deliberative domain. Evolutionary explanations have been suggested to be the cause of large-scale behaviours like incest-avoidance that have helped us evolve better because morality is deeply rooted genetically (Haidt & Joseph 55-66). Consequently, evolutionary psychologists suggest that the human mind is a complex integrated assembly of many functionally specialized psychological adaptations that evolved as solutions to numerous and qualitatively distinct adaptive problems. A slow-deliberative and a fast-intuitive pathway based behavioural model is a common feature. Dual-systems of decision making have long been a core part in cognitive psychology (Kahneman, 2002 Nobel Prize lecture). A similar case has been made by Stanovich and West.[8] But, it needs to be remembered that just because some process is fast, it needn't follow that it has been genetically modified or is an adaptation.

Buller,[9] an internationally acclaimed philosopher and a strong critic of Evolutionary Psychology, points out (quite correctly), that a (*biologically*) massive modular organization is faulty. There is no positive correlation between brain complexity and genomic size. Also, brain structures are a product of additive (formation of cells and synapses where gene-directed protein synthesis is involved) and subtractive (pruning of connections) events. Thus, brain functions are a product of environment and not genetically determined. What Buller seems to argue against is not modularity *per se* but the result of modularization. According to Buller and Hardcastle (307), modules aren't "genetically specified" results of adaptations but are rather a result of brain's plasticity. Further, they suggest that the brain's plasticity is a fundamental psychological adaptation and the modules are adaptive responses to local (not past) conditions.

But, there are certain issues here: (a) some of the above criticism is a straw-man attack and (b) some part of it is obviously wrong. Genetics facilitates some level of evolutionary development and doesn't give rise to modules. Nobody is claiming it is only the genes at work. Also, plasticity is a property for almost all organisms which might make it fundamental and not evolved. Necessity for selecting mates, food, protecting oneself, investing in parenting, selecting friends and co-operating or interacting with others aren't local conditions. Thus, all modules are obviously not responses to 'local conditions' unless Buller is ready to acknowledge some problems are locally existent across multiple generations (which makes it an evolutionary problem anyway). Environment is the key: some struggles are long terms (which are the basis for adaptations) and others are short term (own experiences).

It also needs to be realized that the evolutionary psychologists work at a functional level and their theorizing are tailored towards abstract computational machines which are multiply realizable. Many functionally specified modules (which are adaptations) can be implemented on overlapping brain architectures (neural circuitry) and genetic distributions. Saying each module was designed to solve a specific adaptation problem doesn't entail a different neuronal causal network or a genetic mark-up for it.

Surely there were social and environmental pressures and recurrent problems for which we perhaps have some dedicated mechanisms. These mechanisms could be housed in a module but could also be a process across modules or a module which interacts with multiple processes. The role of genetics is existent but perhaps not a lot, in agreement with Smith. In trying to answer whether evolutionary social science can account for both a large diversity and also universals among people, Smith (325) suggests that the relationship between human genetic diversity and variations of behaviour is minimal. This stance resolves the problem of high behavioural diversity being co-related with low genetic variations. He further stresses that the variations of behaviour are adaptive because of a complex mix of strategic, ecological and cultural evolutionary processes.

Criticism 2: Testability

Some question whether evolutionary psychology can successfully generate hypothesis and test it empirically as it is based on "just-so" stories. The answer is yes it can because Evolutionary Psychology generates scientific hypothesis which follows from theories that can be falsified—these aren't 'just-so' construals. Global models and theoretical frameworks are a common feature in sciences. Basic assumptions like self-motives in economics, computational mechanisms in cognitive psychology, logic-gates of neurons in neuroscience, social pressures of stratification in sociology and formal structures between passages in literature are all rampant. Reverse-engineering and post-hoc analysis yield important knowledge that can also be hypothesized before-hand based on what we think has been adapted.

According to Kurzban,[10] a noted scientist, the issue is compounded with the possibility that most critics fail to understand the logic of adaptationism—about how hypothesis of function require evidence from design giving rise to "just-so" worries. Here is an example from Confer et al. (113). According to fitness theory and parental investing, a hypothesis is that females will use predictable cues for a man's willingness to invest as a criterion for mate selection resulting in a prediction that women will prefer men as potential mates who invest more time in them. This can be obviously tested.

Another argument against Evolutionary Psychology is that current traits studied could have evolved to serve different functions than they do presently, confounding attempts to place them in the correct evolutionary history. One practical solution is to focus on observable traits, social pressures and problems which are general and existent even in modern days. The ancient cause could be relevant even today (like self-protection or mate-selection). More importantly, Buller points out that Evolutionary Psychology is a paradigm or a domain framework and not a single hypothesis.[6] Testable hypothesis can be framed motivated by the basic idea of linking adaptation to environment.

A third criticism is that apparently mechanisms are not studied in Evolutionary Psychology. Again, perhaps there have been some miss-readings because Confer et al. (110-126) repeatedly talks about mechanism and state that the very goal of evolutionary psychology is not only to understand the adaptive function but to understand the details of how the mechanism works. For us, the focus on the processes which has evolved due to adaptations makes the programme, for us, 'Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology', perhaps with 'social' or 'neuro' juxtaposed as a specific study might necessitate.

Criticism 3: Environmental adaptation and Anti-adaptationist behaviours

The old debate of nature vs nurture has taken the form of nativism vs emergentism in Evolutionary Psychology. Both evolutionary explanations and emergentism is committed to causal interactions between genes and the environment. So, it is a fallacy to place nativism against emergentism but sadly is common place in discussions. Natural selection shapes developmental systems. Dynamic, interactive processes during the individual development produce outcomes that promote evolutionary goals (Barrett & Kurzban 637). No evolutionary psychologist suggests that only 'selfish genes' cause behaviour. Asking 'Aren't human behaviours the result of learning and socialization, not evolution?' is a miss-construal of the basic foundations.

Slips of behaviour like homosexuality are sometimes cited as examples against Evolutionary Psychology. Although Confer et al. (120) agree that some such behaviour remains inexplicable to the evolutionary framework; we think that as long as behaviour is seen as a function of situational/contextual factors, short-term goals, evolutionary appropriateness and a possibility of being off-shooted by present emotive processes; there is no issue here. This acknowledgement doesn't be-little the evolutionary research framework. Highly complex agents like humans cannot be guided by a single framework in a rule-based manner. Moreover, there have been multiple discussions of adaptive decision making, where contextual factors guide actions and recently of deep rationality (Kenrick et al. 764) wherein seemingly irrational behaviour actually is founded on long-term advantages.

CONCLUSION

The future of Evolutionary Psychology requires a problem-centered, interdisciplinary research approach; both to solve problems within the discipline and to negotiate the boundaries (Caporael, 622). Also, we need to acknowledge that Evolutionary Psychology is both a framework and a meta-theory which has potential to contribute meta-meta-theories. Although there are possibilities of complementary advances between psychological mechanisms and biologically adaptive fit explanations, we need better formal models and adaptive payoffs for a better integration (Smith, Mulder & Hill, 128-134).

We, along with many others, believe that a cognitive process and its manifested behaviour is a complex integration of genetics, developmental biology, extended social necessities, current environmental conditions, individual development and heuristics, rules and biases. A dynamic developmental approach is needed to place the evolutionary ideas in behavioural or social sciences in an unflawed manner. Two decades back, Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow (4-10) called for a conceptual integration of cognitive psychology with evolutionary psychology.

More than a cross-talk, we need a single integrated approach to cognition which is based on mechanisms informed in biology and anthropology that would result in 'Cognitive Evolutionary Psychology'. Some have called the Evolutionary Psychology Programme as 'Evolutionary Cognitive Psychology'. Place holders of words are important in defining the domain and scope of academics.

'Evolutionary Cognitive psychology' subsumes cognitive psychology under the umbrella of evolutionary approaches but that would constrain and bias the science of the mind. So, we keep 'Cognitive' first and then juxtapose it with a specific framework or meta-theory (in this case 'Evolutionary'). A large interdisciplinary research programme is needed to accommodate a truly multi-dimensional approach to cognition which is based on ideas spread across disciplines. Cognitive Science is perhaps an apt global research programme (not just a field) that is capable to house such an activity.

NOTES

1. Mark, Schaller, Lucian G. Conway III., and Michelle K. Peavy. "Evolutionary processes". *The Sage Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination.* Eds. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, and V. M. Esses. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2010. pp. 81.
2. Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, and Jerome H. Barkow (1992). "Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration". *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.* Eds. Jerome H. Barkow, et al. NY: Oxford University Press, 1992. pp. 6.
3. Paul. E. Griffiths, "Evolutionary Psychology: History and Current Status". *Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia Vol. 1.* Eds. S. Sarkar and J. Pfeifer. NY: Routledge, 2006. 263–268. Print.
4. William von Hippel, Martie Haselton, and Joseph P. Forgas. "Evolutionary psychology and social thinking: History, issues, and prospects". *Evolutionary Psychology and Social Cognition.* Eds. J. P. Forgas, M. G. Haselton, and W. von Hippel. NY: Psychology Press, 2007. Print.
5. Herbert. A. Simon, "Rational choice and the structure of the environment". *Psychological Review* 63, 1956: 129-130.
6. Stephen Downes, "Evolutionary Psychology". *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.* Feb 8, 2008. Web. Jan 2, 2012.
7. Jonathan Haidt, "The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment". *Psychological Review* 108 (2001): 814-834.
8. Keith E. Stanovich and Richard F. West, "Evolutionary versus instrumental goals: How evolutionary psychology misconceives human rationality". *Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking.* Ed. D.E.Over, Hove, UK.: Psychology Press, 2003. 171-230. Print.
9. David J. Buller, "Evolutionary Psychology". n.d. Web. Jan 9, 2012. <http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/ep.htm>

10. Robert Kurzban. "Grand Challenges of Evolutionary Psychology". *Frontiers in Psychology* 1 (2010): n. pag. Web. 7 Jan. 2012.

REFERENCES

Barrett, Clark H. and Kurzban, Robert. "Modularity in Cognition: Framing the debate". *Psychological Review* 113.3 (2006): 628-647.

Buller, David J. and Hardcastle, Valerie G. "Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity". *Brain and Mind* 1 (2000):307-325.

Buss, David. et al. "Adaptations, Exaptions, and Spandrels". *American Psychologist* 53.5 (1998): 533-548.

Cosmides, Leda, John Tooby, and Jerome H. Barkow (1992). "Evolutionary Psychology and Conceptual Integration". *The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture.* Eds. Jerome H. Barkow, et al. NY: Oxford University Press, 1992. 3-15. Print.

Confer, Jaime C. et al. "Evolutionary Psychology: Controversies, Questions, Prospects, and Limitations". *American Psychologist* 65.2 (2010): 110-126.

Caporael, Linnda R. "Evolutionary Psychology: Toward a Unifying and a Hybrid Science". *Annual Review of Psychology* 52 (2001): 607-28.

Darwin, Charles. *On the Origin of the Species by Means of Natural Selection.* London: John Murray, 1859.

Darwin, Charles. *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.* London: John Murray, 1871.

David M. Buss. "The Great Struggles of Life: Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Psychology". *American Psychologist* 64. 2 (2009): 140-146.

Dawkins, Richard.. *The Selfish Gene (30th Anniversary edition).* NY: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Flanagan, Owen. *Dreaming Souls: Sleep, Dreams, and the Evolution of the Conscious Mind.* NY: Oxford University, 2000..

Haidt, Jonathan and Joseph, Craig. "Intuitive ethics: how innately prepared intuitions generate culturally variable virtues". Daedalus (Fall 2004): 55-66.

Kahneman, Daniel. (2002). "Maps of bounded rationality : A perspective on intuitive judgement and choice. A Nobel prize lecture". Nobel Prize Website. Dec 8, 2002. Web. Dec 10, 2008. http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-lecture.html

Kenrick, Douglas T. et al. "Deep Rationality: The evolutionary economics of decision making". *Social Cognition* 27 (2009): 764-785.

Lickliter, Robert and Honeycutt, Hunter. "Developmental dynamics:

Towards a biologically plausible evolutionary psychology". *Psychological Bulletin* 129.6 (2003): 819–835.

Schaller, Mark, Lucian G. Conway III., and Michelle K. Peavy. "Evolutionary processes". *The Sage Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination.* Eds. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, and V. M. Esses. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage, 2010. 81-96. Print.

Smith, Eric A. "Endless forms: human behavioural diversity and evolved universals". *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of Biological Sciences* 366.1563 (2011): 325-332.

Smith, Eric A., Monique Borgerhoff Mulder and Kim Hill. "Controversies in the evolutionary social sciences: a guide for the perplexed". *Trends in Ecology and Evolution* 16.3 (2001): 128-135.

Blackmore, Susan. *The Meme Machine.* NY: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Tooby, John and Cosmides, Leda. "Conceptual foundations of evolutionary psychology". *The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology.* Ed. David M. Buss. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2005. 5–67. Print.

William von Hippel, Martie Haselton, and Joseph P. Forgas. "Evolutionary psychology and social thinking: History, issues, and prospects". *Evolutionary psychology and social cognition.* Ed. J. P. Forgas, M. G. Haselton, & W. von Hippel. New York: Psychology Press, 2007.

BOOK REVIEW

K Sripad Bhat

Literature and Globalization A Reader
Edited by Liam Connell and Nicky Marsh
Routledge, 2011 /First Edition/ 391 pages

Undoubtedly, globalization is the *mantra* of thinkers and academicians alike in the twenty-first century. Globalization, as we know, refers to series of socio-economic changes happening during and after 1980s and 1990s characterized by deregulated expansion of capital, transnationalization of production and rapid multinationalization of corporate structure. The process of globalization has been accompanied by denationalization and deterrtorialization. The impact of globalization is such that it has enveloped all walks of human life problematizing all our cherished beliefs and assumptions. The entire institution of literature for instance has been compelled to confront the challenges thrown up by the might of globalization. If globalization comes, can literature be far behind?

Of course not. That is the *raison d'être* of the recently published book titled ***Literature and Globalization : A Reader*** edited by Liam Connell and Nicky Marsh. This book contains a collection of thirty-one lively essays which foreground all issues pertaining to literature *vis-à-vis* globalization.

The editors in the Introduction make their objective of editing this book very clear : "............ to introduce the student of literature to a selection of theoretical readings", to review as to how "literary studies have sought to accommodate, critique and engage with these perspectives " and also to offer a reading of "literary and cultural texts".

The first segment titled *Theorizing Globalization* contains ten essays which historicize the moment of globalization from diverse theoretical /ideological perspectives. The essay by Anthony Giddens titled *The Globalizing of Modernity* looks at globalization as part of the Enlightenment modernist project moving through the trajectory of capitalistic economic mechanism. For Roland Robertson on the other hand, globalization happens when the universal reaches the particular or when the local meets the global which he wittily describes as 'glocal'.

If the universalizing impulse has been welcomed by a few , a political philosopher like John Gray brands it as a "failed remnant of Utopian Enlightenment". Arjun Appadurai however, endorses the process of globalization because of its ability to contest the idea of nation-state eventually replacing it with "imagined worlds" designated by the term "ethnoscope." Ethnoscope, a term coined by Appadurai refers to "the landscape of persons who constitute shifting world in which we live: tourists, immigrants, refugees, exiles guest-workers and other moving groups..." Perhaps, being a diasporic [rootless?] intellectual himself, Appadurai embraces globalization for its ability to create and legitimize multiple spaces of existence in spite of their contested and problematic moorings .

The second section of the book titled *Literature in the Discipline* contains six essays which come to grips with multiple critical discourses like Feminism, Marxism, New Historicism, Post structuralism and so on. This segment contains an amazing essay by Jacques Derrida titled *Globalization, Peace and Cosmopolitanism.* Derrida is suspicious of the entire project of globalization because he believes that it is driven by America-centric neo-liberal ideology. Therefore, to explicate the hegemonic reach of globalization, Derrida coins the French term "mondialization". Mondialization , he argues, is characterized by "techno-science" which refers to a process of domination of computerization, internet etc. in addition to "the circulation of persons, commodities, modes of production and socio-political models ...." Derrida aggressively postulates that the "euphoric image of globalization as homogenizing opening must be challenged seriously and with unfailing vigilance" because the homogenizing impulse of globalization "often hides old and new inequalities and hegemonies". This essay of Derrida is remarkable for its polemical urgency in that it brilliantly equates globalization with Anglo-American hegemonization.

Conjectures on World Literature by Franco Moretti brings to the forefront the concept of world literature in the era of globalization. Even though the notion of World Literature is centuries old, Moretti reinvents it as a paradigm shift from the hegemonic western European narratives towards Afro-Asian narratives. He argues that it is absolutely necessary to look beyond the dominant western European narratives and pay attention to what Margaret Cohen calls the "great unread": the multitude of writings condemned to exist on the fringe of west European narratives preceding globalization.

Simon Gikandi in his essay *Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality* recognizes the "rhetoric of newness" surrounding the discourse of globalization which according to him is "perpetually caught between two competing narratives, one of celebration, the other of crisis". He posits that fictional narratives produced in the globalized world tend to transcend spacio-temporal specificities challenging the whole notion of historicity itself. For instance, a literary text like Rushdie's ***Satanic Verses*** transgresses national boundaries because its frame of reference is no longer 'nation-state' but "world system as a whole".

The third and last segment titled *Literary Readings* contains fifteen essays which examine the interface between literature and globalization in terms of seminal issues like Environmentalism, Money and Markets, Technology and Cyber Cultures, Migration and Labour and Worldliness and Cosmopolitanism. These areas are indeed reflective of some of the major preoccupations of literary critics who have endeavoured consistently in grappling with the dynamics of globalization. It must be noted that the emergence of ecocriticism in the last decade of twentieth century is coterminous with globalization. A few essays dealing with the sub-theme of technology and cyber culture historicize the transition from "Gutenberg Galaxy" to Internet Galaxy". The other essays in this segment make a re-reading of a few non-canonical narratives through the spectrum of race, class and gender equations heightened by the process of globalization. The anti-globalization thrust of a few narratives coming from non-metropolitan locations is reiterated in many of the essays figuring in this segment. They also highlight the literary representation of diverse anti-globalization voices as well as peace movements.

On the whole, this book is extremely useful for anyone who is interested in the contemporary issues, trends and institutions problematized by the juggernaut of globalization. This book not only maps the broad and complex contours of globalization, but also postulates radical strategies in coming to grips with the varieties of textual narratives . Even though a few essays in this collection seem vague and nebulous due to their inward-looking and monologic style, for the most part the book is cogent and intellectually stimulating, complemented by a wealth of useful references. This book, I believe, is a seminal addition to globalization studies.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

Tuktuk Ghosh

The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity—Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China:

by Tu Weiming (Centre for Studies in Civilizations, New Delhi, 2010)

China fascinates and intrigues the world today and there is an inevitability of its ascendancy to the top slot in global power. It is not only the economic miracle of the last thirty years plus that fuels this fascination. It is also the wonder with which the 'China—watchers' try and make sense of the un-mooring of China's rich cultural ethos in its almost unipointed obsession with growth as represented in concrete terms of GDP, exports, and overseas influence. The link with the past appears to have been largely sundered and in its place there is an essentially 'political' culture, thrown up through cataclysmic, violent stages spanning almost four decades. This does not prima facie bear a close resemblance to what would objectively be termed its civilisational heritage.

On this canvas, Tu Weiming's *The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China* enhances understanding and also points the direction where this enhanced understanding will lead. The term 'concrete humanity' is borrowed from the eminent philosopher Hans Linka. Being authored by a highly distinguished scholar, a professed third generation of Confucian revivalists, with roots in China and experience of the very best of global academic portals, its influence is bound to be profound.

The collection of essays has been presented in three Parts. Part I provides an insight on the influential discourses he has been instrumental in developing, the implications of the rise of East Asia, the significance of Confucian cultural area in the modernising process, the presence of traditions in modernity and reflections on Enlightenment mentality of the Modern West, and multiple modernities. Part II gives a panoramic view of the unfolding of the Confucian tradition from the historical, philosophical and religious perspectives. The interpretation is based on personal knowledge, critical analysis, as well as experiential understanding. Part III studies the creative transformation of Confucian humanism with a view towards the future. It posits Confucianism as a major form of spiritual humanism which will flourish and mould thinking on human identity in the twenty-first century. It will seek integration of the mind and body, fruitful interaction between the self and community, sustainable relationship between human species and nature and promote mutual responsiveness between the human heart and the "Way of Heaven".

Confucianism, as we know, is a shared value-system of East Asia. It has essentially evolved in three stages in China—from the sixth century B.C. to the Han Dynasty when it epitomized the mainstream of Chinese spiritual civilization, to the eleventh century, when it extended beyond China to East Asia and retained its hold for over 800 years, till its perceptible decline in the nineteenth century.

What imparts a very unique significance to the book is its objective of moving off the academic shelf and seeding a change that is waiting to happen in Chinese society. The public debate that it will enrich will go a long way in stretching horizons of possibilities and bolstering the endeavour to move on to new realms, while retaining the intrinsic links with an indescribably rich traditional tapestry.

The comparison with India, which is often bracketed with China, is indeed appropriate. Prof. Tu Weiming's genuine appreciation of the Indian approach to its cultural heritage and its organic growth with modernity, is both striking and highly commendable. He boldly asserts, "I am fully convinced that it would be immensely beneficial for China to take India as a reference society" and that the congruence and 'contrasts' provide occasions for edifying conversations. Further, Indian culture and its vibrancy can be taken as a source of inspiration. Two ancient civilizations, poised to make giant leaps and alter the global power matrix, do call for a more probing scrutiny of scholars. Interestingly, both cultures were historically non proselytizing at their core. This parallel has often been ignored. In China, the past and traditions have been to a degree, subterrainialized today and this is what Tu Weiming hopes to alter in an innovative manner, which will have tremendous resonance.

The International Conference on Harmony at Beijing in November, 2010, was the perfect platform for moving forward a well-informed dialogue which will travel far beyond the obsessive 'clash of civilizations' which takes up so much of politico-academic efforts, without seeming to lead anywhere. The inherent lack of global synthesis of cultural links, on date, is often a function of the hidden political agenda with which such attempted 'veering—togethers' are often loaded. We may look askance at how segments of educated, affluent youth, the world over, are hooked by the extreme fringe of Islam, Jihad and ideals of attaining martyrdom. Whatever may be reasons—and there are many complex ones—the harsh reality remains that what it symbolizes has proved to be a draw of such magnitude that it has changed the course of human history. Other organized religions too, have their fanatic elements with equally lethal potential for disruption. The Beijing Conference had at its central focus a better world in view, anchored in key factors of responsibility and commitment. There is much more that the global civilizational ethos, in its totality, offers and it is here that windows for philosophies and world views represented by Confucianism open up, for rolling out the swathes of harmonizing understanding which concretize bridges rather than leave the goal 'hanging' tantalizingly elusive.

Confucianism, as Prof. Tu Weiming states, has to be taken up in its twenty-first century 'avatar', shredded of what is now regarded as its backward looking and insular attributes, inter-alia, by re-looking at its Classics, 'Five Ethics', 'Constant virtues' of spot-lighting on benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge and sincerity. The 'new' Confucianism can rediscover not only its own original roots but its East Asian span and take wing towards wider, new horizons. The serious question to be raised now is, is it in its own right ready to enter the ring, in a manner of speaking? And if so, what will be its unique pull? Where does the new Confucianism fit in? It was indeed recognized in the 1990s as an important public discourse in China, not merely as an antidote to the overweening grasp of a particular political and economic expression, but supporting a re-awakening of multiple, vibrant weaves to lend a high-resolution to the nuanced picture of the present human identity. An underlying unity of perception of its main constituents, may evolve. It may be primarily a 'cultural' initiative, even though geo-politics could conceivably be inextricably linked to it, it should clearly not to be taken as a means for subtle political expansion. The world today is not unipolar and broad strokes of cultural divides do stand prominently out in the frame. Global shores need to be awash with deeper appreciation and respect for differences. It is not homogeneity or uniformity that is the objective but the rivetting mosaic of pluralism and inclusiveness. This is what 'soft power' should be about.

All resources of spiritual resurgence and regeneration must come together for the creative, all encompassing transformation that every right thinking global citizen yearns for, but is still not hopeful of seeing it materialize. It is only pragmatic to be wary, but purposeful strides have to be taken. They can no longer be tentative, hesitant or faltering. New age, reinterpreted cultural ethnic identities and roots have become attractive contemporary phenomena and need to be accepted as such. Dialogue amidst diversity, with peace as the overarching non-negotiable tenet, is what Tu Weiming points us towards. His exemplary exposition of neo-Confucianism in the Chinese and East Asian context, and honest analysis, at times, searing, of the Maoist period of Chinese history, is a model for scholars to study the world over in their specific contexts. Such studies may unravel and flag lesser known, but tremendously significant, philosophical and cultural strands which may be gainfully reinvoked and drawn into the mega-challenge, of providing a 'permanent' status to stability, equity, justice and well being to humanity and the bounteous environment that has sustained it so far.

Tu Weiming's comprehensive, well researched and original contributions will remain etched in the annals of scholastic contribution for their profound insights which will without doubt be a propellant to significant positive change in the long term. They expectedly will lead to a successful innings for Neo-Confucianism and to the unfolding of a new dimension of the marvel of Chinese-ness that the world now looks up to with a considerable degree of admiration.

Sandhān, Vol. IX, No. 2, July–December 2009

PHISPC and CONSSAVY (EXTENDED PHISPC PROJECT) Publications

Under the PHISPC series, publication of major volumes and monographs has been undertaken. The following are the Volumes in this series.

CONCEPTUAL VOLUMES

* Part 1 *Science, Philosophy and Culture: Multi-disciplinary Explorations*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (eds.)
* Part 2 *Science, Philosophy and Culture: Multi-disciplinary Explorations*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (eds.)

VOLUME I THE DAWN AND DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN CIVILIZATION

* Part 1 *The Dawn of Indian Civilization (up to c. 600 B.C.)*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
* Part 2 *Life, Thought and Culture in India (from c. 600 B.C. to c. A.D. 300)*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
* Part 3 *India's Interaction with Southeast Asia*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
* Part 4 *A Golden Chain of Civilizations: Indic, Iranic, Semitic and Hellenic (up to c. 600 B.C.)*, G.C. Pande (ed.)
* Part 5 *A Golden Chain of Civilizations: Indic, Iranic, Semitic and Hellenic (from c. 600 B.C. to c. A.D. 600)*, in two sections, G.C. Pande (ed.)
➢Part 6 *Purāṇas, History and Itihāsa*, Vidya Niwas Misra & N.S.S. Raman (eds.)

---

* Already published
➢In the process of publication
• Under Plan

Volume II Life, Thought and Culture in India (a.d. 300-1100)

* Part 1	*Life, Thought and Culture in India* (a.d. 300–1000), K. Satchidananda Murty (ed.)
* Part 2	*Advaita Vedānta*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)
* Part 3	*Theistic Vedānta*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)
* Part 4	*Origin and Development of the Vaiśeṣika System*, Anantalal Thakur
* Part 5	*A Social History of Early India*, B.D. Chattopadhyaya (ed.)
* Part 6	*Pūrvamīmāṁsā from an Interdisciplinary Point of View*, K.T. Pandurangi (ed.)

Volume III Development of Philosophy, Science and Technology in India and Neighbouring Civilizations

* Part 1	*History of Indian Science, Technology and Culture* (a.d. *1000–1800)*, A. Rahman (ed.)
* Part 2	*India's Interaction with China, Central and West Asia*, A. Rahman (ed.)
* Part 3	*Development of Nyāya Philosophy and its Social Context*, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya (ed.)
* Part 4	*Philosophical Concepts Relevant to Science in Indian Tradition*, Pranab Kumar Sen (ed.)
* Part 5	*Philosophical Concepts Relevent to Science in Indian Tradition*, Pranab Kumar Sen (ed.)
* Part 6	*India and China: Twenty Centuries of Civilizational Interaction and Vibrations*, Tan Chung & Geng Yinzeng
* Part 7	*The Trading World of the Indian Ocean*, a.d. *1500 – 1800*, Om Prakash (ed.)

Volume III Fundamental Indian Ideas of Physics, Chemistry, Life Sciences and Medicine

* Part 1	*Chemistry and Chemical Techniques in India*, B.V. Subbarayappa (ed.)
* Part 2	*Medicine and Life Sciences in India*, B.V. Subbarayappa (ed.)

---

* Already published

➢In the process of publication

• Under Plan

* Part 3 *Indian Perspectives on the Physical World*, B.V. Subbarayappa
* Part 4 *The Tradition of Astronomy in India: Jyotiḥśāstra*, B.V. Subbarayappa

VOLUME V AGRICULTURE IN INDIA

* Part 1 *A History of Agriculture in India (upto c. 1200 AD)*, Lallanji Gopal & V.C. Srivastava (eds.)
➢Part 2 *A History of Agriculture in India (AD 1200 onwards)*, Lallanji Gopal & V.C. Srivastava (eds.)

VOLUME VI CULTURE, LANGUAGE, LITERATURE AND ARTS

* Part 1 *Aesthetic Theories and Forms in Indian Tradition*, Kapila Vatsyayan & D.P. Chattopadhyaya (eds.)
➢Part 2 *Architecture in India*, M.A. Dhaky (ed.)
* Part 3 *Indian Art: Forms, Concerns and Development in Historical Perspective*, B.N. Goswamy (ed.)
* Part 4 *Language, Grammar and Linguistics in Indian Tradition*, V.N. Jha (ed.)
* Part 5 *The Life-World of Tamils: Past and Present-I*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)
* Part 6 *The Life-World of Tamils: Past and Present-II*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)
* Part 7 *Perspectives on Orissa Cultural-Intellectual Contributions*, P.K. Mohapatra & R.C. Pradhan (eds.)
• Parts 8-10 Other Regional Languages and Literatures

VOLUME VII THE RISE OF NEW POLITY AND LIFE IN VILLAGES AND TOWNS

* Part 1 *The State and Society in Medieval India*, J.S. Grewal (ed.)
* Part 2 *Religious Movements and Institutions in Medieval India*, J.S. Grewal (ed.)
➢Part 3 *Hinduism–I*, N.S.S. Raman (ed.)
➢Part 4 *Hinduism–II*, N.S.S. Raman (ed.)
* Part 5 *Development of Islamic Religion and Philosophy in India*, M. Rafique (ed.)

---

* Already published
➢In the process of publication
• Under Plan

* Part 6	*Indian Christianity,* A.V. Afonso (ed.)
* Part 7	*Zoroastrianism,* Murzban Jal (ed.)
* Part 8	*Tribal Religions,* S. Shyamkishore Singh (ed.)
➢Part 9-11	*Other Religious Systems of India,* G.C. Pande and others (eds.)

VOLUME VIII ECONOMIC HISTORY OF INDIA

* Part 1	*Economic History of India from Thirteenth to Seventeenth Century,* Irfan Habib (ed.)
* Part 2	*Peasant History of Late Pre-Colonial and Colonial India,* B.B. Chaudhuri
* Part 3	*Economic History of India from Eighteenth to Twentieth Century,* B.B. Chaudhuri (ed.)

VOLUME IX COLONIAL PERIOD

* Part 1	*Medicine in India: Modern Period,* O.P. Jaggi
* Part 2	*Women in Ancient and Medieval India,* Bhuvan Chandel (ed.)
* Part 3	*Women of India: Colonial and Post-Colonial Periods,* Bharati Ray (ed.)

VOLUME X TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE

* Part 1	*Development of Indian Philosophy from Eighteenth Century Onwards,* Daya Krishna
➢Part 2	*Colonial Development, Education and Social Awareness up to 2000,* S. Gopal, Ravinder Kumar & S. Bhattacharya (eds.)
* Part 3	*Historical Perspectives of Warfare in India: Some Morale and Material Determinants,* S.N. Prasad (ed.)
* Part 4	*Cultural Foundations of Mathematics: The Nature of Mathematical Proof and the Transmission of the Calculus from India to Europe in the 16th c. C.E.,* C.K. Raju
* Part 5	*Development of Modern Indian Thought and the Social Sciences,* S. Bhattacharya (ed.)
* Part 6	*Aspects of India's International Relations 1700 to 2000: South Asia and the World,* Jayanta Kumar Ray (ed.)

---

* Already published
➢In the process of publication
• Under Plan

- * Part 7 *Political Ideas in Modern India: Thematic Explorations*, V.R. Mehta & Thomas Pantham (eds.)
- * Part 8 *Interpreting the Indian Diaspora: Lessons from History and Contemporary Politics*, Jayanta Kumar Ray (ed.)

VOLUME XI CONSCIOUSNESS, SCIENCE, SOCIETY, VALUE AND YOGA (CONSSAVY)

- * Part 1 *Philosophical Consciousness and Scientific Knowledge: Conceptual Linkages and Civilizational Background*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (ed.)
- * Part 2 *Self, Society and Science: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya (ed.)
- * Part 3 *Consciousness, Indian Psychology and Yoga*, Kireet Joshi & Matthijs Cornelissen (eds.)
- * Part 4 *The Enworlded Subjectivity : Its Three Worlds and Beyond*, R. Balasubramanian (ed.)

VOLUME XII LEVELS OF REALITY (CONSSAVY)

- * Part 1 *A Conceptual-Analytic Study of Indian Philosophy of Morals*, Rajendra Prasad
- * Part 2 *A Historical-Developmental Study of Indian Philosopy of Morals*, Rajendra Prasad (ed.)
- * Part 3 *Vedic Vision of Consciousness and Reality*, S.P. Singh
- ➢Part 4 *Modern Atomism in Europe and India*, J. Pasupathy (ed.)
- * Part 5 *Materialism and Immaterialism in India and the West: Varying Vistas*, Partha Ghose (ed.)
- * Part 6 *Life and Organicism*, N. S. Rangaswamy (ed.)

VOLUME XIII THEORIES OF NATURAL AND LIFE SCIENCES (CONSSAVY)

- * Part 1 *India in the World of Physics: Then and Now*, A.N. Mitra (ed.)
- * Part 2 *From Physiology and Chemistry to Biochemistry*, D.P. Burma & Maharani Chakravorty (eds.)
- ➢Part 3 *Psychology and Psychoanalysis*, Girishwar Mishra (ed.)

---

* Already published
➢In the process of publication
• Under Plan

➢Part 4	*Cognitive Sciences: Brain, Psychology and Computer*, Shobini L. Rao (ed.)
➢Part 5	*Foundations of Sciences*, B.V. Sreekantan (ed.)
* Part 6	*History of Science and Philosophy of Science Pradip*, Kumar Sengupta (ed.)
• Part 7	*History of Science and Philosophy of Science*, Pradip Kumar Sengupta (ed.)
* Part 8	*Science in India*, Jayant Vishnu Narlikar (ed.)

VOLUME XIV NATURAL AND CULTURAL SCIENCES (CONSSAVY)

* Part 1	*Nature and Culture*, Roddam Narasimha (ed.)
* Part 2	*Social Sciences: Communication, Anthropology and Sociology*, Yogendra Singh (ed.)
* Part 3	*Markets and Morals: Ethical Issues in Economics*, Ashok Guha (ed.)
* Part 4	*Different Types of History*, Bharati Ray (ed.)
➢Part 5	*History of India's Polity, Governance and Constitutional Culture*, Subhash C. Kashyap (ed.)

VOLUME XV SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY (CONSSAVY)

* Part 1	*Science, Technology, Imperialism and War*, Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta (ed.)
* Part 2	*Science and the Public*, Ashok Jain (ed.)
* Part 3	*Science, Literature and Aesthetics*, Amiya Dev (ed.)
* Part 4	*Science and Modern India: An Institutional History c. 1784-1947*, Uma Das Gupta (ed.)
* Part 5	*Old Wisdom and New Horizon*, Manoj Kumar Pal

VOLUME XVI YOGA (CONSSAVY)

* Part 1	*Cognitive Anomalies, Consciousness and Yoga*, K. Ramakrishna Rao
* Part 2	*History of Yoga*, S.P. Singh (ed.)
* Part 3	*Streams of Yogic and Mystic Experience*, Manoj Das (ed.)

---

* Already published

➢In the process of publication

• Under Plan

➢Part 4 *Synthesis of Yoga*, Kireet Joshi (ed.)

MONOGRAPHS

* 1 *Science, Philosophy and Culture in Historical Perspective*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (eds.)
* 2 *Some Aspects of India's Philosophical & Scientific Heritage*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (eds.)
* 3 *Mathematics, Astronomy and Biology in Indian Tradition: Some Conceptual Preliminaries*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (eds.)
* 4 *Language, Logic and Science in India: Some Conceptual and Historical Perspectives*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya & Ravinder Kumar (eds.)
* 5 *Primal Spirituality of the Vedas: Its Renewal and Renaissance*, R. Balasubramanian
* 6 *Interdisciplinary Studies in Science, Technology, Philosophy and Culture*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya
* 7 *Ancient Yoga and Modern Science*, T.R. Anantharaman
* 8 *Prolegomena to Any Future Historiography of Cultures & Civilizations*, Daya Krishna
* 9 *Science and Spirituality: A Quantum Integration*, Amit Goswami & Maggie Goswami
* 10 *On Rational Historiography*, V. Shekhawat
* 11 *Kauṭilya Arthaśāstra Revisited*, Surendra Nath Mittal
* 12 *Ways of Understanding the Human Past*, D.P. Chattopadhyaya
* 13 *The Architecture of Knowledge*, Subhash Kak
* 14 *Karnataka Music As Aesthetic Form*, R. Sathyanarayana
* 15 *Indian Philosophy and Philosophy of Science*, Sundar Sarukkai
* 16 *Towards a Theory of Structural and Transcendental Illusions*, Daya Krishna

---

* Already published
➢In the process of publication
• Under Plan

Contributors

1. **KOSHY THARAKAN**, Associate Professor, IIT, Gandinagar, Ahmedabad.
2. **CHHANDA GUPTA**, Professor of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.
3. **ISHWAR SINGH**, Assistant Director, Centre for Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, Goa University, Goa.
4. **MURZBAN JAL**, Professor, Indian Institute of Education Pune.
5. **T.V. MADHU**, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Calicut University, Calicut.
6. **A. V. AFONSO**, Professor, Department of Philosophy, Goa University.
7. **BHAGAT OINAM**, Director, North East India Studies Programme Associate Professor, Centre for Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
8. **THEOPHILA D. DE SOUZA**, Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Goa University, Goa.
9. **SREEJITH. K.K.**, Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad, (Central), Hyderabad.
10. **MANIDIPA SEN**, Associate Professor, Centre for Philosophy, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
11. **K. SRINIVAS**, Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, Pondicherry University, Puducherry.
12. **JAISON A. MANJALY**, Asst. Professor, IIT, Gandinagar, Ahmedabad

13. **SUMITAVA MUKHERJEE**, Research Scholar, Cognitive Science Programme, IIT, Gandinagar, Ahmedabad
14. **K. SRIPAD BHAT**, Professor and Head, Department of English, Goa University, Goa.
15. **TUKTUK KUMAR** (née GHOSH), Additional Chief Secretary, Science & Technology and Biotechnology Department in the Government of West Bengal, Kolkata.

Notes for Contributors

Submission of articles and related correspondence should be addressed to:

The Editor
Sandhān
DD-24, (Near Nehru Enclave)
Kalkaji
New Delhi – 110 019.

Tel. (011) 2622 7832, 2622 7836
Tele-fax: (011) 2622 7831
E-mail: csc@del2.vsnl.net.in

Contributions will be acknowledged as received.

Articles: Original manuscripts on all aspects related to interdisciplinary studies as well as to civilizational issues will be considered. Decision of the Editor will be final. In case of acceptance of the article, the same will be intimated to the author. Authors will receive a copy of the journal of the particular issue along with ten off-prints.

Book reviews: Books for review should be sent to the office of the CSC as mentioned above. Books not reviewed are not returnable.

Submission format: Manuscripts should be typed in one and half space in A4 size paper, and will not be returned. Providing the material through floppy diskette will be appreciated. Contributions may be sent through e-mail provided there are no charts/diacritical marks/figures.

Style sheet: The sequence of the notes and references will be: author's name (beginning with his/her initials), title of the book, name of the series (where necessary), place of publication, name of the publisher, year of publication.